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This study is to explain why Taiwan’s elites delegate the independent authority of 
financial and monetary management to central bankers which resulted in survival of the 
Asian crisis, while Korean political leadership did not do so and the economy faltered in 
the crisis? My arguments are 1) if politicians choose capital-intensive industry and/or 
organized labor as their major coalition partners, they will not allow central bankers to 
have an independent authority; 2) if politicians choose other groups as their coalition 
partners (i.e., commercial banks, agriculture, and/or small-medium sized enterprises), 
they will be more likely to provide central bankers with independent authority. In 
addition to the two cases studies, I explore three Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand). By employing statistical analyses to test the generalizability of 
my arguments in the context of developing countries, I confirm the hypotheses. 
Implications of my study include 1) the state needs to include subordinate social groups 
to counterbalance big bourgeoisie, especially in the globalization era; and 2) merely 
institutional or economic reform does not guarantee an independent central banking 
system; rather it is necessary to include heterogeneous social groups into the growth 
coalition to support effective central banking systems from below.  
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Chapter 1: The Politics of Central Bank Independence 
In July 1997, neighboring Asian countries experienced a turbulent wave of 
financial crisis triggered by a massive run on the Thai baht. Within a year, about 150 
financial institutions were shut down, merged, or sometimes nationalized by the hard-hit 
governments’ urgent decrees (Far Eastern Economic Review April 4, 1998: 81). The 
crisis caused bankruptcies as well as other socioeconomic turmoil such as skyrocketing 
unemployment rates, nose-diving GDP growth rates, economic restructuring forced by 
IMF’s emergency loans, a severe cut of social welfare expenditures, and psychological 
depression in affected countries’ citizens. According to Robert Wade, the Asian crisis 
was the regional equivalent of “the Great Depression of the 1930s in terms of the scale of 
the falls in output and consumption and the increase in poverty and insecurity. Countries 
have been pushed back down the hierarchy of world income to where they were 10 years 
ago and more in terms of per capita income measured at current exchange rates” (1998: 
1-2). 
 Although the effects of the sweeping Asian crisis affected most of all the 
countries in Asia, the effects varied. For example, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia were badly hit and collapsed, while the Taiwan and Singapore economies 
survived the crisis. Some in-between cases included Hong Kong, Vietnam, Philippines, 
Burma, and China, which were shaken but did not fall.   
Interestingly enough, two leading Asian NICs – Korea and Taiwan – were a stark 
contrast. Why did Korea stumble while Taiwan managed to survive? They share many 
similarities, such as Confucian cultural traits, a common historical experience of Japanese 
colonialism, efficient bureaucrats, strong and autonomous states, divided nation-states, 
propinquity of communist threat, export-oriented open economies, concurrent stages of 
economic development and democratic transition, successful land reforms, and U.S. 
pressure and aid since World War II. Furthermore, the countries have been praised for 
their outstanding economic performance, dubbed the Asian “economic miracle” in 
academic circles. For example, while other upper and lower middle income countries’ 
GNP per capita increased 5.55 times and 5.46 respectively from 1965 to 1994, the 
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indicators for Taiwan and Korea are 53.48 and 67.84 in the same period (World Bank 
2003).  
In fact, the “Asian flu” is not an exception if one sees the banking crises in a 
longer historical perspective. The high frequency of financial crises may characterize the 
globalization of the international economy since the 1980s. An IMF study revealed that 
during the period spanning 1980 through 1996, 133 of the IMF’s 181 member countries 
experienced significant banking sector problems (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 1996).  
Another study shows that the past two decades have seen 90 serious banking crises, most 
of them followed by deep recessions. More than 20 of these crises produced direct losses 
to the developing countries exceeding, on average, 10 percent of their gross domestic 
products. In half of these cases, including several Asian countries, losses exceed 25 
percent of the countries’ GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996). 
 Financial liberalization during the past decades, by giving banks and other 
financial intermediaries more freedom of action, has increased opportunities to pursue 
high-return but high-risk investment projects. “Bankers’ appetites for risk are likely to be 
far greater than what is socially desirable. Liberalization may increase financial fragility 
if prudential regulation and supervision are not effective at controlling bank behavior and 
at realigning incentives” (Demirguc and Detragiache 1998: 11).  
 Much of the political economy of financial crises relates to central banks’ 
authority, since central banks are responsible for the financial regime; they seek to 
control the money supply, protect financial stability, regulate and supervise domestic and 
even foreign financial intermediaries, guarantee the domestic and international payment 
system, and provide some range of financial services to the government.  
Yet, whether or not central bankers perform the role that they are expected to do 
depends on politicians’ willingness to provide central bankers with independent authority 
to control the whole financial system. Thus a critical issue during financial liberalization 
era is whether a government allows a central banking system to efficiently control the 
financial market to fend off financial malaise. In fact, Taiwan’s central bankers were 
allowed to be effective in regulating and supervising their financial system which helped 
the country survive the Asian crisis, while their Korean counterparts did not. So the 
question boils down to “why did Taiwan’s elites delegate the independent authority of 
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financial and monetary management to central bankers which resulted in survival of the 
Asian crisis, while Korean political leadership did not do so and as a result, the economy 
faltered in the crisis?” The dependent variable of my study is the different levels of 
central bankers’ independent regulatory authority in Taiwan and Korea. My examination 
of this problem begins with a review of the existing literature.  
 
I. Democratic Accountability and Policy Coordination: Anti-CBI Literature 
The literature provides two opposing views on the relationship between the 
government and the central bank. One view argues that a central bank has to be a 
governmental agent in general, accountable to a finance ministry who oversees its 
monetary and financial policies.  
The other view regards the central bank’s independence (CBI, hereafter) as a 
given to study various sources from which central bankers enjoy institutional 
independence from governments. Some scholars pay attention to the motives and 
incentives that politicians have to give CBI; others emphasize the relationship between 
central bankers and social actors to explain varying degrees of CBI. The former can be 
called a “government-sided theory” and the latter a “society-sided theory.” I will consider 
each view of the CBI, pointing out how they explain variations of the CBI and what 
shortcomings they exhibit with regard to my question. First, let me start with the anti-CBI 
literature. 
A problem that central bank critics point out is democratic accountability. Central 
bankers are powerful enough to determine winners and losers in an economy, yet they are 
shielded from democratic control by their own secret technocracies. Radical scholars 
such as Magdoff and Sweezy argue that the central bank acts like the executive 
committee of the capitalist class. According to them, although central bankers may often 
make monetary and financial decisions unfavorable to specific capitalists, they always 
function in the interests of the capitalist class as a whole (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987).  
In the same vein, Greider (1987: 11-12) argues that the U.S. central bank is 
rentier, making policy in the interests of the finance fraction of capital, and is a threat to 
democracy in the U.S. He criticizes central bankers as follows: 
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It (the Federal Reserve System) provided another mechanism of 
government, beyond the reach of the popular vote, one that managed the 
continuing conflicts of democratic capitalism, the natural tension between 
those two worlds, “democracy” and “capitalism.” … Indeed, it had the 
power to resist the random passions of popular will and even to discipline 
the society at large. The Federal Reserve System was the crucial anomaly 
at the very core of representative democracy, an uncomfortable 
contradiction with the civic mythology of self-government. Yet the 
American system accepted the inconsistency. 
 
Gerald Epstein, after studying European social democracy, is also critical of the 
expanded role of non-democratic central banks which damage what Przeworski once 
called the “class compromise”(Przeworksi 1985) between capitalists and labor. 
“Independent central banks can thwart a Keynesian coalition of labor and industry that 
supports expansionary policy; and they can veto expansionary policy that a labor-led 
social democratic government might support” (Epstein 1992: 13). 
 Another problem with CBI is that central banks often undermine monetary / fiscal 
policy coordination, since they speak for (financial) capitalists while democratic 
governments speak for collective desires of the voting population. Sargent commented on 
the coordination problem as follows (New York Times August 12, 1983): 
The Federal Reserve has resolved to stick to a policy that is feasible only 
if the budget is approximately balanced, while Congress and the Executive 
Branch together determine prospects for taxes and spending that are 
feasible only if the central bank eventually becomes passive and 
accommodative. With such mutually infeasible prospects, all that is 
certain is that one side or the other must eventually give in. Outside parties 
are thrust into the uncertain position of betting on which side in the game 
of chicken will eventually capitulate and on how and when. 
 
Likewise, naming the relationship between the government and central bankers “a 
car with two drivers,” Greider also criticized the relationship by saying that “while the 
Federal Reserve was confronting inflation with tight money and high interest rates, the 
Reagan government was embarking in the opposite direction. Ronald Reagan wanted to 
reawaken the industrial giant while Paul Volcker wanted to sedate it” (1987: 358).  
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The policy disagreement leads central bankers to their monetary overreaction to 
fiscal agency. “If the central bank anticipates a more expansionary fiscal policy than it 
believes desirable, it might implement tighter money policy than otherwise called for, in 
turn leading the fiscal authority to hold fast to its expansionary path” (Maxfield 1997: 
15). Monetarists and neoclassic economists argue for the CBI, but a central bank is an 
institution that leads to suboptimal outcomes for social welfare. 
 Anti-CBI studies raise some fundamental concerns about democratic 
accountability and policy coordination that most central bank studies ignore. But even 
though the Federal Reserve looks removed from democratic controls, it may be consistent 
with democratic theory for several reasons: it is based on authority delegated by the 
Congress; the basic goals of monetary policy are set legislatively; the leaders of the 
Federal Reserve are appointed by the President; and Congress retains ultimate control in 
case of dire emergency (Blinder 1996). Furthermore, the democratic delegation of the 
monetary and financial spheres from elected officials to a central bank is rationalized by 
the fact that the spheres need to be protected from political manipulation and electoral 
pressures of the self-interested private social groups.  
As for the fiscal/monetary policy coordination problem, institutional 
independence that central bankers enjoy does not always lead to policy conflicts between 
a government and a central bank. A central bank as ‘the bank of government’ has an 
inherently close relationships with government. Sometimes they cooperate with each 
other. Furthermore, a lack of coordination can stem not from central bankers but from the 
government. For example, the problem may originate from the ruling politicians’ desire 
to boost up the economy by showering cheap credits to their constituent so as to win an 
upcoming election. In this sense, “the central bank can be seen as the repository of reason 
against the short-term claim of passion” (Elster 1979: 89). If central bankers collude with 
government politicians to make “perfect” policy coordination, the collusion may lead to a 
disaster such as hyperinflation with budget deficits as often happens during war time. The 
CBI functions as a system of “check and balances.” 
The anti-CBI critics may overemphasize the seamy side of CBI. More 
importantly, they do not answer why some governments provide central bankers with the 
independent authority to manage the whole financial system while others don’t. This 
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dissertation is not about the legitimacy of the central bank itself in a capitalistic 
democracy; it is about the causes of varying degrees of CBI, taking for granted that the 
existence of a central bank in a country is a given. In fact, almost every country has a 
central bank or a substitute, no matter how independent it is. 
 
II. Government-Sided Explanations of Central Bank Independence 
 The ‘government-sided’ theories of CBI come from the notion that central banks 
have to gain “permission” from government politicians or finance ministries to start their 
own central banking businesses. The historical origin of the central bank shows that this 
is the case (Goodhardt, Capie, and Schhadt 1994). The Bank of England started from a 
special commercial bank which received charters from the English government allowing 
them monopolistic privileges to issue notes. In exchange, the special private bankers took 
the burden on their shoulder to mobilize financial resources for funding the English 
government’s budget deficits caused by war efforts. In fact, “Britain’s superior financial, 
economic, and military performance after 1689 rested in large part on the establishment 
of the Bank of England. The bank provided a commitment technology that improved the 
government’s ability to borrow, a need impelled by intense military competition” (Broz 
1998: 231). As in the case of the origins of the English central bank, government-sided 
explanations of central banks pay attention to motives and incentives that government 
politicians have when deciding how much CBI they want to allow to the central bankers.  
Given that the central bank provides a lot of benefits to the government, why do 
all politicians not support CBI? If one considers the standpoint of elected officials, it is 
not easy to provide central bankers with independent authority because: 1) politicians and 
their constituencies benefiting from previous “financial repression” 1 (McKinnon 1973; 
Shaw 1973) may resist financial deregulation and an independent central banking system 
over which they have less control; 2) an authoritative central bank in charge of monetary 
policy often undermines policy coordination with the fiscal ministry; and 3) they just do 
not want to relinquish their political power to determine “who gets what and how.” 
 
1 In a “repressed” financial system, the government maintains artificially lower interest rates. Because this 
induces an excess demand for credit, the government is drawn into the process of rationing financial 
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Thus the CBI literature focuses on policymakers’ preferences and interests under 
conditions of political competition: do politicians allow CBI because they want to do 
what their partisan preference dictates? because they want to win an upcoming election? 
because rightist politicians want to influence monetary and financial regimes after their 
opposition party wins an election? or because government elites need money to fund their 
budget deficits? 
 
Governments’ Partisan Affiliations and CBI 
Some political economists argue for an affinity between central bankers’ authority 
and the partisan affiliation of government. The preference of leftist governments has been 
for relatively low unemployment at the cost of high rates of inflation, whereas 
comparatively low inflation and high unemployment characterize political systems 
dominated by center and right-wing parties (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1991). Consequently, 
leftist governments are likely to prefer that central bankers be dependent on the 
government agencies in charge of spending and planning, to enhance economic growth 
and employment, while rightist governments tend to let central bankers assume 
independent monetary and financial responsibility to secure price and financial stability.  
 But partisan affiliation-based policy differentials are neither clear-cut nor 
consistent in the real world. John Goodman argues that the “ideological desire” of a party 
in government is not necessarily equal to the “capability” to implement its preferred 
policy. For example, German and French political parties often prefer what the partisan 
model expects. The ability of these parties to translate policy preferences into action, 
however, varies across the two countries. “In Germany, the alternation of party control – 
between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats – has exercised little effect 
on the course of monetary policy. In France, by contrast, a similar alternation of parties 
has produced a very substantial impact” (Goodman 1992: 213). In this sense, Cukierman 
claims that any administration, whether liberal/leftist or conservative, will raise the rate 
of monetary expansion when it expects real economic activity to be relatively low, which 
 
resources among competing uses. These preferential credit schemes constitute the central questions for 
politicians during industrialization. 
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suggests that monetary policy varies according to administrations rather than partisan 
affiliations (Cukierman 1992).  
Bernhard also shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
partisan ideology and CBI. Instead, he points out a counterintuitive argument that leftist 
parties will favor independent central banks. Leftist parties recognize that they have little 
inflation-fighting credibility with financial and capital markets, which contributes to 
higher risk premia and the possibility of capital flight. To demonstrate their commitment 
to responsible economic policies, leftist parties may establish an independent central 
bank. Rightist parties have more credibility in the markets and, consequently, less 
incentive to choose an independent central bank. This is why Thatcher’s government 
never moved to grant the Bank of England more independence, whereas the Labor Party 
decided to give more independent monetary and financial authority to the bank in 1997 in 
order to appeal to both markets and their more moderate constituencies (Bernhard 1998). 
 In my perspective, the partisan affiliation story is another version of social group 
theory, which suggests that leftist politicians work for organized workers while rightist 
politicians work for capitalist classes. Assuming that the Phillips curve (i.e., the tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment) dictates the market, the theory asserts that a 
rightist government prefers to favor its social base, capitalists, by stabilizing the price 
level and thus high favors a level of CBI, while a left-wing government wants to support 
the unionized workers by boosting economic transactions so as to lower unemployment 
rates and thus raises the level of CBI. Lurking behind the partisan affiliation theory are 
various social groups’ interests and preferences. 
 It should be noted that social groups’ preferences are not fixed and homogenous 
as the simplistic theory assumes. Industrialists and financiers, two major social bases of 
rightist government, may have different preferences toward the price stability since the 
former, as debtors, may not be as resistant to inflation as the latter as creditors. In 
addition, organized workers – supporters of leftist politicians – may sometimes have the 
same preferences and interests as industrialists – social bases of rightist government – by 
whom they are employed, since rank-and-filers’ material benefits often depend on the 
profitability of the industry that they are in. 
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Political Business Cycle and CBI 
 A group of political economists have focused on the impact of periodic elections 
on economic policy choices in democracies. They argue that a government, whether 
rightist or leftist, chooses economic policies to maximize its plurality in the next election. 
Thus, as an election approaches, opportunistic and self-interested incumbent officials 
manipulate the economy to gather votes: the unemployment rate will be lowered and the 
economy will expand. But, immediately after an election, the victor will raise 
unemployment rates to a relatively higher level in order to combat inflation caused by 
their own or predecessor’s pre-election policy exploitation. This is a political business 
cycle (PBC), with unemployment and deflation in early years followed by an inflationary 
boom as an election approaches (Nordhaus 1975).  
The PBC explanation offers insights into the relationship between democratic 
political competition and CBI but, if the PBC theory is correct, one should empirically 
see a strong correlation between inflation rates and the timing of a move to CBI. 
Unfortunately, an empirical study shows that there is no such correlation (McNamara and 
Castro 2003).  
Given that a central bank is a government institution whose major goal is to fight 
inflation, the political business cycle implies that the CBI will fluctuate according to 
electoral cycles. As election time comes near, any election-motivated governments, 
rightist or leftist, will deny their central banks inflation-fighting authority and provide 
easy money to boost the economy. In contrast, after an election, any winner – leftist or 
rightist – will support the CBI so to lower high inflation, thus increasing the 
unemployment rate. CBI as an institutional phenomenon, however, does not fluctuate to 
the rhythm of election schedules; it does not change as frequently and periodically as 
elections happen. Rather, one often sees an institutional inertia once a level of CBI is 
established. 
One of the behind-the-scene assumptions of the PBC theory is that it is based on a 
model of “myopic” voters who quickly forget what governments did when facing 
electoral competition. The story is totally different if one considers “far-sighted” rational 
citizens who remember what the government did in the past and accordingly can predict 
what it will do in the future. For example, as elections repeat periodically, organized 
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workers may not vote for an employment-enhancing government just because they expect 
that government officials will focus on economic stability thus allowing high 
unemployment rates after they win the election. Likewise, financiers will not always vote 
or contribute campaign funds for the opportunistic government since they know they will 
suffer from price instability and high inflation rates as elections come near. Opportunistic 
manipulation of the economy based on myopic agents is sometimes effective, but will 
ultimately fail.   
The fact that the CBI has a certain institutional inertia surviving recurrent 
elections suggests that there is a relatively solid relationship between government 
politicians and their key social groups, which is not subject to election-motivated 
opportunism. Governments usually have social bases which politicians rely on for their 
political welfare. Therefore, they will rely on core social groups to decide important 
economic policies including CBI. If they keep switching over to the opposite policies 
before or after elections, their key social group will withdraw its political support and 
loyalty.  
 
Tenure Security and CBI 
Based on his research on the Deutsche Bundesbank, Bank of Italy, and Bank of 
France, Goodman claims that a government which has a preference for low inflation and 
expects a short tenure will adopt an independent central bank to limit the ability of future 
governments to manipulate economic policy (Goodman 1991). Applying this tenure 
security problem over time to the Chilean case, Boylan brings up the fact that exiting 
Chilean government officials spearheaded the central bank reform in 1989. Her story is 
that “outgoing authoritarians seek to protect their interests by increasing the autonomy of 
the central bank that would otherwise be subject to the vicissitudes of the democratic 
political process” (Boylan 1998: 444). Intensity and proximity of the political threat by 
democratic forces contributes to authoritarians’ efforts to create an independent central 
bank. 
The “tying successor’s hands” theory argues that a government’s tenure security 
problems cause the rise and decline of monetary authorities’ independence, although 
there is not much agreement in the field. Clark finds that tenure security or insecurity, 
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measured by the size of the governing party’s majority or plurality in the legislature, 
bears no statistically significant relationship to CBI in developing countries (Clark 1994).  
An implication of the ‘tying successor’s hands’ theory is that highly polarized 
systems or systems with highly antagonistic parties should have independent central 
banks. Systems with moderate, centrist parties should have dependent banks, since 
politicians can trust the opposition to pursue similar policies to their own. Bernhard 
shows that this is not the case. Broadly based, moderate/leftist parties and low levels of 
polarization are associated with high levels of CBI (Bernhard 1998). 
 In addition, the theory hints that governments with tenure security may be 
expected to have dependent central banks, because they do not face any serious political 
challengers. But there are many cases that do not reflect this. For example, the KMT and 
PRI governments ruled Taiwan and Mexico, respectively, for a long time but they 
devolved institutional autonomy to central bankers when they could have kept them in 
tight control under the finance ministry (Cheng 1993; Maxfield 1991). 
The theory also implies that the outgoing government will choose to reduce CBI 
in a reversed sequence of leftist-to-rightist, or democratic-to-authoritarian transition. If 
this is the case, the tenure security theory approaches the aforementioned partisan 
affiliation theory: a leftist or democratic government will pursue their preference “to the 
last day of its governing period” manipulating the central banking system so as to benefit 
its own politicians and social bases.  
Interestingly enough, the theory regards the former government as a reformer for 
CBI in a sequence of rightist-to-leftist or authoritarian-to-democratic transition.  But an 
incoming government may also assume the role of reformer. Regardless of a 
government’s partisan affiliation, newly elected officials may support CBI to fight 
inflation as they learn from the former government’s failure to keep inflation within 
tolerable boundaries. As Karen Remmer argues, it is more common that crisis-stricken 
precedent governments are followed by reformer governments than vice versa (Remmer 
1998; Rodrik 1994). 
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Governments’ Financial Needs and CBI 
The last type of government-sided CBI story considers the correlation between 
governmental financial needs and CBI. According to Broz, severe budget deficits 
incurred by a government create an incentive for politicians to support CBI to attract 
financial resources to fund the deficits. For example, in the case of the Bank of England, 
repeated violations of government loan contracts by monarchs severely constrained the 
creditworthiness of the English state. Creditors were very concerned about extending 
loans to the government when the war with France required a great amount of 
governmental expenditures. In 1694, Parliament accepted the plan for a Bank of England 
proposed by London creditors. The state received badly needed loans in exchange for 
granting extensive legal privileges to a private banking corporation (Broz 1998).  
The United States is another instance of the “government financial needs” theory. 
Early central banking arose during the War of Independence that led to the government’s 
war deficits. The fledging government undermined the sanctity of its debt obligations, 
which resulted in the loss of the government’s credibility in the eyes of creditors. The 
government promised rents on financial transactions to a special bank (The First Bank of 
the United States) by granting it a monopoly, in exchange for restoring public confidence 
in lending to the government (Broz 1998). 
 In the same vein, Maxfield argues that the founding and bolstering of central 
banks appears to come in waves associated with periods when foreign capital inflows are 
highly prized and the leverage of international creditors and their domestic allies rises 
commensurably. The more internationally integrated the economy, the more likely it is 
that a government’s need for financial assistance will yield CBI, because “foreign 
investors read central bank independence as a signal of the strength of domestic 
proponents of sound monetary policy, both within the government and among domestic 
social groups, with whom the investors might implicitly or explicitly ally in an effort to 
influence policy” (Maxfield 1997:36). 
 The “financial needs” explanation does not explain why a government delegates 
financial power to a central bank in order to draw private capital when there are a variety 
of other ways for financial mobilization. A government in debt can mobilize resources by 
increasing taxes, printing money, cutting back the budget, and issuing bonds. When 
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determining how to collect money, governments may consider their social bases of 
support to minimize disadvantages that may befall their constituents. For example, 
governments tend to rely, ceteris paribus, more heavily on seigniorage revenues to bridge 
temporary discrepancies between expenditures and revenues if elected officials’ 
coalitional bases are industrialists who are often debtors of private commercial banks. 
Since inflation favors debtors over creditors, officials and industrialists often have an 
incentive to partially default on and inflate away their debt burden through inflation. Thus 
they may prefer relatively dependent central banks subject to political pressures. In other 
words, a government’s financial needs do not always lead to higher CBI; rather the 
opposite case often occurs. 
 In sum, government-sided theories emphasize some political conditions under 
which CBI delegation occurs, bringing up partisan affiliation, the political business cycle, 
tenure security, and a government’s financial needs. But the theories do not take into full 
account a ‘problem of mobilizing support.’ Deciding on delegating monetary and 
financial powers to a third party, politicians need to find support for their choice from a 
number of societal actors if their choice is to be sustainable and acceptable.  
 
III. Society-Sided Theories of Central Bank Independence 
 Some studies of the sources of CBI focus on the organizational and political 
strength of different sectoral/interest groups with different relative preferences for 
employment and price stability. Posen argues that financial firms tend to be very 
supportive of monetary restriction and price stability, favoring the CBI (Posen 1995). On 
the other hand, William Clark claims that capital-intensive industries tend to prefer 
dependent central banks since they are capital-hungry and thus prefer cheap credits 
manipulated by the government.  
 In a way, the aforementioned anti-CBI scholars also emphasize social groups’ 
preferences toward the central bankers’ autonomy. When they criticize the central 
bankers for their functioning as the executive committee of the capitalist class, Magdoff 
and Sweezy argue that the capitalists prefer an independent central banking system 
(Magdoff and Sweezy 1987). In the same vein, criticizing the U.S. Federal Reserve 
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system, Greider agrees with Posen insisting that the holders of financial capital prefer 
CBI (Greider 1987: 11-12).  
Society-sided theories contribute to the political economy of the CBI by looking 
into the social interests that the government-sided perspective pays insufficient attention 
to. Those theories show that, even if elected officials seem to decide on the CBI for their 
own interests, lurking behind the officials’ decision are social interests which supply their 
political welfare. 
 Society-oriented theories have some shortcomings in examining sources of 
varying degrees of CBI. First, most studies focus on big industrialists and financiers, 
paying little attention to subordinate social groups such as workers, farmers, and small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This bias originated from the notion that big 
industrial and finance firms are more organized and have more intense preferences 
toward the CBI than the subordinate groups. But it should be noted that those subordinate 
groups may be minorities in the market, although they are a majority as citizen-voters in 
the political realm. In other words, self-interested politicians who mobilize support from 
social groups may co-opt or integrate those subordinate groups into the political system 
to strengthen their power bases. In this case, government politicians will not do exactly 
what the big firms want them to do, since they have to accommodate and satisfy 
heterogeneous interests – subordinate groups and the big firms – at the same time. Big 
industries and financiers’ power to secure what they want is not only a function of their 
own sectoral influences but also a function of the power of countervailing groups. 
 For example, there are jituanquye (big business group) in Taiwan. In theory they 
are expected to exert a great deal of influence on the government’s monetary and 
financial policies since they are organized and influential in the market. In practice, they 
are not as powerful as the society-oriented theory predicts, for the Nationalist government 
traditionally adopted pro-SME policies discouraging the development of the big 
bourgeoisie.  
Capital-intensive industry in Singapore tells the same story. The Singaporean 
government employed a state-guided industrialization and nurtured big industrialists for 
rapid economic growth. This suggests that capital-intensive industries in the entrepôt 
have political leverage with which they can pressure the government to do what they 
15
want it to do. In reality, the picture is totally different. The government has adopted labor 
policies to integrate organized workers into the political system so it could not support 
big business at the costs of organized labor. Elected officials have to take care of both 
groups and workers check and balance capital-intensive industrialists’ desires.  
 Second, some sectoral group-oriented explanations assume that sectoral or interest 
groups should have political influences in exact proportion to their economic 
competitiveness. The more competitive a sector is, the more likely it is to gain political 
power. This means that the explanations register a pluralist assumption that preferences 
are the same as the policy outcome, ignoring political selection mechanisms involved in 
translating a potential alliance of interest into actual policy benefits. In a nutshell, the 
sectoral/interest group explanation essentially posits that CBI is an epiphenomenon of 
societal forces, and assumes that politicians bear neither costs nor benefits from having 
either a dependent or independent central banking system. Thus, the pluralist story does 
not answer which party the government will favor when it faces equally powerful anti-
CBI industrial and pro-CBI financial sectors. The government may tip the balance toward 
the former or the latter pursuing its coalitional partners’ preferences.  
 Third, interest groups’ preferences may not be fixed as society-sided explanations 
assume. Exogenous economic events – particularly a large and rapid inflationary upswing 
– can lead non-financial actors to redefine their interests. Goodman (1991: 333) offers a 
possibility that industrialists may support CBI. 
 
In a period of rapid inflation, many manufacturing firms, for example, will 
become less concerned about the prospects of deflation and more worried 
by the increase in their real tax burdens and the erosion of their financial 
holdings. Under these circumstances, they will be less inclined to oppose 
initiatives in favor of CBI. 
 
Furthermore, industrialists may be less concerned about CBI if they can freely 
attract foreign loans to fund their business operations without institutionalized 
intermediation from the state. This “financing by bypassing the state” is a typical 
phenomenon in Thailand where the manufacturing sector does not care much about CBI 
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even if central bankers in Bangkok do not extend cheap credits to industries keeping strict 
monetary policy. 
In the same vein, Hall and Franzese claim that strong labor and industry can be 
helpful for CBI and price stability if corporatist institutions exist. “Where wage 
bargaining is more coordinated, the signaling process between the central bank and 
economic actors is likely to be more effective, so that increasing CBI can lower the long-
run rate of inflation with relatively low unemployment costs” (Hall and Franzese 1998: 
506). In sum, interest groups’ preferences are subject to change. 
According to Posen’s theory, financiers and bankers are expected to pressure 
governments to provide institutional autonomy to central bankers who will enhance 
financial sector’s interests. But situated in different politico-economic conditions, the 
same the financial sector will be different in their preferences toward the CBI. For 
example, commercial banks, although owned by the KMT government, have consistent 
and strong preferences for a powerful central bank since they cherish monetary and 
financial stability. In contrast, commercial banks in Korea do not have as strong and 
consistent preference for CBI as their Taiwan counterparts even if they are private 
capital. The reason is that the financial sector, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, was 
owned and controlled by chaebols (big business conglomerates) so the sector represents 
big industrialists’ preferences toward the CBI. The Korean financial sector has not argued 
for an autonomous central bank in Seoul. 
Fourth, sectoral group-oriented scholars have not reached an agreement about 
which groups have preferences for and against the CBI. Posen argues that the financial 
sector is the most consistent CBI supporter since it flourishes with independent central 
bankers on macroeconomic issues. In contrast, Frieden argues that holders of liquid assets 
are indifferent to governmental policy including the CBI problem, for they can switch 
their funds over to alternative business that can earn high rates of return (Frieden 
1991:21).   
Another disagreement in the field is about industrialists’ CBI preferences. The 
basic assumption is that sectoral groups’ preferences for macroeconomic policies 
translate into preferences for the CBI. Groups favoring price stability will also favor the 
CBI while groups preferring full employment will argue for political control of the 
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central bankers. Thus Maxfield argues that labor-intensive industry is the most likely to 
oppose the CBI (Maxfield 1997:22). In contrast, Clark argues that capital-intensive 
industry poses the greatest challenge to central bankers’ authority (Clark 1994: 124). 
Labor-intensive industry is usually located in light industry and SMEs while capital-
intensive industry is mainly found in heavy and chemical industries and big firms. 
Further research is needed to clarify the aforementioned disagreement in the filed. 
 
Central Bankers’ Capacity and CBI 
 Lastly, an explanation of the sources of CBI takes into account central bankers’ 
leadership and Weberian bureaucratic rationality (Hamilton-Hart 2002). If a central bank 
has a high quality of expertise as well as an impersonal and rule-based form of 
organization under the leadership of the central bank governor, it is likely that the 
government will trust the central bankers’ capacity to manage monetary and financial 
policies and thus allow CBI. Furthermore, central bankers of this type will be able to fend 
off government pressures once they achieve CBI. 
 Although this explanation claims internal attributes of a central bank itself as a 
CBI source, the governor’s leadership may be a result from a government’s commitment 
not to intervene in central bank operations, for it is often the case that even experienced 
and knowledgeable central bankers are forced to be subservient to the finance ministry 
and spending agencies. Government politicians and technocrats may oust capable but 
disobedient central bankers, which leads to a dependent central banking system. On the 
other hand, central bankers’ leadership and expertise may be based on followers’ 
willingness to accept the bankers’ guide, advice, orders, and instructions. In other words 
central bankers’ leadership is a function of the financial community’s preferences and its 
acceptance. Even if central bankers are effective in managing their own business, 
commercial bankers and financiers may often resist them and not respect “the bank of 
banks.” In sum, politicians’ motives and the financial sectors’ self-interested willingness 
may lurk behind the ability of central bankers to exercise leadership.  
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IV. The Arguments: Coalition Politics of Central Banking System 
 In this section, I propose to focus on the different coalitional bases of varying 
levels of the CBI to explain why some central bankers have independent regulatory 
authority that contributes to their stable monetary and financial regimes while others do 
not. First, let me start with the inflation problem, since monetary control/stabilization is a 
major policy goal of central bankers. 
How does price instability and inflation affect the economy in a society? The 
accepted view is that “in the longer term this relationship is negative, i.e., more inflation 
is associated with lower growth of output. The deleterious effects of hyper-inflation on 
growth, with the dislocations caused to saving patterns and to the monetary and pricing 
mechanism, are fairly obvious” (Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida 1996: 14).  
 There are a variety of channels though which inflation may adversely affect real 
activity and output. First, if a tax system is not fully indexed to price changes, a high 
inflation tax of nominal interest earnings may seriously distort the incentives to save and 
invest. Second, a higher level of inflation is often associated with higher volatility of 
price levels, increasing economic uncertainty in a society. In response, economic actors 
will be unwilling to make long-term commitments to any business activities, which can 
severely decrease investment – a major source of capitalist economic growth. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for actors to perceive and to react to changes in relative prices. 
These noisy and inconsistent price signals may cause an inefficient allocation of 
economic resources (Fischer 1994).  
 It should be noted that inflation has uneven effects on various social interest 
groups. Roughly speaking, “financial firms tend to be very supportive of monetary 
restriction and price stability while workers, manufacturers, and farmers tend to favor 
greater expansion since they prefer full employment and prosper less in periods of 
deflation” (Goodman 1991: 333). Therefore when inflation happens, various sectoral 
groups will bring different and crosscutting pressures to bear on the government. 
 On the other hand, politicians choose their coalition partners among various 
groups/sectors that maximize their political welfare. In other words, the policymakers 
maximize their political survival by playing the political gains in one sector against the 
political losses in the other sectors. In this sense, government officials consider their 
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coalition bases and thus their political survival when they deal with the CBI problem, a 
critical issue for them in allocating financial resources to their favored political partners. 
Thus CBI is a function of the political costs and benefits political leaders associate with 
different coalition types. In other words, social groups, as far as they are in the coalition, 
can influence the government to do what they favor. 
 How does this coalition type shape the central banking system? I pose two 
arguments, accompanied by theoretical explanations.  
 
Hypothesis 1: if politicians choose capital-intensive industry and/or organized 
labor as their major coalition partners, they will not allow central bankers to have an 
independent authority. 
 
I generate a rough picture of capital-intensive industry’s interests on the basis of 
deductive logic. According to Frieden (1991:19-20), an economic agent’s interest 
depends on asset specificity:  
 
An actor’s policy preferences are a function of the degree to which his 
asset has an available alternative use in which it earns a similar rate of 
return. The harder it is to move an asset from use to use, the more closely 
its owner is wedded to its current activity and the greater the incentive to 
obtain policies to favor this activity. 
 
Specific asset-holders are more susceptible to a government’s economic policy 
changes and thus have more incentives to lobby for their desired policy. Capital-intensive 
sectors, such as electronic, metal, heavy, and chemical industries register high asset 
specificity. Capital-intensive sectors are characterized by unique technology, dense 
business network, high rates of industrial concentration, “high barriers to entry, large 
economies of scale, and huge sunk costs in task specific fixed capital” (Clark 1994: 77). 
These features contribute to a few firms’ dominance of the capital-intensive sector, and 
they are in better a position to overcome the collective action problem in lobbying 
government policy in their favor.  
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Furthermore, in most developing countries, capital is scarce and long-term capital 
markets are underdeveloped, if they exist at all. Thus the manufacturing sector is usually 
a debtor that borrows the capital they need from public and private financiers, i.e., the 
government and commercial banks. Since theoretically high inflation favors debtors over 
creditors, industry will derive more value from government-induced favorable price 
changes than creditors.  
 The aforementioned theories suggest that if politicians choose capital-intensive 
industries as coalition partners for economic growth, one would expect an increased 
demand for subsidized credit, economic intervention, and laxness of monetary policy, as 
opposed to the central bankers’ preference for tight monetary control and regulation of 
preferential credits.  
As I stated in the literature review section, there is no agreement on which 
fraction of industry – capital-intensive or labor-intensive – is the strongest challenger to 
CBI in developing countries (Clark 1994; Maxfield 1997). I’ll test this disagreement by 
using case studies of Taiwan and Korea, and statistical analyses. 
 As for organized labor, I expect that the strength of unionized workers is 
negatively correlated with CBI, but that their preference is weak. Their “weak” 
preference comes from the fact that workers have conflicting double positions with 
regard to the price stability that central bankers have as their main policy goal. As 
employed producers, they get benefits from nominal wage increases and price increases 
of the products that they produce, although as consumers they prefer price stability. 
Cross-cutting interests reduce the intensity of their preference. 
Organized workers have preferences against CBI. First, as collective action theory 
suggests (Olson 1965), workers are likely to organize themselves to protect their benefits 
more as producers and wage-earners than as consumers. Producers and employees 
usually have a single income source so they organize very well, while consumers spend 
their money on a variety of commodities in the market so they find it difficult to organize 
against rising prices of each commodity. Second, the cost of tight monetary policies and 
austere measures such as cuts in subsidies tends to be felt immediately, while the benefits 
from price stability are usually socially diffuse and temporally distant. Third, unionized 
workers are usually found in the capital-intensive sector and their material welfare often 
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depends on the profitability of the sector, which suggests that they will have the same 
negative preference with regard to CBI. 
 It should be noted that only when capital-intensive industrialists and organized 
workers are in the coalition with the government does their preferences translate into 
actual governmental policies. If they are out of the coalition, the government will pay 
little attention to their preferences and interests and their voices will not be heard. 
 My second hypothesis introduces social actors whose preferences contribute to 
central bankers’ independent authority managing monetary and financial policies.  
 
Hypothesis 2: If politicians choose other groups as their coalition partners (i.e., 
commercial banks, agriculture, and/or small-medium sized enterprises), they will be 
more likely to provide central bankers with independent authority. 
 
The ability of capital-intensive industry to secure preferential credits and loose 
monetary policy is not only a function of its preference intensity and organization, but 
will also depend on the power of countervailing groups. Financial assets are the least 
specific of all assets since they can be moved to their most efficient allocation at 
relatively low cost. Therefore, as discussed in the previous section, financial asset holders 
may have fewer incentives to organize to influence sector-specific policies or relative 
price changes.  
 However, if the price level is uncertain and relative price changes are volatile, it is 
very difficult for financiers to know which sector is worth investing in. In other words, 
even if financial assets are liquid, it is not easy for the holders to find alternative business 
to invest in under the conditions of high and volatile price change. Therefore, financial 
asset holders will be interested in shaping “policy to the extent that it affects the return on 
financial assets in general; they are quite susceptible to changes in general price level. To 
the extent that they will mobilize to affect policy, therefore, financial asset-holders are 
likely to lobby for price stability and low inflation” (Frieden 1991: 21). In addition, rising 
and volatile price levels are the bête noire in the eyes of private financial sector since, by 
definition, inflation favors debtors over creditors.   
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Therefore, since a central bank, as the bank of private banks, tends to favor 
restrictive monetary policy and fiscal conservatism, governments allied with commercial 
bankers should be different from governments allied with capital-intensive industry. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may favor cheap credits and loose 
monetary controls by central bankers. In this sense, Maxfield claims that labor-intensive 
firms, a typical type in the SME sector, are likely to oppose the CBI (1997:22). Their 
preferences are, however, inconsistent and less intense compared to capital-intensive 
industries since the SMEs’ assets are usually smaller and less specific than their capital-
intensive big firms. In other words, the SME sector registers low entry and exit barriers, 
which suggests that they have less incentive to lobby the government for the policy they 
prefer. Furthermore, the SME sector is usually more dispersed and has a large number of 
unit firms, thus often suffers from the free rider problem; their organization costs are 
higher than those of their capital-intensive counterparts. 
 On the other hand, even if they prefer cheap credits, they often find themselves 
competing with capital-intensive big firms for a limited amount of financial resources. 
This competition between both sectors may make the SMEs show the cold shoulder to 
big firms in lobbying for the government. In addition, if the government elites invite the 
SME sector, rather than big business, into their social coalition, SMEs’ preferences may 
be differentiated from those of capital-intensive big businesses. They may be less 
reluctant and more ready to accept CBI.  
 Farmers as producers may prefer cheap credit and loose monetary policy, but they 
have crosscutting interests: farmers may prefer instable and rising price levels as 
consumers of city-produced commodities. On the other hand, farmers do not always 
prefer loose monetary policies; rather, sometimes they prefer price stability even as 
producers. Features of agricultural production and marketing make them stand against 
monetary instability. They usually invest year-around, but reap a harvest few times a year 
so they have to wait for a long time to gain income from agricultural marketing and sales. 
This differentiates them from workers, who usually earn their income once a month, and 
industrialists, who can check their profits almost everyday. Furthermore, agricultural 
business is usually under the unavoidable control of capricious weather and seasonal 
conditions, thus the amount and quality of farmers’ output is usually unpredictable at the 
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time when they start farming activities. This intrinsic instability and inconsistency of 
their business operations often makes them prefer stable, predictable, and consistent 
levels of price so that they can run their businesses in more stable and predictable ways. 
In sum, farmers as both consumers and producers have reasons to prefer the monetary 
stability that central bankers pursue.  Figure 1-1 simplifies the aforementioned spectrum 
of various sectoral groups’ varying preferences with regard to price stability. 
How does a coalition of countervailing groups whose interests and preferences are 
cross-cutting and heterogeneous contribute to an independent central banking system? 
First, siding with a special interest becomes costlier as the number of coalition partners 
increases. If the political coalition includes various participants, there would be “checks 
and balances” among heterogeneous and even conflicting preferences for government 
financial and monetary policies, and thus less pressure from capital-intensive industries 
for a dependent central bank. Furthermore, the checks and balances mechanism may 
inhibit the ability of political decision makers to reverse or undo central bank decisions. 
Evans (1997:83) once emphasized that political integration of various groups strengthens 
public-private relations: 
 
The central issue in recapturing embedded autonomy is clear. The heart of 
the problem is finding a way to counterbalance the weight of a more 
powerful business community so that embeddedness is less likely to 
degenerate into capture. At least one logical possibility presents itself. 
Extending the institutionalized connectedness that characterizes 
government-business relations under East Asian-style embedded 
autonomy to include a broader range of societal groups could potentially 
solidify the state’s position and contribute to prospects for economic 
transformation. Comparative evidence suggests that including additional 
actors whose interests partially conflict with those of business in the 
institutionalized networks that bind state and society could strengthen the 
institutionalized character of business-government relations. Inclusion of 
groups with diverse and partially conflicting interests in public-private 
networks creates, as Biddle and Milor point out, strong pressures for 
transparency. 
 
Second, governments with countervailing groups as their political constituency 
have incentives for CBI as a solution of distributive conflicts. In order to keep broad 
coalitions sustainable, governments have to satisfy or coordinate, in exchange for their 
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broader political support, heterogeneous financial and monetary preferences from various 
groups, which is not an easy task. A solution is for the government to set up an institution 
that aims to control flows of money and maintain monetary and financial stability. The 
CBI will benefit elected officials, since they can avoid at least some of the blame for the 
conflicts by passing the buck to central bankers, and thus secure votes from their broader 
political constituency. The solution by delegation is an incentive for an independent 
central bank to rise as a macroeconomic regulator neutral to distributive politics. In this 
sense, CBI contributes to a government’s political survival rather than hollowing out its 
ability to manage the economy. 
 
V. Research Design 
 I will examine the aforementioned hypotheses in the following chapters by using 
1) a focused comparison of two cases, i.e., Taiwan and Korea; 2) additional case studies 
of Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand; and 3) a large-N statistical test of developing 
countries.  This combination of three different and complementary methods is known as 
triangulation (Tarrow 1995), which is particularly appropriate in cases where quantitative 
data are partial and inconsistent, and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political 
conditions, as in the study of central banking systems and political coalitions. 
 Since there is no perfect method that guarantees the scientific causality in social 
science, it is appropriate to use varying methods to tackle the same question. “The case 
study method uncovers causal processes hitherto undetected, or leads to a reformulation 
of previously postulated causal processes… Focused case studies are particularly useful 
at an early stage of theory development, when considerations of theory development 
greatly outweigh those of testing.” (George and McKeown 1985: 51-52). After 
comparing Taiwan’s and Korea’s political coalitions and central banking systems, I’ll see 
whether or not my hypothesis holds in the East and South-East Asian context. I’ll do 
additional case studies to probe into the generalizability of my arguments by asking if 
those patterns in the coalitional bases of the central banking system and CBI are observed 
in other cases. Finally, I’ll employ a large-N statistical method for more a rigorous test of 
my hypothesis in the context of developing countries. 
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As for my case study selection, I employ the “most similar systems” or “method 
of difference”(Przeworski and Teune 1970) to identify independent variables associated 
with differing outcomes. I chose Taiwan and Korea because prominent explanations 
about central banking systems come mainly from Western industrialized countries rather 
than developing countries, and because these two countries are good cases since they 
share many similarities but differ in CBI and coalition type. The two countries are similar 
in terms of the historical experience of Japanese colonialism, successful land reform after 
World War II, their existence as divided nation-states, small open economies, state-driven 
and export-oriented industrialization, concurrent sequences of industrial development and 
democratization, and long experience of authoritarianism, as well as their subordinate 
relationships with the U.S. They differ in that the Korean central bank is dependent on 
planning and spending government agencies and has low autonomy, while the central 
bankers in Taiwan are not subject to political pressures and keep monetary stability and 
financial prudence as their goals. The “most similar systems” method is useful for 
controlling the variables that might otherwise affect outcomes on the dependent variables.   
 The research of this study involves field work in Seoul, Korea and Taipei, 
Taiwan, including interviews and archival research. In the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, I used secondary literature, newspaper clippings, official periodicals issued 
from central banks, and email interviews with central bank officials. As for the scope of 
the research, my study focuses on the correlation between the coalitional composition of 
national government (i.e., the independent variable) and the different levels of CBI (i.e., 
the dependent variable) from the 1950s to the 1990s. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 My research starts from the diverging experience of two Asian NICs, Taiwan and 
Korea, in the turmoil of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Why did Taiwan survive the 
crisis while Korea faltered, when they share many similarities? Theoretically, my 
research question explores the uneven development of central banks’ independent 
authority: why do some central bankers have autonomous power that contributes to their 
monetary and financial stability, while others do not? There have been many prominent 
explanations of the phenomenon, including government-sided theories (i.e., partisan 
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affiliation, political business cycle, tenure security, and government financial needs) and 
society-sided theories based on interest groups as well as the internal attributes of central 
banks. 
While this study uses some insights from both sides, it also challenges certain 
aspects of them. Government-sided theories pay little attention to the social bases of 
central banking and domestic financial systems. Society-sided theories are useful for 
understanding the array of social forces, but are less clear about the political selection 
mechanisms through which some interests come to be favored by their government. My 
study starts from society-sided sectoral/interest groups, but at the same time incorporates 
politics. It is a politically reconstructed explanation of the social bases of CBI. The 
dissertation explores governments’ coalition partners, and how this affects CBI and thus 
monetary and financial regimes. 
The remainder of this dissertation unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
political choices about coalition-building that Korean and Taiwanese elites made to 
secure their political survival. Chapter 3 analyzes social bases of the two countries’ 
economic growth, focusing on heavy-chemical industry, SMEs, organized labor, farmers, 
and the financial sector. Chapter 4 compares central banking systems in Korea and 
Taiwan, discussing how and why different political leadership’s coalitional choices 
shaped different central banking systems in those two industrial rivals in East Asia. 
Chapter 5 surveys additional cases (i.e., Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand) to see if the 
configuration of coalitional bases and CBI is found in the Southeast Asian context. 
Chapter 6 tests the hypotheses of the study by using statistical analyses of central banking 
systems in 36 developing countries. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the main 
findings of my study and discusses their theoretical implications as well as limitations. 
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Chapter 2: Choosing Developmental Coalition Partners 
 This chapter explains how and why two Asian NICs, Korea and Taiwan, were 
different in inviting various social groups into their developmental coalition. The next 
chapter will go further in detail comparing both countries’ sector-by-sector politics of 
developmental coalition-making. 
 In the first section of the current chapter, I describe the prehistory of 
developmental governments in Korea and Taiwan and how those governments reached 
policy agreements with the U.S. I argue that the setting up of developmentalism in Korea 
was not smooth due to policy conflicts with the U.S. that lasted until the 1960s, when the 
Park government started export-oriented industrialization, gaining policy rapprochement 
with the American hegemon. In contrast, the Kuomintang (The Nationalist Party, KMT) 
government adopted a “growth with stability” principle, mainly due to historical learning 
from the failure in mainland China, reaching policy agreement with the U.S. earlier than 
Korea.  
The second section discusses how political leaderships in Korea and Taiwan 
differed in pushing economic growth for their political survival, with reference to private 
businesses, state agencies, and party-legislative politics. The political leadership in Korea 
made a developmental coalition with big business and adopted an unbalanced growth-
oriented strategy, while the KMT government set up the coalition without the private big 
bourgeoisie, espousing a balanced, stability-oriented approach to industrialization.  The 
last section summarizes my conclusions based on the two case studies in the chapter.  
 
I. Narrowing Down Policy Choices toward Export-Oriented Industrialization 
Korea: Policy Disagreement and Rapprochement with the U.S. Hegemon    
 The developmental coalition in Korea can be classified as growth-oriented. A 
growth-oriented coalition pursues rapid growth at almost any cost, including high 
inflation, regional and sectoral imbalances, or disproportionate concentrations of wealth. 
The coalition usually chooses “unbalanced” modernization strategies by which, in 
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situations of economic backwardness, concentrates scarce government-controlled capital 
and resources into strategically chosen industries (Park 2001).2
But the growth-oriented developmental strategy of Korea was not established 
from independence from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), or even the early stage of 
General Park Chung Hee’s military regime (1961-1979). “The course of development 
was shaped more by numerous improvised decisions or ad hoc policy changes than by 
some premeditated national grand design. And the process was replete with political 
battle” (Cheng 1990: 141). 
 The United States Army occupied Korea from 1945 to 1948 and played a major 
role in building institutions, limiting what was possible by manipulating their aid to 
resource-scarce Korea. The U.S. aid was actually a lifeline for Korea, then a poor post-
colonial agrarian society. Between 1953 and 1961, U.S. aid accounted for nearly 70 
percent of total imports and 75 percent of total fixed capital formation (Cole 1980). 
Furthermore, the amount of the aid was tremendous since a “free” Korea was an 
important strategic post against the communist bloc consisting of North Korea, 
communist China, and the Soviet Union. “Korea’s total of nearly $6 billion in U.S. 
economic grants and loans, 1946 to 1978, compares with a total for all of Africa of $6.89 
billion and for all of Latin America of $14.8 billion; only India, with a population 
seventeen times that of Korea, received more ($9.6 billion)” (Cumings 1987: 67). 
 However there were policy disagreements over the use of the U.S. aid program 
among American policy makers, the military, and the State Department (Lyons 1961: 6). 
Haggard, Kim, and Moon (1991:852) describe the policy disagreements as follows: 
 
The American-dominated UN leadership was highly skeptical of Korea’s 
economic potential and was primarily concerned with buttressing Korea’s 
military position rather than its economic self-sufficiency. The American 
military emphasized stabilization, arguing strenuously about the dangers 
of credit expansion and new industrial investments. On the other hand, an 
economic advisory team to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency (UNKRA) and Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 
supported by the State Department represented a more liberal 
 
2 For “balanced” and “unbalanced” economic development, see Albert Hirschman, 1958, The Strategy of 
Economic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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developmentalist approach that was critical of the stabilization package. 
This group argued for a rationalized program of infrastructural 
development and import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that would 
make Korea self-reliant in five years, financed by large infusions of 
development assistance and greatly expanded mineral and agricultural 
exports. 
 
President Rhee Syngman (1948 – 1960) found space for maneuverability in the 
aforementioned two U.S. policy options toward Korea, playing one against the other. 
Rhee, a Princeton Ph.D. in government under Prof. Woodrow Wilson, was skillful at 
manipulating the bureaucratic compartmentalization within the U.S. government; he was 
“effective in playing off the Defense Department against the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the State Department”(Woo 1991: 9) For 
example, Rhee often frightened American foreign policy makers by threatening to 
blitzkrieg North Korea, so the U.S. maintained their troops in Korea as a force of military 
moderation. On the other hand, Rhee complained publicly about the U.S. government’s 
slowness of aid delivery, their lack of attention to new investments, and overemphasis on 
commodity imports.  
His trick worked in 1955 when the Rhee government and the U.S. State 
Department reached temporary agreement on economic reconstruction in Korea. Rhee 
promised inflation-fighting stabilization and devaluation in exchange for further U.S. aid, 
the material base for his political constituencies. The Rhee government was skillful as a 
“U.S. aid maximizer to overcome the scarcity of domestic resources” (Mason et al. 1980: 
94) with no serious long-term vision for economic growth and industrialization as in the 
Nathan Plan that the UNKRA recommended (Jones and Sakong 1980: 44). Cole and Nam 
(1969: 32) argued that the 1950s leaders:  
 
rejected the idea of overall planning and were not interested in trying to 
define the longer-run economic objectives or an integrated set of policies. 
These probably reflected a belief on their part that they could retain more 
flexibility and achieve better results in negotiations with aid donors by 
proceeding on an ad hoc basis and avoiding the overall commitments and 
constrains of a plan. Clearly the Nathan Plan called for very forceful 
policy action by the Korean government and set ambitious targets of self-
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support which the Koreans were not prepared to accept. To have agreed to 
the plan would have exposed the government to serious political risks. 
 
The stabilization program, however, did not work because the Rhee government 
was a corrupt rent seeker (Haggard 1990: 57). The government used policy instruments 
such as allocation of foreign exchange, bank credits, import licenses, and the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises to maintain its political support. Rent allocation 
was based on personal and political ties, and flowed to the highest bidders for political 
contributions. Furthermore, in 1954 the government rejected the Nathan Plan of liberal 
developmentalist version prepared by UNKRA, which shows Rhee’s economic policy 
was a confusing patchwork, lacking long-term economic strategy. For example, when 
four ministers of economic affairs, impressed by India’s economic efforts, proposed a 
five-year economic development plan in March 1957, Rhee reprimanded them for being 
affected by “Stalinist thinking of economy” (Lee 1993:54). The government lacked the 
political will for industrial transformation of the agrarian society. 
 After a series of student demonstrations against the corrupt government, Rhee 
resigned and the opposing Democratic Party came to power in 1960 in the form of a 
parliamentary system. The Chang Myon government (1960-61) tried some market-
oriented economic reforms, including devaluation of foreign exchange and rationalization 
of state-owned enterprises that the U.S. had pursued during the 1950s. But the perpetual 
intra-party factional disputes prohibited the formulation and implementation of effective 
economic reform (Kim 1975: 207-209). Thus the US-Korea tug of war and policy 
disagreements over how to use U.S. aid and reconstruct the Korean economy lasted well 
into the early 1960s. Both the authoritarian Rhee government and the democratic Chang 
Myon government lacked the political will necessary for long term economic 
developments.  
 After the military coup of 1961, General Park Chung Hee and the military 
government centralized state power, holding the civil bureaucracy on a tight leash and 
began to recruit highly-trained academics to staff the newly created developmental 
headquarters – the Economic Planning Board (EPB). But the U.S. was quite suspicious of 
General Park since he had been a communist before the Korean War (1950-53). 
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Moreover, his early policy drive aimed at nationalistic import substitution 
industrialization (ISI). He argued in 1962 that the “creation of a self-supporting economy 
and accomplishment of an industrial revolution is a key to national renaissance and 
prosperity” (Park 1962: 171). The U.S. could accept his pledge of economic 
development, but the Americans endorsed a liberal version. In the American view of 
economic liberalism, export-oriented industrialization (EOI) was the most rational and 
promising strategy for small-sized, resource-poor, and labor-abundant economies. 
 An example of the U.S.-Korea policy conflicts was the currency reform that 
Park’s military junta pushed in 1962 in the hope of mobilizing domestic financial 
resources into an industrialization fund. Citizens were required to register all cash, 
checks, and money orders, and to direct personal savings into a new Industrial 
Development Corporation that would finance industrial activities. U.S. officials were 
shocked by the blitzkrieg reform since it was initiated without prior consultation with the 
U.S. government. Faced with severe opposition from the American officials, the junta 
soon terminated the money squeezing measure (Tadashi 1991). 
Cole and Lyman (1971: 165), American policy advisors, described the U.S.-
Korean policy agreement over domestic resource mobilization as follows:  
 
As productivity of the Korean economy increased, the conflict of 
objectives between aid donor and recipient sharpened. The basic issue was 
over domestic resource mobilization, that is, over the share of the 
increasing output that should be saved or taxed to provide resources for 
investment, for the maintenance of military forces, and for other essential 
government services. This conflict had a major impact on the entire range 
of economic policies in Korea throughout the postwar period. Taking 
many forms, it at times had harmful effects on the political and economic 
development of the country. Unfortunately, quite often this issue was 
posed by both Korean and American officials, in terms of a direct conflict 
between domestic resource mobilization and foreign assistance.  
 
Facing the American hegemon’s opposition, the Park regime was quick to change 
its policy orientation to follow the course recommended by the U.S. It revised its original 
five year economic plan (FFYP, 1962-1966) that stressed inward-looking ISI deepening 
to achieve an integrated domestic industrial structure, a seeming retreat from international 
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economy (Cole and Nam 1969). Now Park accepted export-oriented economic 
development as his industrialization strategy, which until today has never been 
questioned. Furthermore, the junta concluded a secret agreement with Japan in November 
1962. The Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization symbolized the Park government’s 
hope to utilize Japanese investment capital and, from the perspective of the U.S., 
complete the grand design for regional integration (i.e., the anticommunist bloc of U.S.-
Japan-South Korea against North Korea-communist China-Soviet Union) (Woo 1991).  
After Park’s victory in the 1963 presidential election, American policy makers were 
relieved to see the setup of an anticommunist, stable, and civilian form of government 
with political will for economic growth, the exact answer to political and economic 
objectives that the U.S. had in the Korean peninsula.  
 The U.S.-Korea rapprochement toward a growth-oriented strategy came to 
fruition in mid-1964 when there were important changes in the leadership of both the 
EPB and the USAID mission. In May 1964, Chang Key-young took charge of the EPB as 
a deputy prime minister. Under Chang, the stabilization program as an anti-inflation 
measure began to be subject to a more active growth and investment policy (Cole and 
Nam 1971: 87). His policy drive won the full support of the president who thought 
monetary expansion was tolerable in the name of industrial expansion. 
 On the other hand, the USAID signaled that it would take a more lenient view of 
plan-targets than the previous team had. Traditionally, the USAID emphasized a strict 
money supply based on a neo-classical premise. The new USAID team and David Cole, 
an economic advisor, believed that “it was counterproductive to push strict monetary 
targets while simultaneously undertaking difficult reforms of the fiscal and financial 
systems” (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1991: 864). The USAID consented to a low 
exchange rate and cheap industrial credit for businesses and exports. But the consent was 
a tacit one. “The USAID team did not openly abandon the money supply targets of the 
1964 stabilization program on the grounds that to do so would lessen U.S. bargaining 
power on the Korean peninsula” (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1991: 864). The U.S. wanted 
to exert pressure and their bargaining power if Korea were subject to severe expanist ills 
like high inflation and financial crisis in the 1960s. 
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In summary, the Rhee government in the 1950s was concerned mainly about aid 
maximization but lacked the political will to achieve long-term economic growth, which 
resulted in policy disagreements with the U.S.’s, which pushed economic liberalism. 
After the short democratic episode in 1960-61, General Park’s government tinkered with 
ISI deepening and then finally adopted the EOI strategy that the U.S. and the IMF had 
recommended. In response, the U.S. compromised its stern emphasis of macroeconomic 
stability, tolerating an industrialization strategy that might cause expansionist ills.  
 
Taiwan: Historical Trauma and Early Adoption of Economic Stabilization 
 Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party, KMT) adopted 
macroeconomic stability as their policy core after their relocation to Taiwan in 1949. The 
KMT regime was successful in stabilization during the ISI stage of the 1950s and 
continuously pursued orthodox macroeconomic policies such as positive interest rates, 
cautious monetary policy, and a well balanced budget. Why did the KMT government 
push so early the economic orthodoxy against the mainstream of economic thinking in 
those days? Given that the government firmly controlled the island, if the government 
had wanted to, it could have poured preferential credits to private firms for rapid 
industrialization.  
 The KMT learned a lesson of economic stability from their historical trauma, i.e., 
defeat in the mainland China and retreat to the small island in 1949. Destruction from 
wars against the Chinese Communist Party and Japanese imperialism and the siphoning 
off of resources for war had disastrous effects on China, especially acute fiscal deficits 
and inflation spiral. The price index skyrocketed almost ten thousand times from 100 in 
1937 to 10,340,000 in 1947. Government deficits increased about nine hundred times 
from 1,276 million CNC (Chinese National Currency) dollars in 1937 to 1,106,696 in 
1945 (Chang 1958: 124, 372). The real value index of deposits in private banks 
nosedived from 100 in 1937 to 1 in 1945 (Chou 1963: 215). The inflationary spiral was a 
major cause of the downfall of the KMT and the victory of communists in civil war. The 
spiral undermined KMT’s political legitimacy from the bottom and destroyed the Chinese 
economy. 
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Desperate and humiliated when crossing the Taiwan Strait, the KMT leadership 
was quick to realize that to resist the Communists effectively and strengthen the KMT’s 
tenuous position on the island, the party had to be fundamentally reformed and the people 
of Taiwan given an incentive to support it. Unintentionally, the relocation to Taiwan 
contributed to the consolidation of Chiang’s political leadership since only loyal KMT 
officials crossed the strait while corrupt bureaucrats scattered with their assets to Hong 
Kong, Southeast Asia, and the U.S. Furthermore, Chiang broke the intraparty factions 
that he believed had rent his mainland regime to communists, taking complete personal 
charge of the political realm (Gold 1986: 59).  
 The KMT mainlanders were worried about the possibility of peasant upheavals in 
the post-colonial island and thus pushed land reform during 1949-53, culminating in The 
Land to the Tiller Act of 1953. The reform was a “passive revolution” or “revolution 
from above”3 that removed the indigenous traditional elites’ power base and earned 
political legitimacy from indigenous Taiwanese. In addition to the KMT government’s 
political need, there was also American pressure for land reform, as the there was in 
Korea and Japan under American Occupation. The Americans strongly urged the reform 
on the Nationalists and supplied experts, advice, and funds, all funneled through the Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). The reform was a breakthrough in the 
post-colonial agrarian society; it allowed the émigré government to earn strong support 
from farmers, the majority of the island (Gold 1986: 58-59, 63). 
 Having learned from its failure in mainland China, the KMT launched an 
orthodox stabilization program in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The program included 
currency reforms, balanced budgets, and high “preferential” interest rates, as well as tight 
governmental controls over money supply and credit availability (Clark 1989). These 
stabilization policies proved to be highly successful. The chronic hyperinflation rate 
plummeted to 300 percent in 1950 and about 30 percent in 1951-2, and then averaged less 
than 10 percent for the rest of the 1950s. Real GDP growth rates during 1953-60 
averaged 7.2 percent during 1953 to 60 (Council 1969). 
 
3 The locus classicus for the concept of “revolution from above” and “passive revolution” is Gramsci 
(1971), Moore (1966), and Trimberger (1978). 
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Successful ISI in the 1950s, however, was not carried out in harmony. Among 
economic bureaucracy there was a conflict between “those who favored continued state 
dominance of the economy based on its ownership of confiscated Japanese enterprises, 
and those who advocated more range for a private sector. In the 1950s, to revive 
production, the more socialist- or statist-oriented cadres prevailed” (Gold 1986: 67). The 
former group claimed legitimacy of ISI based on the official state ideology of the 
founding father Sun Yat-sen, who had once argued “the state should lead in business 
enterprises and set up all kinds of productive machinery, which will be the property of the 
state” (Sun 1927: 442).  
 In 1957, however, when the problem of foreign exchange and trade became 
worse, there was a big policy battle among the KMT policy makers, which consequently 
resulted in EOI as the strategic model for the Taiwanese economy. Pang (1992: 175) 
summarizes the policy battle as follows: 
 
Their opinions went in two directions: 1) a conservative-interventionist ISI 
line, represented by Hsu Peh-yuan, minister of Finance, maintained that 
the existing system had a great deal to contribute to the stability of 
Taiwan’s economy and that overemphasis on market mechanisms would 
hurt the growth of Taiwan’s infant industries; 2) a liberal-reformist EOI 
line, represented by K.Y.Yin, secretary-general of the Economic 
Stabilization Board, contended that the existing system had triggered too 
many corrupt practices and too much inefficiency, which could only be 
remedied by a comprehensive and radical change. 
 
The liberal-reformist line finally won the battle due to the support given by the 
KMT’s leadership, especially Chiang and Ch’en Ch’eng, Vice President, as well as from 
influential scholars like T.C. Liu and S. C. Tsiang (Ho 1987: 243-5). Chiang’s choice of 
economic liberalism aimed at developing Taiwan as a “showcase” of Chinese 
development under free economic institutions. It had powerful propaganda value in the 
ideological battle with Communist China. Given that the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1956 
with the U.S. restrained the KMT government’s bold military action to recover the 
mainland and offered military security for the island, the KMT elites saw economic 
development as “a means of increasing the probability of success in attaining the ultimate 
goal, return to the mainland” (Jacoby 1966: 37). In Gramsci’s terms (1971: 238-9), the 
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KMT leadership changed from “war of maneuver” to the “war of position” vis-à-vis their 
lost mainland in late 1950, which was repeated in Korea when the Park regime put 
economic development over national unification on his agenda after his military coup.  
 The 1958-1960 economic reform package, including the 19-Point Program, 
liberalized exchange rates and controls on trade and industry, rationalized the fiscal 
system, reduced military spending, and enacted an investment promotion act. The 
government made the developmental strategy more export-oriented in 1965 by “adding 
more export and investment incentives into the statute as well as establishing the 
Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone” (Pang 1992: 191). The reform and subsequent 
measures constituted export-oriented industrialization as the main economic strategy – 
one that has not been questioned to date.  
 In addition to the KMT leadership’s choice and academic persuasion, we must 
add American pressure to the list of explanations for the EOI transition. In the late 1950s, 
the U.S. Congress reviewed foreign aid policy, which resulted in a gradual emphasis on 
socio-economic development and fostering private enterprises and a market-oriented 
economy (Schelling 1957). On the island, the USAID mission often played the role of 
“whipping boy” for the development-minded officials in Taiwan. “The major weapon of 
USAID influence upon the KTM government was a promise to increase or a threat to 
reduce the level of aid. The government officials regarded the USAID policy advice as 
real, and the actions were in fact effective in producing desired results” (Jacoby 1966: 
134). For example, in 1959, Director Haraldson of the USAID Mission proposed an 8-
Point Program to the government that was later elaborated into the 19-Point Program 
through subsequent discussions with the KMT (Jacoby 1966: 134-5). The pay-off that the 
U.S. offered for the liberalization was more aid funds as well as introducing foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and financial capital from Japan and the U.S. to the island. 
Jacoby (1966: 130, 132), a USAID evaluator, commented on the USAID-Taiwan policy 
agreement and smooth EOI transition as follows: 
 
From the very beginning, the Chinese government and AID were involved 
by mutual agreement in an effort to use resources effectively for these 
purposes [stability and development]….The U.S. AID Mission had a 
strong, persistent, and generally beneficent influence upon the formation 
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of Chinese economic policies…. The main reason for the large measure of 
U.S. influence on Chinese economic policy was that there was agreement 
between the governments of the two countries on fundamental aims. A 
broad set of mutual interests in military strength and economic progress 
were recognized. There was little debate over the basic framework of 
control of aid funds and Chinese resources…..The complementary 
interests of the two countries formed a firm foundation; disagreement 
could occur on the details of the superstructure. 
 
In a political sense, the pro-EOI package was feasible, ironically, due to the 
Mission’s failure to pressure the KMT to privatize the government sector. The package 
reform did not undermine state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the organizational base of the 
KMT government. Originally, USAID sought to persuade the KMT government to 
privatize the public enterprises in the banking, fertilizer, sugar, aluminum, iron, and steel 
industries, but the government was reluctant to follow the USAID advice (Jacoby 1966: 
146-8). The government simply did not want to be shorn of authority over resource 
allocation. It is well to remember that in the 1950s almost two-thirds of all bank loans 
and discounts went to the government sector: on average 31.0% for government, 31.9% 
public enterprises, 28.8% private enterprises, and 4.5% individuals (Council 1969: 102). 
Politically, the government had to support its loyal state employees who crossed the 
Taiwan Strait with the KMT in 1949; financially, SOEs contributed to the émigré 
regime’s control over the economy; and ideologically, KMT cherished a view of 
restraining private capital based on Sun Yat-sen’s principle of Minsheng (people’s 
livelihood). In a way, the EOI package was a policy compromise between American 
economic liberalism and the KMT’s critical interest in political survival. As John 
Montgomery (1962) stressed, it is very important for a successful foreign aid policy that 
both the aiding and the aided governments respect a core of mutual interests and 
objectives. “The U.S. did not use economic assistance as a lever to bring about political 
reforms; the lever was used only to induce economic reforms” (Jacoby 1966: 148). The 
U.S. and the KMT agreed to push an EOI strategy but not to reduce the state’s power to 
channel resources to SOEs.  
So far I have discussed how the political leaderships of the two new nations 
narrowed down their economic choices under U.S. hegemony. In comparative 
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perspective, both countries were deviant cases from most less developed countries that, 
with some natural resource base, tend to perpetuate ISI, a path of least resistance that 
avoids the pains of dismantling vested protected interests, especially agricultural and 
mineral export (Ranis 1977: 28-9, 31, 38, 42). In a nutshell, an easy and abrupt transition 
to EOI as a national strategy happened in the context of the Cold War milieu in which 
American hegemony cared about showcases of the free world, especially Taiwan and 
Korea “poised on the geopolitical fault line” (Woo 1991: 9).  
 
II. The Politics of Making a Developmental Coalition 
This section discusses how and why Korea and Taiwan accepted different 
developmental coalition strategies, the “unbalanced growth without economic stability” 
path in Korea and the “balanced growth with economic stability” path in Taiwan. Each 
government faced different political conditions. The key differences had to do with 
historical learning, political legitimatization, sub-ethnic cleavages, availability of 
industrialists, and the relationship between the ruling party and technocrats within each 
government.  
 
Korea: Coalition with Big Business and Unbalanced Growth-Oriented Strategy 
 Since the Park government lacked the political legitimacy earned from democratic 
elections, it based its legitimacy on economic development that the preceding 
governments had failed to push. As Lucian Pye put it, “the criterion of legitimacy, to a 
dangerous degree, has become [a source of ] success in advancing economic 
development. The more insecure the government, the greater the pressures on industry to 
expand. Any period of prolonged stagnation could cause a crisis of authority” (Pye 1988: 
85). Explaining his military coup, Park argued “spiritually, this revolution must and will 
establish our self-respect. Socially, it is to modernize our society. Economically, it is to 
industrialize our nation” (Park 1962: 23). Among three modern projects (i.e., 
industrialization, state-building/national unification, and democratization), he emphasized 
the first even at the expense of the latter two when he said “development of democracy, 
construction of welfare state, and anti-communist national unification, everything 
depends on economic success” (Park 1969: 134). 
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As E. E. Schattschneider claimed, “new cleavage produces a new allocation of 
power” (Schattschneider 1960: 64). Park understood that the political actor who is able to 
define the issues prevails and is likely to take over the political realm, since the 
development of new cleavage (i.e., economic growth vs. underdevelopment) from old 
one (i.e., democracy vs. authoritarianism) is a prime instrument of power. An example of 
the political obsession with economic development is the growth rate that the first Five 
Year Economic Development Plan (FYP) targeted: the military junta ambitiously 
proposed 7.1% of economic growth rates compared to 1.9% of 1953-1960 average 
growth rates (Tadashi 1991: 49). 
 Now the real problem that the military government faced is “who will be the 
developmental agents that serve its economic legitimatization?” Landlords had already 
lost their material bases and disintegrated as a class due to successful land reforms under 
the Rhee government. The possibility of making a coalition with the popular sector 
including urban workers, farmers, and small business owners must have been thin since 
the government did not want to “waste” scarce material resources on such a 
“distributional coalition.”  
 But there were a few big industrialists available for the junta to choose from. In 
the 1950s under the Rhee government, big industrialists emerged through acquiring 
former Japanese properties at bargain prices and privileged access to U.S. aid, bank 
loans, and public contracts. Unlike the KMT that resisted U.S. pressure to privatize 
colonial-firm-turned SOEs, in 1947 the Rhee government privatized SOEs, as USAID 
recommended, to bidders with strong political ties. Favorable treatment from the state 
was possible only through political connections with the state elites. By means of these 
connections, the big bourgeoisie gained economic favors in exchange for political 
contributions. For example, “in 1960 the Industrial Bank issued a 4.3 million won bond to 
nine enterprises and got 1.7 million back from them as contributions for presidential 
campaigns” (Kim 1975: 152). However their clientelistic relations with the state elites 
created a politically weak and dependent bourgeoisie (Kim 1976: 466-9), different from 
idealized vision of the Western “conquering bourgeoisie” featuring moral and political 
leadership for an industrial society.  
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But it should be noted that the junta’s choice of chaebols was not predetermined 
from the start of the military “revolution.” In an apparent effort to ensure the legitimacy 
of the coup for the citizens, the populist military junta enacted the “Special Law for 
Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation” to confiscate the industrialists’ fortunes. The 
Special Law was intended to nationalize new industries, which could have led the Park 
regime toward the Taiwan model where the KMT government controls the majority of 
industries in the name of SOEs.  
As the first FYP was initiated, however, the junta faced a dilemma of how to 
industrialize with the entrepreneurs who the Special Law targeted. Unfortunately, in the 
eyes of military leaderships, the bourgeoisie were the only viable economic force for the 
difficult task: they possessed entrepreneurial talents, organization, personnel, and capital 
resources. A deal was necessary. Thus the developmentalist EPB argued against their 
criminal prosecution, favoring political amnesty to the accused businessmen. General 
Park summoned the ten major business leaders and struck a deal with them, which 
resulted in the October 26 Decree:  
 
The government would exempt most businessmen from criminal 
prosecution; with the notable exception of commercial bank shares, 
existing assets would not be confiscated; and businessmen should instead 
pay off their assessed obligations by establishing new industrial firms and 
donating the shares to the government. (Jones and Sakong 1980: 69-70) 
 
In response, the convicted businessmen persuaded the government to actually 
help them build new industries under the long-term development plans. When the plants 
were completed, they were to pay the imposed fine by yielding a majority share of the 
stocks to the government. The military junta, however, allowed businessmen to pay in 
cash instead of giving up ownership, thus leaving control of the firms in private hands 
(Kim 1976: 471).  
 In fact, nationalization of industrial facilities was not a feasible option to the 
junta, since the U.S. government was a critical of the junta’s playing with the 
“communist idea.” General Park was deeply concerned about the suspicion American 
officials had – he had been a communist organizer of high level in Namnodang (South 
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Korea Labor Party) before the Korean War. Furthermore, the junta desperately needed a 
tremendous amount of cash to create its new civilian political organization, the 
Democratic Republican Party.  
 Interestingly enough, the junta confiscated commercial bank shares from the big 
businessmen. The accused business leaders gave up their equity shares in the banks to the 
government, but received promises of credit-based industrial financing. The military 
government controlled what French jurist Jean Bodin called “the nerve of the state,”4
which resulted in a credit-based financial structure for industrialization, as in France and 
Japan. The advantage of the credit-based system is that the state can influence the 
economy’s investment pattern and guide sectoral mobility. In such a structure, firms rely 
on bank credits for raising finances beyond retained earnings and respond quickly to the 
state’s policy, as expressed in the interest rate and preferential policy credits (Zysman 
1983: 76-7). 
 The Decree and subsequent events might be called a “historical compromise” that 
shaped the growth-oriented developmental coalition up to present day in Korea. The Park 
regime traded off the confiscation of illicit wealth that big private enterprises had 
gathered during the 1950s for their cooperation in industrialization that the regime 
proposed for its political legitimacy and survival. Granting industrial ownership to 
entrepreneurs while keeping them on a tight leash via financial control, the junta set up its 
developmental coalition. 
 Here we need to pay attention to the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)5, a
national organization of businessmen, and EPB, since they have been two institutional 
bases for the developmental coalition since the 1960s. The military junta released thirteen 
businessmen who were in jail for one and half months, requesting economic cooperation 
with its economic plan. In response, those entrepreneurs organized FKI which 
represented member industrialists’ interests to the government via policy proposals and 
lobbying.  
 The FKI was more than an interest group. It was an institution through which the 
government designated the member businessmen to several industries strategic for rapid 
 
4 This is requoted from Woo-Cumings (1999: 10).   
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economic growth. For example, in the summer of 1961, the junta offered as key 
industries cement, chemical fiber, electricity, fertilizer, steel, and oil refining, asking the 
FKI’s member businessmen to select a few sectors in the form of single or joint venture. 
The cement industry was allocated to Kumsung textile; fertilizers to Samsung and 
Samho; electricity to Daehan Milling; steel to Daehan Cement, Kukdong Shipping, 
Daehan Industry, and Dongyang Cement in joint enterprise; and the chemical textile to 
Hwashin, Chosun Textile, and Hankuk Glass (FKI 1991:61). Furthermore, the FKI often 
drafted its own investment plans such as the Ulsan Industrial Park and proposed it to EPB 
that in turn accepted and implemented the proposal (FKI 1991: 64).  
 Before the coup, it was at the level of individual firms that businessmen pursued 
their own profits and competed with each other. For example, competition in the auction 
of Japanese colonial enterprises, bidding for aid materials and funds, and use of personal 
ties for import quotas and licenses individualized their identity. After FKI was set up, the 
member businessmen gained a collective identity by the vehicle of the national umbrella 
organization (FKI 1991: 65-6). They organized themselves as a capitalist class beyond 
individual firms. They became eager to give input on sectoral and macroeconomic policy 
proposals to the government and implemented industrial tasks that EPB allocated to 
them. They became private agents of political legitimatization, monopolized each sector 
allotted by the state, and obtained various incentives such as cheap foreign loans and 
foreign exchange, tax relief, and preferential credits. Entrepreneurs in Korea formed 
themselves into a class not in conflict with organized workers as in advanced countries, 
but in cooperation with the state. They were, however, political capitalists in that “they 
played on political connections to gain economic favors in exchange for political 
contributions” (Kim 1976: 469). They were the junior partner of the developmental 
coalition depending on state-generated rents.  
 Another pillar of the developmental coalition was the EPB.  Bureaucrats began 
discussing economic planning in the late 1950s, although it was not actualized due to 
policy disagreements in officialdom and political instability. The military junta stepped in 
and took command. After researching Japanese and Indian experience, General Song 
 
5 FKI was called AFI (Association of Korean Industries) before 1968. 
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Yochan, a leader of military technocrats, and his staff set up the EPB, taking budgeting 
from the Ministry of Finance, statistics from the Ministry of Interior, and planning from 
the Ministry of Construction. The EPB head was given the title of Deputy Prime 
Minister. It took about two months for the junta to set up this supper-ministry after the 
coup (Lee 1993: 77-87). Such rapid institution building was possible because the junta 
had to convince the people of its political enthusiasm for economic development. The 
principal ideology that the EPB adopted for industrial growth was an “economy of scale” 
based on mass production and capital concentration for rapid growth, which resulted in a 
big business-oriented growth strategy. 
 The EPB was the de facto and de jure center of rapid industrialization like “a train 
to move forward through history as fast as possible” (Gramsci 1971: 98). It formulated, 
implemented, and supervised every economic plan, which transformed the 
underdeveloped agrarian society to a middle-income industrialized one in only two 
decades. They controlled the cross-sectoral flow of economic resources and pressured the 
central bank to adjust monetary supplies and interest rates to their economic goals. They 
also determined “which firms invest how much funds to which sectors” and “which firms 
are out of market,” taking full responsibility in every corner of economic affairs. EPB 
was, in Ralf Dahrendorf’s term (1968), “plan rational,” rather than “market rational,” in 
that rather than accepting some predefined place in a world divided on the basis of 
“comparative advantage,” it sought to create “competitive advantages” by sophisticated 
planning. 
 EPB enjoyed indicative authority and autonomy vis-à-vis big business during the 
1960-70s industrialization era, more than its Japanese counterpart MITI (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry) did vis-à-vis Zaibatsu. The Korean state was senior 
partner of the developmental coalition. Two political economists compared the Japan 
with the Korea as follows: 
 
In Japan, ascension to the top of both executive and legislative branches 
requires success in electoral politics, especially in the parliamentary 
system, and this in turn depends heavily upon the financing and support of 
business. In Korea, Park’s original power base was the military and other 
executive agencies.... When elections have been held, they have been 
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financed by levies on the business community. This has taken the form of 
an unavoidable political tax levied by a powerful incumbent, rather than a 
discretionary contribution that imposes obligations on the recipient. (Jones 
and Sakong 1980: 67-8) 
 
What was the role of the governing party in developmental coalition? The military 
government set up the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in May of 1963, with the help 
of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), to mobilize civilian support for the 
Park regime and to offset criticism from opposition parties for its lack of democratic 
legitimacy. The DRP argued that their political aim was to uphold the spirit of military 
“revolution,” purify political culture, and push a generational shift in political scene 
(Central Council for Election Management 1968: 262). The DRP organization was “a 
highly centralized structure, with a disciplined party membership, and a single command 
from the headquarters to the provincial, city, and district branches. The party secretariat 
had 1,300 permanent salaried staff members, and its operation cost was estimated at 
700,000 dollars a month in 1966” (Kim 1975: 236). DRP was a modern political party in 
terms of organization, totally different from previous parties which were actually loose 
and personalized cliques or elite groups in Seoul. DRP was an “externally created party.” 
Such parties tend to be more centralized than those that are internally created, “more 
ideologically coherent and disciplined, less subject to influence from the legislative 
contingents of the parties, and generally less willing to ascribe major importance to or be 
deferential toward parliament” (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966: 10). 
DRP’s original plan was to subordinate government activities to the party, 
especially its central standing committee, and to make DRP the center of national power 
in the hope of spreading their spirit of military “revolution” to the government and 
society (Kim 1975: 235). But economic bureaucrats regarded “bending” to party 
influence as diverting government attention from its priority tasks, assuming that 
narrowly partisan interests could not represent the national interest. The military 
government supported developmental technocrats at the expense of its own political arm 
in the legislature.  
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President Park frequently faced serious party challenges to the basic 
organization and direction of the economic program, usually centered on 
the EPB head, Chang Key-young. The president twice intervened 
personally, in 1965 and 1966, to choke off an attempt from the DRP to 
obtain votes of nonconfidence in Chang…. This conflict was a struggle for 
economic power. The president was prepared to defend the highly 
centralized and aggressive direction of economic policy that had 
developed under Chang and to keep policy initiatives in the hands of those 
primarily loyal to himself, rather than to the more diverse interests of the 
party. President Park was determined to maintain the cabinet largely intact 
as a whole against repeated appeals from the DRP for a major shake-up. 
(Cole and Lyman 1971: 96) 
 
Thus DRP and the legislature, the National Assembly, were relegated to a “rubber 
stamp” for the executive branch of the government, passing most of the bills bureaucrats 
proposed to the floor. The government frequently pressured the legislature to pass its bills 
on a schedule determined by the president. “In frustration, the opposition reacted by 
liberally using its prerogative to question cabinet ministers on political issues. This made 
it a valuable democratic forum for certain public issues but had little more than nuisance 
value in affecting the executive’s developmental policies”(Cole and Lyman 1971: 244). 
Some statistics show the government’s dominance in public law and policy making over 
the legislature: 84 percent of the passed bills in 1970s were initiated by the government, 
rather than members of the legislature (Jones and Sakong 1980: 28). Furthermore, after 
the revision of the constitution in late 1962 that institutionalized strong presidentialism, 
President Park used his own decree power to push growth-first plans, bypassing public 
discussion in the legislature: of 84 major economic bills between 1961 and 1991, 79 were 
enacted by presidential decrees and the rest were passed in the name of administrative 
orders at the ministerial level.6 The governing DRP and the opposition did not propose 
any significant policy bills in the turbulent industrial transformation era. They did not 
check and balance developmental technocrats by gathering various societal inputs form 
society.  
Was there any political challenge to EOI developmental coalition driven by EPB 
technocrats and FKI industrialists? Unlike Taiwan, Korean authoritarian government did 
 
6 I calculated the figures based on Korean Development Institute (1995) and Lee (1993: 394-403). 
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not dare to suspend the political schedules of elections at the national level, which 
suggests that political leadership felt a serious burden from periodic electoral 
competition, which allowed opposition parties to rally urban citizens.  
It was in the early 1970s that the coalition faced serious political challenges from 
opposition parties. Two elections in 1971 showed that even restricted democracy could 
not be an institutional framework to sustain an unbalanced growth-oriented industrial 
strategy. Although Park won the presidential election of April 1971 with 53.2% of the 
votes, 45.3% went for the young prominent opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung from the 
New Democratic Party (NDP). Kim waged an influential campaign against the Park 
regime. One month later, DRP earned 48.8% of the total votes while the NDP garnered 
44.3% in the general election (Central Council for Election Management 1982: 582, 564), 
which threatened the political survival of authoritarian elites. During their campaign, 
especially in urban areas, Kim Dae Jung and the NDP focused on fair economy and 
democracy including greater control of inflation, public sale of corporate shares in large 
firms, greater opportunity for small business, balanced rural-urban development, a self-
reliant national economy, and opposition to developmental dictatorship (Central Council 
for Election Management 1982: 571-6). Their campaign was a populist appeal to the 
mainly urban liberal sector, white collar workers, students, intellectuals, and workers, 
who formed a loose distributional coalition.  
The Park government was confronted with two options. One was to continue the 
narrow developmental coalition with chaebols, excluding the popular sector. The other 
was to incorporate the subordinate groups into its developmental scheme.  Those 1971 
elections reflected the people’s voice against ills created by an unbalanced economic 
growth where big business monopolized the economic benefits. Democratic opposition 
wanted to “expand public investment in the agricultural sector and create a domestic 
market by increasing the supply of wage goods and the income of the popular masses 
while maintaining an open development strategy” (Im 1987: 266).  
The Park government stuck to the first option. With the Emergency Decree on 
National Security at the end of 1971, Park forced a more stringent “bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime” (O’Donnell 1973) with a change in the constitutional framework, 
the Yushin Constitution, by which he was allowed to select a third Assembly member at 
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his disposal without elections. Setting up the Yushin regime by autogolpe, the Park 
government depended on a more dangerous degree of economic success to compensate 
for its lack of democratic legitimacy. “The more insecure the government became, the 
greater the pressure on industry to expand” (Pye 1988: 85). The government launched 
this industrial deepening in 1972.  
In fact, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Korean economy mainly had two 
problems: saturation of light industrialization and debt-ridden firms. Growth via labor-
intensive light manufacturing in the 1960s reached its limit and there was a policy 
proposal from bureaucrats arguing for the need to seek another developmental alternative. 
True, Korean industries depended on imported capital and intermediate goods purchased 
with external financing, which resulted in the pressure of debt services and thus debt-
ridden firms’ bankruptcy in late 1960s. To solve the saturation problem, the government 
chose to upgrade its industrial structure from light industry to “heavy chemical 
industrialization” (HCI) in 1972. It officially targeted six industries (steel, chemical, 
metal, machine-building, ship-building, and electronics) for import substitution of capital 
and intermediate goods (Lee 1993: 176-80).  
Responses were critical of the HCI plan. The American government criticized the 
HCI strategy since it believed that the plan was “unsuited to the factor endowments and 
small domestic market in Korea” (Kuznet 1977: 152). In other words, “Korea was 
violating a rational international division of labor” (Cumings 1987: 76). FKI was deeply 
concerned that the plan would limit private firms’ initiatives in the free market, and some 
EPB bureaucrats claimed that they could not mobilize massive capital and high 
technology to implement the plan (FKI 1991: 128; Lee 1993: 222). Since the HCI was a 
direct result of executive initiatives aimed at political legitimatization through industrial 
performance, President Park openly bypassed policy deliberation among officialdom, 
academia, and interest groups. Now, the practical problem boiled down to how to 
mobilize financial resources for the grandiose industrial voyage to an uncharted sea.  
To clear away the financial constraint, the government pronounced the August 3 
Decree in 1972 which was inconceivable in a free-enterprise or laissez-faire economy. 
The decree was to “confiscate” financial resources from financiers and private savers. Its 
main features were:  
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All the loan agreements between business and lenders in the unregulated 
financial market were nullified and replaced by new ones. The borrowers 
would have to repay loans over a five-year period after a three-year grace 
period, carrying a 1.35 percent monthly interest rate, or the lenders had the 
option to switch their loans into shares of the borrowing firms. Some of 
the short-term high-interest-rate bank loans by business firms were 
replaced by long-term loans at an 8 percent annual interest rate, payable 
over a five-year period, after a three-year grace period. An overall 
reduction in the interest rates of banking institutions lowered the time 
deposit rate from 17.4 percent to 12.6 percent and general loans up to one 
year form 19 percent to 15.5 percent. (Cole and Park 1983: 162-3) 
 
What the Park government feared was that increasing business bankruptcies 
would undermine the nations’ credit standing in the world market and hamper the inflow 
of foreign capital, which ran counter to the high growth objective of the government. As 
a result, the government decided to bail out those troubled firms. The volume of informal 
loans reported by firms “amounted to 345.6 billion won, approximately 80 percent of the 
money supply at that time” (Cole and Park 1983: 163). When facing economic troubles, 
the government coercively mobilized financial resources from the market, foreign or 
domestic, and distributed them to selected firms that would follow official economic 
strategies. This is a patterned dynamic of “financial crises – industrial restructuring” 
which was repeated in the early 1960s, early 1970s, early 1980s, and 1998-9.  
As Gerschenkron commented on German-style late development, “the supply of 
capital ofr the needs of industrialization required the compulsory machinery of the 
government, which… succeeded in directing incomes form consumption to investment” 
(Gerschenkron 1962: 20). The HCI-Yushin regime was an upgraded version of 
developmentalism. The National Investment Fund (NIF) was established in 1973 to 
maneuver the financially leveraged big firms into new heavy and chemical sectors. The 
NIF extended 65.5 percent of its total funds to HCI sectors during 1973-78. Thus the ten 
biggest firms’ average assets invested in the HCI sectors were 70.6 percent of their total 
assets in 1972 and 84.7 percent in 1979 (FKI 1991: 296). Policy loans issued by the Bank 
of Korea (BOK) were 55.2 percent in 1975, 78.6 in 1978, and 59.3 in 1980 out of the 
total BOK loans (Woo 1991: 162). As a result, the developmental coalition gave birth to 
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the “too-big-to-fail” problem in Korean society which Theodore Lowi (1969: 279-280) 
called “permanent receivership,” where: 
 
A government maintains a steadfast position that any institution large 
enough to be a significant factor in the society may have its stability 
underwritten. It is a system of policies that sets a general floor under risk, 
either by attempting to eliminate risk or to reduce or share the costs of 
failure…. Permanent receivership would simply involve public or joint 
public-private maintenance of the assets in their prebankrupt form and 
never disposing of them at all, regardless of inequities, inefficiencies, or 
costs of maintenance. This is quite conceivable as long as a government or 
a large private enterprises assure all the creditors that they would be better 
off allowing the original enterprises to continue operations than if they 
liquidated and took their ten cents on the dollar. 
 
In summary, the Park government’s developmental coalition with big bourgeoisie 
was motivated from its lack of democratic legitimacy. The government felt it urgent to 
impress citizens with its economic performance until the next election came near. The 
state invited chaebols to the coalition and poured financial resources into them, alienating 
the popular sector and other subordinate groups. The FKI and the EPB were the main 
institutional arms used to sustain the unbalanced growth strategy and the political elites 
protected industrialists and technocrats from distributional demands.  
 
Taiwan: Broad Coalition without Big Business and Balanced Stability-Oriented Strategy 
The Taiwan case shows how political interests during the state-formation process 
molded the organizations of private interests in society. As Otto Hintze (1929: 427) 
emphasized, “the rise and development of capitalism remains unintelligible without an 
insight into how it was conditioned by the course of nation-building and by the spirit of 
politics.”  
According to Barrington Moore, the KMT represented a reactionary and 
protofascist element in the transition to a modern China. The KMT’s main social basis 
was, despite its nationalist and revolutionary discourse, “antagonistic cooperation 
between rural landlords and urban commercial, financial and industrial interests. The 
KMT, through its control of the means of violence, served as the link that held the 
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coalition together, which resembled Franco’s Spain and Hitler’s NSDAP” (Moore 1966: 
196-7). 
Then, what were the political conditions under which the KMT government chose 
to broaden its developmental coalition after the Nationalist’ relocation to the small 
island? First, the Nationalists did not find a big bourgeoisie on the island who were 
reliable for the industrialization project. When the émigré government crossed the 
Taiwan Strait to Formosa (i.e., old name of Taiwan) in 1949, the majority of the 
mainland private financiers and industrials fled to the U.S. and Hong Kong. 
Counterfactually speaking, if they had followed the KMT, the Nationalists might have 
pursued the Malaysian path, where ruling elites deliberately nurtured entrepreneurship 
within their ethnic group, bumiputera (sons of the soils) in the name of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), discriminating against the local wealthy Chinese business 
community. 
The second condition was the existence of a sub-ethnic cleavage that divided the 
mainlander and the islander. The Nationalists found themselves in an alien society: they 
constituted only a 15 percent minority while 85 percent of the inhabitants were native 
Taiwanese (Cheng 1993: 59). The sub-ethnic difference was an important barrier, with 
the mainlander political elite being differentiated from the Taiwanese business elites. For 
example, the Economic Cooperation Administration reported after an extensive field 
survey as follows:  
 
They [Taiwanese manufacturers] emphatically said that they employed no 
mainlanders in their plants and had no intention of doing so, and added 
that no Taiwanese hold responsible positions in government factories. The 
Chinese government has not cultivated the loyalty and cooperation of the 
Taiwanese people. (Simon 1988: 147)  
 
The KMT leadership viewed the formation of private indigenous economic power 
as a challenge to their hegemony on the island. Thus, the Nationalists could not count on 
indigenous economic elites as private agents of economic development as in Korea. 
Instead, they chose to nationalize major Japanese colonial firms and islander-owned 
enterprises, transforming them into SOEs that in turn created a lot of jobs for government 
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officials from mainland China. As for landlords, the KMT crushed the traditional rural 
elites by executing land reforms which later became the material base of rural support for 
the émigré government. It was at the socio-economic level that the Nationalists forged a 
loose but broad coalition with social groups to consolidate their power in the popular 
sector.  
In addition, the KMT government’s agenda emphasized economic growth with 
macroeconomic stability, equity, and redistribution. The coalition adopted a balanced 
strategy to narrow sectoral, regional, rural-urban, and interclass gaps. The inflation rate is 
a good example of the balanced growth of the island economy. Taiwan was successful in 
keeping its inflation in the single digits, averaging 6.5 percent between 1955 and 1990 
(Council 1995).  According to Charles S. Maier, a high inflation rate has a 
socioeconomic base, since it can be conceived of as a failure of production to respond to 
expectation among economic actors. The rate of Taiwan’s inflation fits the “creeping 
inflation” type. The prerequisite for this type is economic growth that avoids a harsh 
distributional conflict between classes, keeping the “balance of social forces” and 
“general consensus of all classes on high employment and welfare” (Maier 1978: 43, 59). 
 But indigenous islanders could not have political representation in proportion to 
their population, especially at the national level. A record of the ethnic breakdown of the 
KMT’s Central Standing Committee (CSC), the power center of the party, shows that 
indigenous membership constituted, on average, 3.6 percent in 1950s, 9.3 percent in 
1960s, and 20.6 percent in 1970s (Pang 1992: 66). Furthermore, the Nationalists imposed 
an Emergency Decree by which martial law came into effect from 1949 until July 1987, 
although many measures like military law, curfews, and military street patrols were not 
utilized.  
The distinctive feature of the politics of the economic development in Taiwan is 
that the Nationalist party assumed the supreme authority to sustain and supervise the 
broad coalition and its economic projects. Given the fusion of the party with the state, the 
KMT provided the only formal links and coordinating mechanisms among the disparate 
arms of the state. All the major government appointments and decisions and all the 
proposed legislation had to be approved by the CSC of the party. No branch of the state 
apparatus, not even the judiciary, was immune from the influence of party bureaucrats. 
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For almost four decades, no opposition party was legally allowed to form and compete 
with the KMT.  
 The KMT dominated the Legislative Yuan. 539 out of the 760 who were elected 
in 1948 had followed Chiang Kai-shek across the Taiwan Strait to the island, constituting 
an overwhelming majority of the Yuan. Those “old” members held their posts without re-
election for more than three decades. To fill the national elective offices when old 
members died, as well as to broaden the foundation of the government, elections have 
been held since 1969. As a result, in 1985, the new membership totaled 348, although 
more than 80 percent were the KMT members (Pang 1992: 73). 
 In a way, the KMT was an institutional twin of the Communist Party in mainland 
China (Linebarger 1937: 161-4). The party permeated almost all aspects of political life, 
with membership reaching almost 20 percent of the entire adult male population (Chu 
1994: 116). Gold (1986: 60) describes the KMT’s dominant position on the island as 
follows: 
 
The KMT is still Leninist in structure and in its democratic-centralist 
principles of organization. Its rank and file is members of party cells that 
exist in schools, the military, residential street offices, enterprises, social 
organizations, and overseas Chinese communities. Their main function is 
to ensure that party policies are implemented and to resist challenges to 
KMT domination. Four hundred service centers around the island provide 
a variety of social services as well as a means of keeping informed of local 
affairs. ‘Security offices’ in private enterprises, schools, and civic bodies 
perform a control function. At the local level, party cadres are also 
charged with selecting candidates for elections and using whatever means 
are necessary to see them through to victory. This function gained in 
importance with the implementation of local self-government. It often 
meant coopting local elites and manipulating extant factional conflicts. 
 
Comparatively, the KMT succeeded in institutionalizing its authoritarian rule 
through the vehicle of the pseudo-mass party, while the ruling DRP in Korea failed to 
institutionalize their rule over society because they were threatened by opposition parties 
and democratic upsurges. The KMT generated and approved major governmental policy 
decisions. Politically sensitive economic decisions like financial, monetary, and industrial 
policies required cooperation with party leaders. As a result, economic officials were not 
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entrusted with the power to manipulate economic policies. “Senior economic policy 
makers did not enjoy the same political standing as their rivals in the military and 
security agencies and senior party officials in charge of organizational and ideological 
affairs” (Chu 1994: 117). In terms of membership of the CSC in 1952 through 1984, 
political elites dominated the CSC over military, economic, and cultural leaders: 
members with a political background were 51.67 percent in 1950s, 50.34 in 1960s, and 
40.2 in 1970s and early 1980s, whereas members with an economic background were 
3.74, 8.67, and 26.76 in respective periods (Pang 1992: 69). A wide range of public 
policies were off-limits to the economic bureaucrats at the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEA) and the Council of Economic Development and Planning (CEDP). Furthermore, 
economic bureaucrats’ actions were subject to surveillance by security agencies and party 
officials. “Leniency toward private vested interests could be mistaken for favoritism” 
(Chu 1994: 118). 
Then, what policy orientation did the party officials impose and disseminate to the 
developmental technocrats? An official partisan doctrine is the Principle of Minsheng,
people’s livelihood, which was meant to push late industrialization in China, without the 
pathology of the class struggle. Programs supporting this principle are the promotion of 
state capital, regulation of private capital, direct taxation, and socialized distribution of 
wealth (Sun 1927: 386-9). Although the principle was ill-defined and subject to various 
practical interpretations by the Nationalists, it surely was the main concern for party 
leaders like Chiang Kai-shek when he argued:  
 
Almost every one of our comrades knows that our failure in the anti-
communist struggle is due to our neglect of the Ming-sheng Principle in 
the mainland. Every comrade also knows that henceforth in our anti-
Communist struggle we must rely on the Principle. We should realize the 
Min-sheng Principle through practical action, not theoretical discussion. 
(Pang 1992: 84) 
 
Thus when economic technocrats proposed a highly preferential credit policy and 
privatization of state capital for rapid economic expansion, their proposal was 
counterbalanced by the KMT’s strong obsession with keeping monetary stability and 
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financial orthodoxy, and with sustaining broad support among SMEs, farmers, and state 
employees.  
 Then how did the KMT government achieve speedy economic growth when it 
invited diverse private interests into the developmental coalition? How did they 
orchestrate various economic agents’ passion and interests into one national effort as they 
desired? The KMT maintained the broad socioeconomic coalition through “field 
manipulation,” rather than selective intervention or command, so that the government 
looked relatively neutral to sectoral or regional interests and took a more balanced view 
of development (Ho 1978: 251). According to Dahl and Lindblom, a manipulated field 
control is “deliberate action on another person’s field (by means other than command) in 
order to secure a definite response, by manipulating signals about rewards and 
deprivations” (1953: 104). Compliance or non-compliance is up to the controllee’s 
decision and is on its own reward. Field manipulation either expands the perceived 
opportunity set, or alters expected payoffs from particular courses of action. Command, 
on the other hand, reduces the feasible opportunity set, assuming there is sufficient 
compulsion to make it operable (Dahl and Lindblom 1953: 104-108).  
Taiwan basically used a field manipulation mode of market intervention while 
Korea heavily relied on a command approach, often with good effect (Jones and Sakong 
1980: 84).  A KMT official commented on field manipulation by saying: 
 
The KMT was actually an “invincible armada” in this island. Some people 
say we always imposed our will to society. Yes, it is true. But that’s a half 
story. We were constantly concerned about our fairness and neutrality 
toward various socio-economic groups in market. In my opinion, we might 
have to adopt the [field manipulation] strategy not to give impression that 
the KMT favored a few vested social and economic interests, keeping our 
broad support bases sustainable. We knew we were a minority ethnic 
group. And our efforts worked.(interview, summer of 2003, Taipei, 
Taiwan)  
 
According to Ian Little, although Taiwan’s economic plan was not very different 
from those found in developing countries, the core of the Taiwanese plan consisted of the 
macroeconomic projections that had no planning force – unsupported by controls. 
Taiwan’s loose plan and non-commanding style lacked the mechanisms associated with 
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indicative planning. “There were no standing consultative committees with private 
industry; any consultations were ad hoc. There were virtually no teeth either. Thus, the 
textile industry was apparently rightly warned that it was overinvesting in 1973, but it 
went ahead anyway” (Little 1979: 487-8). 
 To encourage industrial growth, Taiwan depended on fiscal incentives, especially 
tax reductions, while Korea mainly relied on discretionary control of policy credit 
allocation (Kim and Yu 1998). As Zysman suggests, taxation, a typical example of a 
fiscal measure, is not as flexible as credit allocation. “Taxes can be used to target 
categories of action but they are difficult to manipulate toward specific industrial ends. 
Moreover, taxes operate to increase profits from gross earnings; they tend to follow rather 
than to lead new industrial activities” (1983: 77). According to Cheng (1990: 158), fiscal 
incentives were the main financial instrument for SMEs, the backbone of the national 
wealth:  
 
“Fiscal incentives in Taiwan forced a choice between an attractive tax 
holiday for new undertakings and a depreciation allowance for the 
established firms, a choice leading to the proliferation of new but small-
medium firms. The reinvestiment restriction of the Company Act also 
dissuaded firms from branching out… The Act was very restrictive in the 
scope of business operation as well as the interfirm equity flow, which had 
the effect of dissuading industrial concentration. 
Government-business relations in Taiwan were relatively “distant and cool.” The 
relations are characterized by “commensualism” (i.e., they cooperated but acted as two 
separate parts), rather than the “symbiosis” (i.e., they not only cooperated but also acted 
as an integral unit) as found in Japanese or Korean political and economic elites (Pang 
1992: 113). The story of the steel industry shows how the KMT treated private business 
associations in its developmental project.  
In 1962 the Taiwan steel sector organized their national peak association, the 
Taiwan Iron and Steel Industries Association (TISIA). The Association set up a 
cooperative export system where it fixed export prices, set up a common fund for export 
promotion schemes, and regulated under- and over-production. “The system also helped 
reduce downward pressures on domestic steel prices. But as the number of member firms 
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increased, they became the focus of repeated controversies within the government, and 
finally collapsed in 1971” (Nobel 1998: 74).  
It collapsed because the industry association attempted to form cartels and other 
forms of collective action and thus their efforts were blocked by the government. Gregory 
Nobel (1998: 73) explains as follows: 
 
While the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was sympathetic to industry requests for collective 
adjustment of capacity, the higher and more political levels of the regime 
remained resolutely opposed. The president and his top advisers, the 
Ministry of Finance, and most ministers of economic affairs were 
profoundly skeptical of the private sector and unwilling to countenance 
private cartels.  
 
Outside observers complained sardonically about the Nationalists’ attitude toward 
the association, comparing it to their idealized Japanese and Korean counterparts (Noble 
1998: 81).  
 
In Taiwan industry associations rarely have administrative leadership 
functions. This is not a problem of the iron and steel industry association 
alone but of all the industry associations. Currently, the iron and steel 
industry associations in Japan and Korea have the ability to regulate the 
production and sales of their members. If we look back at the iron and 
steel industry association in our country, to the present day it has not even 
been able to publish a single journal. How could we expect it to have the 
strength to regulate production and sales?  
 
The story does not necessarily mean that the KMT government was passive about 
industrial deepening. Rather, the government launched their sixth four-year plan (1972-
76) that called for developing heavy and chemical industries to replace imports of 
intermediate raw materials and capital goods, and to increase exports. The government 
commissioned Arthur D. Little, Incorporated (ADL) to suggest an economic strategy; 
ADL advised upgrading by investing in petrochemicals, electrical machinery and 
equipment, electronics, precision machine tools, and computers (Gold 1986: 94).  
Given that heavy industrialization is a capital-intensive project, how did the KMT 
implement its industrial deepening without nurturing private big businesses that could 
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threaten its balanced coalition? The Nationalists’ solution was to allow the state sector to 
lead the EOI deepening. In a sense, the HCI project was launched against the backdrop of 
an uneasy relationship between the KMT government and local industrialists. The reentry 
of state capital was justified in the steel and shipbuilding industries since high capital 
intensity and a long gestation of investment might deter private initiatives. While the Park 
regime in Korea urged private big businesses to join the grand projects and thus 
coordinate what each firm specialized to produce, the KMT government strategically put 
its SOEs in major backward industrial linkage, and dispersed private investment in 
various productions. A story of the petrochemical industry shows how the KMT 
orchestrated a balanced growth strategy inviting SOEs, big business, and SMEs in that 
sector. 
 SOEs, like China Petroleum Corporation and Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation, 
monopolized oil refining and upstream basic feedstocks (Naphtha, Ethane, and Benzene). 
Taiwanese jituanqiye, big business groups, purchased upstream materials and produced 
midstream intermediate raw materials (vinyl chloride and ethylene glycol, etc.) which are 
obtained by SMEs who manufactured downstream final products (plastic and rubber 
products). Output of SOEs and business groups was usually for domestic sales while 
SMEs produced petrochemicals for domestic consumption and, in larger amount, export. 
As petrochemicals were exported by SMEs – the backbone of national wealth – the SOEs 
and big private enterprises could not form a cartel to put the squeeze on SMEs by price 
collusion because their profits depended on SMEs’ price competitiveness in foreign 
markets (Tuan 1990). This industrial arrangement is a stark contrast to the Korean 
experience where a few chaebols like SK, LG, and Samsung dominated the 
petrochemical industry, each firm maintaining vertical integration from oil refining to 
finial products for export (Chung 1999: 112-3; Shin 1999: 324-5). 
The KMT government got SOEs, big firms, and SMEs involved and designed a 
“checks and balance” system in the petrochemical industry while maintaining its strategic 
position in overall backward linkage. Ying-yi Tu (2001: 236) describes the government’s 
policy toward the petrochemical industry as follows: 
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The KMT government, with the objective of discouraging monopolitistic 
behavior of the large business groups, did not allow the petrochemical 
industry to develop into an integrated operation. Instead, the operations of 
upsteam and midstream manufacturers were separated from each other. 
Midstream operations were in turn segregated into a series of 
manufacturing processes, with a corresponding increase in the number of 
manufacturers. Unfortunately this resulted in products at various states of 
completion changing hands more frequently, and overall production costs 
increased. 
 
Sometimes there were price disputes among SOEs, business groups, and SMEs. 
For example, in 1979, midstream suppliers sold their products in foreign markets because 
world prices were higher than domestic ones. As a result, local downstream SMEs 
suffered from insufficient supplies of intermediate materials. In response, downstream 
producers increased their imports of intermediate raw materials in 1980 when the world 
prices were relatively low. It was a game of “prisoners’ dilemma” where each sector 
pursued each short-term interest at the cost of overall and long-term prosperity. The KMT 
stepped in, orchestrating a compromise by influencing the upstream manufacturers, 
mostly SOEs, to lower the prices they charged to midstream producers, who in turn 
lowered the prices they charged to the downstream producers (Tu 2001: 243).  
It should be noted that the capital-intensive industrial upgrading plan in the 1970s 
was motivated not only by a saturation problem that successful light industry in the 1960s 
came to face. Several political factors contributed to the industrial transformation just as 
in the Korean case: geopolitical change and political succession problems.  
The Nationalists experienced many diplomatic disasters in the early 1970s: the 
successful PRC’s atomic bomb test in 1964, the secret visit to China by Henry Kissinger 
in July 1971, the UN’s ostracism of Taiwan in the fall of 1971, and President Nixon’s 
Shanghai Communiqué with Chou En-lai in February 1971. This series of events 
seriously challenged the KMT’s boasts about retaking the mainland by force. It was 
under the national security crisis that Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, 
became premier in 1972.7 He actually dominated the politics of the island on behalf of 
 
7 Chiang Ching-kuo dominated the politics in early 1970s due to the untimely death of his chief rival, 
Ch’en Ch’eng in 1965, and the progressive physical weakness of his father, Chiang Kai-shek. He was a 
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his father who then was physically weak. He had been a security czar controlling the 
military and intelligence agency until the early 1970s, when he gathered the instruments 
of economic policy making around the premier’s office, ousting his old rivals, Hsu Po-
yuan and Li Kuo-ting. He came to power in 1972 and he launched the next year the Ten 
Major Development Projects (TMDP) including transportation system (freeway, railroad, 
airport, and harbor) and heavy chemical industries (integrated steel mill, petrochemical 
complex, shipyard, and power plants) (Gold 1986: 93, 98). As he actually succeeded to 
his father’s political power during the crisis of confidence in the ability of the 
Nationalists to control the island’s fate, he enthusiastically implemented the TMDP. A 
professor commented on the TMDP as follows:  
 
Chiang Ching-kuo was the security czar in the 1960s during which he took 
charge of national defense and military intelligence under the auspices of 
his father. But the diplomatic crisis of the early 1970s proved that national 
security and reunification that he had been involved in were simply a 
failure. Furthermore the first oil shock was ready to upset Taiwan, an 
export-dependent small open economy. As he became the premier in 1972, 
he needed to do something different that could legitimize and consolidate 
his power. In a way, the Ten Major Development Projects played the role. 
He decided to push the plan to boost the self-confidence of the people and 
survive the turmoil of the days. The project was, in a way, a result of 
diplomatic and economic crisis and political succession problem 
(interview, summer of 2003, Taipei, Taiwan). 
 
The aforementioned regional shakeup of geopolitics also affected Korea in the 
early 1970s, when the Park government launched the HCI plan in response to the Nixon 
administration’s recognition of the People’s China and its withdrawal of a division of 
U.S. troops out of Korea. The Park government pressed for the HCI project, arguing that 
“the [HCI] project would keep the Korean peninsula safe from communist threats 
because the American government would not let any free country with considerable 
industrial capacity fall under the control of communists” (Kim 1990: 359).  
 Whereas in 1972 the Park government moved to a more exclusive Yushin regime 
by autogolpe to push the HCI, the KMT did not move in such way. Rather it started 
 
security czar by his influence in the military and security apparatuses. He became minister of national 
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liberalization and Taiwanization to break through the confidence crisis. The measures 
were aimed at “moderation by engagement,” making Taiwanese disappointments and 
complaints about the KMT fizzle out.  In 1969 it held the first elections in two decades 
to fill the increasing vacancies in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control 
Yuan. The diplomatic setbacks in the early 1970s pressured the mainlanders into opening 
more opportunities in local government for Taiwanese people. In 1972, indigenous local 
politicians constituted 58 percent of the provincial government councils, 97 percent of the 
provincial assemblies, and 100 percent of the county executives. In addition, the KMT 
sought to recruit indigenous islanders as its nominees: they constituted 88 percent of total 
party nominees in the Legislative Yuan, 91 percent in the National Assembly, and 60 
percent in the Judicial Yuan. The Taiwanization was, however, limited to the legislative 
branch of the national government, and executive and legislative branches of the local 
government. Key portfolios in the KMT government were still dominated by the 
mainlanders: Taiwanese were 14 percent in the KMT Central Standing Committee, 19 




The chapter has discussed the political conditions under which two Asian NICs 
invited different socioeconomic groups into their developmental coalitions. It also 
compared how each government managed and sustained its own coalition during great 
transformations from poor rural societies to upper-middle-income countries.  
General-turned-president Park’s authoritarian regime suffered from a lack of 
political legitimacy since it originated from a military coup in 1961, crushing the April 
Uprising of 1960 and the democratic Chang Myon government. The developmental 
regime based its legitimacy on economic developments that the preceding governments 
had failed to achieve. Furthermore, the Park government was subject to a short time 
horizon: it had to prove its economic legitimization before the next election. Thus the 
government employed the “economy of scale” strategy and chose a few big businessmen 
 
defense in 1965 and vice-premier in 1969. 
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as industrializing agents, pouring tremendous amounts of financial resources in the form 
of policy loans. Since the political leadership excluded the government party from 
economic policy making, the party could not counterbalance the technocrat-led growth-
first drive tolerating macroeconomic and financial instability.  
In the case of Taiwan, the KMT learned the lesson of economic stability from 
their historical trauma, i.e., their defeat in the mainland of China and their retreat to the 
small island. Desperate and humiliated when crossing the Taiwan Strait, the KMT 
leadership implemented a stringent stabilization program in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, which has been the policy core that guided the postwar “balanced-growth-with-
stability” path until recently. 
The KMT’s anti-private capitalist ideology and Minsheng principle included 
various sectors like farmers, SMEs, SOE employers in its loose yet broad developmental 
coalition. Its dictatorial welfarism was possible given the sub-ethnic cleavages along 
which mainlanders monopolized public officialdom while indigenous Taiwanese were 
dispersed in the private sphere and were not able to concentrate economic power in a few 
hands. 
 The next chapter will compare Korea and Taiwan on a sector-by-sector basis (i.e., 
big business, SMEs, finance, agriculture, and labor) to show in detail how each sector 




Chapter 3: Social Bases of Developmental Paths 
 This chapter utilizes detailed data and statistics about the social bases of 
developmental paths in Taiwan and Korea to demonstrate how developmental politics 
mentioned in the previous chapter were associated with divergent sectoral arrangements. 
On average, Taiwan was more successful than Korea in accommodating and balancing 
various private interests under the roof of a softer authoritarianism.  
The first section discusses industrial concentration in each economy, focusing on 
chaebols in Korea, and SOEs and jituanqiye (business group) in Taiwan. The second 
section deals with the economic status of SMEs in each country including large-small 
firm relations, government’s SME policies, and access to financial resources. In the third 
section, I show that although the two countries experienced relatively identical degrees of 
financial development, they were different in terms of financial mobilization, loan 
distribution, efficiency of the banking industry, financial ownership, and loan extending 
behaviors. The fourth and fifth sections look into the popular sector. The former 
discusses agriculture and the rural population. Based on the rural/urban bias in economic 
growth, farmers’ interest representation, and agricultural institutions, I show that 
Taiwanese agriculture and farmers were more accommodated in rural-to-urban 
transformations than their Korean counterparts. The fifth section considers labor politics. 
Both countries started with a labor-intensive EOI path under labor-repressive regimes, 
although they differed in providing material benefits to rank-and-filers in exchange for 
the political demobilization of organized labor. 
 
I. Big Business and Industrial Concentration 
 The Park government’s developmental strategy favored chaebols as its private 
agents for industrialization. To survive competitive elections, Park needed to improve the 
country’s economic performance prior to the next election. Thus the state nurtured the big 
industrial bourgeoisie by assigning them state-sponsored HCI projects and providing 
policy loans, tax exemptions, and favorable interest rates, even at the cost of monetary 
and financial instability.  
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In contrast, the KMT, influenced by the inflationary experiences of mainland 
China, deliberately restricted private capitalists and maintained a broad but loose 
developmental coalition on the island. Thus the chaebols developed at a phenomenal rate 
during the HCI period while the jituanqiye (business group) remained roughly the same 
size, as shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2.  
Table 3-3 shows more detailed information about the ten largest companies in 
Korea and Taiwan during mid-1980s. Chaebols are much bigger than Taiwanese business 
groups in terms of sales and employees. The biggest Korean conglomerate, Samsung, had 
a sales total of $21 billion for 1987, which is nearly 40% larger than those of all Taiwan’s 
top ten companies combined. Samsung’s 160,596 employees exceeded the total 
employment of the ten biggest firms in Taiwan by more than 50 percent. As for 
ownership, Korea’s top ten firms are privately owned except for Pohang Iron & Steel 
while Taiwan’s industrial pyramid is divided relatively evenly between four SOEs and 
six private companies. But combined sales and employees of the six private firms are 52 
and 83 percent, respectively, of the four SOEs. Interestingly enough, neither country has 
transnational companies (TNC) in the top ten list. This is in contrast to Mexico and 
Brazil, two Latin American industrial rivals, where foreign firms play a substantial role in 
the economic sphere. In 1987, four and three foreign firms are listed in the top ten biggest 
companies in Mexico and Brazil, respectively (Gereffi 1990: 92).  
 The importance of public sector enterprises in Taiwan can be seen clearly when 
Taiwan’s experience is compared with that of other countries. Table 3-4 shows that SOEs 
played a larger role in Taiwan than they did in most other developing and developed 
countries. Taiwan is similar to India and Indonesia, where the public sector traditionally 
leads industrial development. The percentage share for Korea is significantly lower than 
it is for Taiwan. 
 The share of the public sector in economic development in Taiwan as Table 3-3 
and 3-4 demonstrate reflects the Nationalists’ effort to counterbalance indigenous 
Taiwanese private capital. In addition, many leading economic officials in the 
government came from an industrial and engineering background and several had worked 
for the China Petroleum Corporation, an SOE, on the mainland. The KMT could not let 
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them retire or go unemployed since they were a bureaucratic arm that would guide the 
émigré government along a developmental path. 
 Varying levels of industrial concentration are clearly indicated by Table 3-5 
showing the GDP shares of the ten largest companies in four developing rivals. A striking 
contrast is that Korean chaebols account for 63 percent of GDP in 1987, compared to 
concentration ratios of 14.7 percent for Mexico, 10.5 for Brazil, and 14.3 for Taiwan. The 
Korean economy is 4.5 times more concentrated than the Taiwanese economy.  
If we look at Fortune’s annual list of the world’s 500 largest industrial firms, it is 
clear again that Korea stands out in the group of developing countries in 1988. Table 3-6 
shows that Korea has eleven firms on the list, far more than any of the other developing 
rivals. Taiwan has only four firms on the list. 
Then, how did the ‘economy of scale’ affect the profitability of the firms in the 
two Asian rivals? Table 3-7 shows that ‘bigness’ negatively affected profits in the 
manufacturing sector. The average profitability per asset was 7.22 percent for Korean and 
13.76 for Taiwan; the average ratio of profit to sales was 2.64 percent for Korea and 4.38 
for Taiwan. In general, manufacturing firms in Taiwan are roughly two times more 
profitable than Korean rivals.  
The differential profitability originates from the fact that firms in Taiwan 
typically use their own funds without supersizing their business, while Korean firms do 
the opposite. When facing decreasing profitability, companies in Korea usually increase 
fixed investment with external financing for more market shares in trying to compensate 
for low profitability. Korean firms are bigger in average sale sizes than Taiwanese firms, 
although sales do not offset profit losses from debt services. This phenomena suggests 
that big Korean firms are likely to be tempted by the “moral hazard” or the “too-big-to-
fail” problem: the more debt-laden a big firm gets, the more likely it is to be protected 
since the state and creditor banks step in to reschedule payments and funnel additional 
funds in order to reduce the dire effects failure would have on the whole economy. 
Different sizes, ownership, and profitability are not the only criteria that 
differentiate the two countries. Big businesses in both countries differ in terms of their 
internal management relations. The authority structure that underlies the chaebols is a 
principle of corporate patriarchy, where “a huge industrial empire is the property of an 
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authoritarian individual and his designees who manage them not by consensus but by 
centralized command” (Hamilton 1987: 102).  
For example, Kun-Hee Lee, the chairman of Samsung Group, and his family own 
only 2.15 percent of the Group’s total assets. Yet the boss controls the whole Group 
through a complicated web of cross-investments and cross-ownerships between the fifty-
six member firms. The Group reorganized kijosil (office of planning and coordination) to 
support the boss’ personal control of the whole group. Thus, it serves as the control tower 
that manages personnel, funding, information, and investment planning. It has 180 
staffers in its eleven task teams, sometimes called “presidential secretary in the economic 
circles” due to its powerful influence (Bae et al. 2001: 97; Kang 1996: 153). 
 In contrast, big firms in Taiwan are less centralized than their Korean 
counterparts. Jituanquye, loosely knit private agglomerations, are based on the principle 
of a “patrilineal network” where:  
 
Firms tend to be organizationally separate from other firms, with no 
unified management structure. Instead of a formal system of command, 
one finds a highly flexible management arrangement that relies on 
networks generated by personal relationship based on reciprocal trust, 
loyalty, and predictability. The Taiwanese business groups do not express 
the will of a single patriarch but rather the interests of an extended family. 
(Hamilton and Kao 1987: 102)  
 
II. SMEs and Economic Dispersion 
 As Korea and Taiwan chose different industrial strategies, the two successful 
small-open countries diverged in terms of their SMEs’ status in the national economy. 
Table 3-8 shows that Taiwanese SMEs accounted for 65.2 percent, on average, of total 
exports in the 1980s while Korean ones exported only 29.4 percent of the total in the 
same period. SMEs’ contributions to export-dependent growth are more than two times 
larger in Taiwan than in Korea. 
 
Korean SMEs: Subordination to Chaebols 
The developmental state in Korea drove SMEs into exporting textiles, apparel, 
machine parts, and electronics. During the 1970s, the Park government introduced 370 
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SMEs in three export industrial parks and 100 SMEs in two export free zones (EPB 1981: 
312), a strategy also found in the Taiwanese case. What differentiates the two countries’ 
SME policies is large-small firm vertical linkage in Korea and SMEs’ networking in 
Taiwan.   
While investing national financial sources into capital-intensive industries during 
the HCI period, the Park government made serious efforts to link chaebols with SMEs, 
which resulted in the SME Linkage Law of 1975. The law encouraged long-term 
subcontracting between large firms and SMEs and mergers between SMEs. The scope of 
linkages covered from 41 product items and 157 SMEs in 1970 to 71 items and 263 
SMEs in 1980. According to Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business 
(KFSMB), the Economic Planning Board and Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
pushed the policy further in 1988, linking vertically 323 large firms and 2,060 SMEs 
covering 43 sub-industries and 1,199 items (KFSMB 1989). A recent study shows that 
74.4 percent of SMEs depend on subcontracted production in 1997 and the dependency 
amounts to 95 percent of their sales (Chamyeo Yundae 1999: 457). Although the Korean 
government tried to protect SMEs vis-à-vis big business from unfair contracts via the Fair 
Trade Law and Fair Subcontracting Law, conventional transaction practices often 
prevented weak SMEs from suing big business. When they took legal action, big firms 
often took advantage of those subcontractors by requiring more precise quality tests, 
threatening transaction termination, and suspending settlement day.  
 Another SME policy in Korea concerns their access to financial resources. In the 
early 1960s, the Park government pursued somewhat populist policies of industrialization 
and thus created the Medium Industry Bank (later renamed Medium-Small Industry 
Bank) in 1961 and the Citizens National Bank in 1963. Furthermore the government 
stipulated in 1965 that at least 30 percent of the new loans extended by commercial banks 
must go to small industries (Ho 1980: 98). Yet, as Korea experienced industrial 
deepening, SMEs’ status deteriorated financially. Deposit money banks’ credit to small 
business was 14-25% of total credit during the 1960s, and it decreased from 25 to 21% in 
the 1970s (Park 2002: 102). This demonstrates that SMEs’ chance of getting industrial 
funds was limited due to the Park regime’s ambitious HCI project that showered policy 
loans and various financial incentives of various forms into capital-intensive industries.  
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The successor governments under Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88) and Roh Tae Woo 
(1988-1993) gave small firms easier access to bank credits than before: the SMEs share 
of bank credits increased from 39 to 43 percent of the total in the 1980s and from 45 to 
53 percent in the early 1990s. That sharp increase in the SME credit allocation resulted 
not just from the fact that the Chun government had to adjust the problem of chaebol’s 
overinvestment in the HCI project which was the main source of economic inefficiency 
in the late 1970s, but also from the policy change requiring bankers to reserve a certain 
portion of industrial credit for SMEs (KFSMB 1993).  
Does that mean that in the early 1990s chaebols had less access to financial 
resources, while SMEs enjoyed more benefit than before? A caveat is that chaebols came 
to control non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFI) as Korea experienced rapid financial 
liberalization in the 1980s and the 1990s. The share of commercial banks declined 
steadily from more than 50 percent in 1975 to about 20 percent in 1992, whereas NBFI 
rose from about 10 percent in 1975 to more than 60 percent in 1992 (OECD 1994: 111). 
Thus, one may not exaggerate the SMEs’ financial status in the 1980s even if their share 
of bank credit increased in the period. 
SMEs’ interest representation was limited and their organizations had little 
political leverage. The number of members of SME cooperative associations at the 
national level increased from 117 in 1962 to 176 in 1967, although the number stagnated 
during industrial deepening in the 1970s, 175 in 1972 to 177 in 1977. The number started 
to grow thereafter as the successor government streamlined the HCI projects, from 193 in 
1982 to 338 in 1987 to 710 in 1997. Nevertheless, the increase of SME associations’ 
members after the 1980s did not mean more organizational density. The Korea 
Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSMB), a SMEs’ peak organization, 
covered only about 12.3 percent of the total small firms and 1 percent of the total non-
manufacturing small firms during the 1990s. Their membership fees constitute less than 
5% of the Federation’s annual budget (Park 2001: 858). An official of KFSMB 
commented on the status of SMEs’ interest representation (interview, summer of 2002, 
Seoul, Korea).  
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In Japan, SMEs were well organized and thus the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) tried to coopt them under electoral competition with 
communist and socialist parties. The LDP provided various kinds of funds 
and favors to SMEs through Japan Council of Chambers of Commerce 
(JCCC), the urban equivalent of the rural Agricultural Cooperatives 
(Nokyo)… In contrast, SMEs in Korea employ almost two-thirds of 
workers, but their interests are not represented in national political scene 
simply because they are weak in terms of organization and financial 
resources that they can mobilized… As you sometimes see from 
newspapers, several SME businessmen have committed suicide because 
their firms usually were under pressure of debt service and poor 
operation... Politicians often try to listen to SMEs only when they do 
election campaign. After that, they just disappear. In this situation, it is 
rational for SME businessmen go to big firms for subcontracting rather 
than making efforts to organize their own interests. Even in this case, they 
are often subject to inappropriate practices that big firms impose onto 
SMEs. 
 
Taiwanese SMEs: An Army of Ants in the World Market 
 SMEs in Taiwan have operated within a network of subcontracting relationships 
interwoven between firms of different sizes both vertically and horizontally. When a 
large-sized firm receives an order from foreign buyers, it usually subcontracts these jobs 
to small firms, which then usually work a single stage of processing or manufacture 
individual parts. The big parent firm assembles them into a final product. This inter-firm 
relationship is a vertical one.  
On the other hand, different sizes of firms can also cooperate horizontally. They 
work together to produce a part or a product to fill a big order. When one company 
receives an order that exceeds its capacity, it subcontracts part of that order to other firms 
in the same business. This subcontracting relationship can be reversed when the next 
order goes to another firm in the network. The network system has an advantage in that 
“it pools each SME’s limited resources to complete large production tasks” (Hsueh, Hsu, 
and Perkins 2001: 94). Describing Taiwanese SMEs as an “army of ants,” the Economist 
(Nov. 7, 1998) described the structure on the island as follows:  
 
The great thing about [Taiwanese] SMEs is that they are infinitely 
flexible. They can switch businesses as market conditions dictate. Because 
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they are small, they must find niches, avoiding the competition instead of 
outgunning it. Because they are numerous, corporate Taiwan as a whole is 
good at exploiting most of the niches in a particular industry, collectively 
creating a critical mass, or “cluster economy,” that makes up for the 
marketing inefficiencies of each undersized member. And because the 
business network in Taiwan is so dense, local subcontractors can usually 
be found for everything a particular firm needs to produce its specialty, 
making Taiwanese companies models of sticking to their “core 
competence.  
 
According to an OECD study, there are various ways for SMEs to survive in a 
national economy in relationship to large firms. Those strategies are technology transfer 
(Ireland and Spain), subcontracting (Germany and Japan), or forming larger groups or 
networks of SMEs (Denmark, Italy, and Finland). Korean SMEs can be classified as a 
subcontracting system due to the chaebol-led vertical linkage. Taiwan’s SMEs fit into a 
network style as they were successful in “balancing the SME’s natural desire for 
independence with incentives to encourage more co-operative approaches to the 
international economy (such as networking, clustering, joint venturing, etc)” (OECD 
1997: 97). Taiwan, the kingdom of SMEs, can be compared to Italy that Piore and Sabel 
(1984) acclaimed for an SME network of flexible specialization. Taiwan and Italy are 
only two of the economies the OECD (1997: 78) report covered where SMEs account for 
more than 50 percent of total exports (53 percent for Italy and 56 for Taiwan). A political 
economist commented as follows. 
 
SMEs in Taiwan feature flexible management and network of cooperation. 
They often form vertical alliances with big firms, although their 
subcontracting relations usually differ from hierarchy. Even if big firms 
have some leverage to make their subcontractors subject to its order, they 
usually do not exploit SMEs’ weakness but cooperate with their 
subcontractors so the whole production goes smoothly. (interview, 
summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) 
 
Who played the role of coordinating the “army of ants” to export to the foreign 
market? In other words, given that exploiting the world market requires skilled 
entrepreneurship and costly information gathering, how many small family firms could 
market their products without being integrated into big business, as they are in Korea?  
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Interestingly enough, Taiwan failed to establish general trading companies 
(GTCs) that are often regarded as essential for coordinating export production and 
gathering information about volatile world markets. Japan and Korea, on the other hand, 
succeeded in doing so via sogo shosha and chonghap sangsa, respectively. The Park 
government, obsessed with export promotion as a substitute for political legitimacy, 
offered substantial subsidies and incentives to chaebol-owned GTCs to reduce the risks 
incurred from ambitious HCI programs. The growth of GTCs was spectacular. Total 
exports for 1975 were valued at U.S.$ 5.4 billion with the GTCs handling less than 14 
percent of the total. By 1983 exports were valued at U.S.$ 24.2 billion with the GTCs 
handling 51.3 percent of the total (Cho 1987: 55). 
 Fascinated by Korean GTCs’ success, some economic bureaucrats in Taiwan 
launched GTC projects in the late 1970s which fizzled out. They averaged only 0.82 
percent of total trade in 1980 and 1.15 percent in 1983 (Cho 1987: 62). Haunted by its 
failure in mainland China, the KMT government feared the possibility that big private 
businesses could rise to power via GTCs. Nationalists knew that sogo shosha and 
chonghap sangsa contributed to Japanese regrouped zaibatsu and Korean chaebol. What 
was their solution? 
 
The government invited multinational, especially Japanese, GTCs and 
importers from export markets causing most SMEs to concentrate only on 
manufacturing without bothering to market their products. In 1978, 
Japanese and American trading companies accounted for 65 percent of 
Taiwan’s total trade volume, and 60 to 70 percent of exports by SMEs. 
Domestic GTCs only offered their services in terms of communication and 
paper work and did not realize the real function of marketing.(Cho 1987: 
59)  
 
In this way, the Nationalists achieved the double aim of restraining big private capitalists 
and fostering internationally competitive SMEs. 
 Did the SMEs have full access to financial resources? True, they were 
disadvantaged compared to SOEs and jituanqiye when asking for industrial funds at risk-
sensitive commercial banks that usually required collaterals for loans. Nonetheless SMEs 
did receive special financial treatment. “Funneling low-cost bank loans to the export 
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sector where small firms thrived, the KMT government established eight SME banks by 
reorganizing savings and loan companies” (Park 2001: 854): the Medium Business Bank 
of Taiwan (MBBT), Taipei Business Bank, and Medium Business Banks in Hsinchu, 
Hualien, Kaohsiung, Taichung, Tainan, and Taitung. SME banks were legally required to 
extend at least 70 percent of their total loans to SMEs. The requirement was strictly 
observed: their loans to SMEs were 78.1, 75.7, and 72.6 percent of total loans in 1987, 
1988, and 1989, respectively. Furthermore “the SME share of Taiwan’s outstanding bank 
loans steadily increased to almost 40% by 1988” (Park 2001: 855). The share was 
considerable considering that the KMT government was reluctant to allow NBFIs to enter 
the financial realm, and thus to let commercial bankers prevailed in the market.  
 The state-owned MBBT, the flagship of SME banks, offered strategic industry 
loans as well as many preferential loans to SMEs, such as SME Development Loans and 
three Sino-American Fund programs. The former accounted for 92 – 93 percent of total 
loans by the eight SME banks during 1980s. A variety of additional aid programs were in 
operation beginning in 1967 when the Executive Yuan pronounced Regulations 
Governing Assistance to SMEs as a policy guide through which the Ministry of Finance 
could create organizations such as the SME Credit Guarantee Fund, and the Small 
Business Integrated Assistance Center (Yang 1994: 309-10). 
 It should be noted, however, that SMEs as well as big business were not as 
politically influential as they were in the economic realm. Since the 1950s, most business 
associations were penetrated by the KMT party cells, various security agents, and 
bureaucratic persuasion. In addition, the export sectors consisted of a large number of 
SMEs which typically lacked the necessary resources and skills for organizing group-
based action.  
Another factor contributing to weak SME’s interest organization was the KMT’s 
long-established policy of low entry barriers and exit costs. “Firms moved in and out of a 
given sector with ease, which encouraged private adjustment instead of collective 
bargaining and thus created the free-rider problem detrimental to effective collective 
action”(Chu 1994: 120). Thus, in 1997, Taiwan’s SME peak organization had only 14 
local member associations and has yet to reach 2,000 member companies (Park 2001: 
863). 
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Another feature of SMEs in Taiwan is that they are more dispersed throughout the 
island than their Korean counterparts. In Taiwan, the rural shares of manufacturing firms 
in the size categories 50 – 99, 100 – 499, and 500+ workers were respectively 49, 49, and 
46 percent in 1971. By contrast, in Korea the rural shares in the same categories were 37, 
28, and 21 percent in 1975 (Ho 1982: 981). Dispersed SMEs in Taiwan contributed to a 
narrowing rural-urban income gap since those firms in small rural towns absorbed 
seasonally idle labor and provided non-agricultural income to farmers. The average ratios 
of rural to urban income were 0.71 for Korea and 0.81 for Taiwan during 1978-90 (World 
Bank 2003).  
 
III. The Financial Sector 
 Korea and Taiwan, two successful late-late industrializers in East Asia, 
experienced roughly the same level of financial development. One indicator of this is the 
level of financial intermediation ratio measured by the ratio of total (i.e., personal and 
corporate) financial assets to the GNP (Hugh 1994: 325). In other words, this indicator 
measures how many economic transactions occur via institutionalized financial 
intermediaries. As Figure 3-1 shows, financial deepening in Taiwan steadily increased 
while the growth of the Korean financial sector followed a stop-and-go pattern (i.e., rapid 
deepening in 1965-70 and stagnation in the 1970s and then smooth deepening after the 
1980s). Generally speaking, Taiwan’s financial sector has benefited from high rates of 
savings and the low inflation that the KMT government eagerly supported. Thus the 
Taiwanese had an incentive to deposit their money in financial institutions, making the 
financial sector develop at steady rates. 
In the case of Korea, the Park government, suffering from a lack of investment 
funding, launched interest rate reforms in 1965 to induce money flow into banks. The 
remarkable reform originated from policy recommendations of the U.S. Operations 
Mission to Korea. The reform doubled the annual time deposit rate from 14 to 30 percent 
and created a negative spread between commercial banks’ low lending and high deposit 
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interest rates.8 It brought forth a rapid increase in total bank deposits in the latter half of 
the 1960s. As Ronald McKinnon (1973: 108) praised, the successful reform achieved 
“both increasing private savings and drawing private capital from the curb markets into 
the organized financial system.”  
The August 3 Decree in 1972, though, forced a moratorium on all private loans 
incurred by firms. The measure marked “the end of the partial financial liberalization and 
a complete return to the financial repression” (Cole and Park 1983: 159). The 1970s saw 
slightly declining financial assets due to the decree and the inflation-tolerating HCI 
project. High inflation rates (21 percent on average in 1970s) and negative real interest 
rates (-3.1 percent) made financiers and savers hesitate to maintain their accounts in 
banks. In the 1980s, the Chun government’s market-oriented financial liberalization 
attracted savings into bank accounts, which contributed to Korean financial sector’s 
catching up to the Taiwanese level. 
 
Mobilization, Distribution, and Profitability of Financial Resources 
 Finance is blood containing nutrients and oxygen for industrial muscle. In pursuit 
of economic growth, it is important that capital-scarce governments of underdeveloped 
countries mobilize financial resources for certain sectors of the economy. Using finance 
for the purpose of industrial development entails a high price as well, turning finance into 
a highly politicized area. It could be a source of various of ills, including bureaucratic 
corruption and inefficient resource allocation. This is what neoclassical economists 
criticize as market-distorting rent seeking. But wisely used, industrial financing can be a 
efficient and powerful policy tool in drawing out business cooperation and support for 
government policies. Furthermore, it can encourage capital formation in an economy if it 
can channel citizen’s money from consumption to investment activities (Cheng 1990).  
In other words, financial mobilization is neither theoretically nor ideologically a 
“good or bad” thing. Instead it is empirically objective since almost every country, 
developed or not, creates what neoliberals call “rents” with varying degrees of efficiency 
and performance. In this sense, most less developed countries, when mobilizing financial 
 
8 The recommendation was made by Hugh T. Patrick, E.S. Shaw, and John G.Gurley. See McKinnon 
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resources for economic advancement, have to sail between the Scylla of corruption and 
the Charybdis of useful financial catalyst for industrialization.  
It is helpful to come up with three criteria to evaluate the experiences of financial 
development in Taiwan and Korea: how much capital each country’s financial sector 
mobilized, how they distributed the resources, and how effective and profitable the 
allocation was. 
 First, the degree of financial mobilization can be measured by real interest rates, 
the difference between the rate of change in the GNP deflator, and the time deposit 
interest. The higher the real interest rate the bankers offer, the more incentive savers and 
financiers have to deposit their money. A more immediate proxy is the ratio of domestic 
savings to investment, measuring how much the government and financial sector transfer 
money from consumption to industry. 
Taiwan was a pioneer in its steadfast adherence to a high interest rate policy to 
combat inflation and stimulate savings and investment. This prevented “artificially cheap 
capital from favoring large enterprises employing inappropriately capital-intensive 
technologies, a frequent occurrence in countries that suppress interest rates and ration 
credit”(Park and Johnston 1995: 195). The Figure 3-2 shows that Taiwan maintained 
positive real interest rates except in two periods of economic turmoil (1973-4 and 1979-
80) following the first and second oil shocks, while the Korean financial sector 
experienced negative real interest rates during the first half of the 1960s, most of the 
1970s, and the early 1980s. Average interest rates for the three decades were 1.1 for 
Korea and 6.1 for Taiwan. Korea had a relatively more “repressed” financial system than 
Taiwan did. As Ronald I. McKinnon (1973) put it, “in a repressed system, a government 
maintains artificially low interest rates. Because this induces an excess demand for credit, 
the government is drawn into the process of rationing financial resources among 
competing uses, i.e., preferential credit schemes.”  
Figure 3-3 shows the yearly ratio of gross domestic savings to gross domestic 
investment, both as a percentage of GNP. Taiwan covered its domestic investment with 




whereas Korea lacked domestic investment funds most years and thus had to resort to 
foreign loans and capital. Korea borrowed foreign capital that amounted to, on average, 
2.5 percent of the GNP between 1970 and 1991, compared to Taiwan which exported its 
capital as 5.9 percent of GNP during the period (World Bank 2003). Due to the historical 
trauma of hyperinflation in mainland China, the KMT government was eager to sustain 
macroeconomic stability and positive real interest rates to increase savings. The 
government supported corporate financiers and individual savers by low inflation and 
high real interest rate to attract domestic financial resources for economic growth. 
The second criterion for financial evaluation is patterns of loan distribution. In 
Taiwan, an industry-specific credit policy was apparent in the brief stage of ISI during 
the 1950s, but was soon replaced by credit policies targeted at broad goals that included 
export promotion, industrial upgrading, and pollution control. An industry-specific credit 
policy was revived in the 1980s to nurture strategic industries (i.e., information, 
machinery, and electronics, etc.) but the credit extension was small in size, comprising 
only 4.4 percent of total government loans, and constantly came under criticism from 
central bankers and economists. The remainder of the credit went to non-strategic 
industries to finance automation equipment, domestic machine production, and 
environmental control in various sectors (Shea 1994: 252-3).  
 The KMT government made considerable efforts to financially support its 
political coalition partners, SMEs, and farmers. Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, a political 
populist, explicitly endorsed special treatment for those sectors, arguing that credit 
allocation should be fair and reasonable. The SME credit started in the 1950s, when the 
Sino-American Fund financed SMEs’ financial needs. During economic deepening in the 
1970s, central bankers raised huge amounts of SME funds in the wake of the 1974 oil 
crisis and the KMT established the Medium Business Bank (MBB) of Taiwan and MBBs 
at six cities in 1976.  
On the other hand, the agricultural sector became heavily subsidized in 1971. As a 
result of the new agricultural policy during the 1970s that Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized 
to consolidate his power in rural society, Taiwanese farmers were financially supported 
by rural credit cooperatives that emerged as one of the richest types of financial 
institution on the island. The Farmers Bank of China, Land Bank of Taiwan, and the 
76
postal savings account financially supported the agrarian people under the control of the 
Central Bank of China (Cheng 1993: 70). 
 In contrast, Korea’s financial allocation was mainly in the name of preferential 
policy loans: its amount as a percentage of total credit was 65.2 percent in 1962-66, 44.1 
in 1967-71, 53.7 in 1972-76, 57.1 in 1977-81, 55.6 in 1982-86, and 53.0 in 1987-91. The 
cheap credit was funneled into large capital-intensive firms: shares of HCI accounted for 
74.2 percent of total investment to manufacturing in 1976, 75.4 in 1977, and 82.5 in 
1978; average debt-to-equity ratios in 1976-90 were 84.7 percent for small firms, 272.9 
for medium-sized firms, and 356.0 for big firms (Woo 1991: 162; Lee 1999: 409). 
The third criterion is how lucrative the financial sector is in its managing of 
financial resources. Table 3-9 is The Banker’s reports about varying degrees of banking 
performance in the top 200 Asian banks. Total assets of those big banks in Korea are 
U.S.$ 310,152 million, compared to U.S.$ 222,736 million for Taiwan. The size of 
enlisted Korean banks is much bigger than Taiwanese ones. Twenty nine Korean banks 
are enlisted in the top 200 list and have the third largest assets in Asia, behind China and 
Australia. Indicators of banking performance, however, show the reverse. The return on 
capital and assets for Taiwan are 29.52 and 1.09 percent, respectively, while Korea has 
much lower rates, 7.84 and 0.52 percent. Taiwan’s banking sector is rated 3.0 whereas 
the Korean sector is rated 5.0. Note that the lower index numbers signify better 
performance. The survey shows that Taiwan’s banking sector has fewer big banks but 
performs better and more effectively than its Korean counterpart. 
 
Ownership and Loan-Extending Behavior 
Who are the major owners of commercial banks in Taiwan and Korea? Almost all 
of the banking system was state-owned in Taiwan. Of 16 domestic full-service banks, 
only four are less than half owned by the KMT government. Banks as SOEs held the 
following share of total deposits: 98.5 percent in 1970, 97.2 in 1975, 90.0 in 1980, 88.3 in 
1985, and 84.0 in 1990 (Central Bank of China 1995).  The private commercial banks 
have been in a marginal position of Taiwan’s banking hierarchy because there have been 
many regulations against the entry of private capital into the banking system. The assets 
of financial institutions as a percentage of the national total in 1991 are as follows: the 
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Central Bank of China (20.2 percent), domestic banks (42.4), SME banks (5.8), credit co-
ops (12.7), postal savings (9.2), foreign banks (2.3), and other insurance/trust companies 
(7.6) (Central Bank of China 1992). Financial institutions beyond the KMT government’s 
control are the last two institutions comprising only 9.9 percent of the total assets. Non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are not yet developed in Taiwan mainly due to 
deliberately slow financial liberalization. 
 Interestingly enough, the KMT leadership had a “preference order” granting 
banking permission to newcomers. Nationalists would do their utmost to expand the state 
sector before considering any new private institutions. If it was not feasible, they granted 
permission in the order of foreign banks – overseas Chinese banks – domestic private 
financiers. What is the order for? 
 
First, foreign banks were politically safe and not predisposed to 
challenging the legitimacy of the regime. In addition, the KMT needed 
foreign banks that could compensate Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation from 
international society with their presence in the island. Second, new 
banking licenses were a reward for overseas Chinese political support of 
the KMT regime. Overseas Chinese capitalists could threaten to switch 
loyalty from the KMT to the Chinese communist regime. Also, they could 
be an “offshore opposition,” freely criticizing the KMT. Last, indigenous 
private capital was allowed to enter the financial realm only in credit co-
ops, provincial banks for SMEs, and trust/investment companies. Their 
market share was small and the operations of these institutions were 
highly restricted by the KMT. (Cheng 1993: 75-7) 
 
What the KMT government aimed at was to discourage native Taiwanese 
industrialists from entering the financial sector and growing into industrial-financial 
giants threatening the émigré regime’s political dominance.  As Tun-jen Cheng put it, 
“the preference order was less a function of their economic value than of political risk 
and the bargaining power the three groups of capitalists possessed vis-à-vis the KMT 
regime”(Cheng 1993: 75). 
The Korean banking system was privatized in the early 1980s when the Chun 
government launched financial liberalization. According to a study (Park 1994: 185), 
assets at financial institutions as a percentage of the total in 1990 are as follows: 
commercial banks (31.0 percent), specialized banks (11.8), developmental banks (8.0), 
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investment companies (13.3), credit unions and co-ops (24.0), insurance company (7.5), 
securities companies (4.6). Here, government-owned financial institutions are only 
specialized and development banks, both of which constitute merely 19.8 percent of total 
asset in financial market. 
 Who then are the dominant owners of the financial realm in Korea? If one looks 
into the shares of financial intermediaries, (s)he will find that the share of commercial 
banks has been steadily declining from more than 50 percent in 1975 to about 20 percent 
in 1992, whereas the share of NBFI has been rising from about 10 percent to more than 
60 percent in the same period (OECD 1994: 111). It should be noted that chaebols own 
large NBFIs that in turn invest their money into big commercial banks as major 
shareholders. For example, the Samsung Group controlled as a major shareholder twelve 
nation-wide banks and seven local banks by 1997. Top 5 chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai, 
Daewoo, LG, and SK) owned 32.1 percent of the securities market, 35.6 percent of the 
life insurance market, and 13.7 percent of merchant banks by 1996 (Lee 1999: 351).  
Why did the chaebols not own commercial banks directly? Commercial banks 
were bound to comply with the Bank of Korea’s guidelines on the aggregate money 
supply, reserve ratio, and banking operations, and thus could not extend credit to private 
firms at their discretion. Thus chaebols decided to bypass the regulation: they entered 
non-bank financial businesses from which they could secure industrial funds and 
influence the banking sector in their favor. Chaebols constructed an empire dominating 
both finance and industry. 
Different patterns of loan-lending behavior contributed to different profitability of 
loan extension in the countries. In Taiwan where most of the banking institutions were 
state-owned up to the mid-1990s, individual bank officers are, by definition, civil 
servants facing administrative sanctions and even criminal punishment for any non-
performing loans. Thus they meet strong disincentives against risky lending. The bank 
officers allocate funds based on the consideration of security (i.e., collateral), not the rate 
of return. The concern over possible personal liability for bad loans makes bank officers 
risk-averse. An American banker (Ralp 1970: 11-2) complained about their strict 
practices at bank windows: 
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[Bank] employees are judged by agencies, on their ability to avoid 
mistakes rather than upon their exercising authority, making decisions, or 
making other important contributions to the banks. Thus imagination, 
initiative, and decision making tend to be discouraged. Thus if he had a 
cash shortage of US$10.00 or US$50.00 his career may be jeopardized 
and the bank may lose the full services of someone capable of 
satisfactorily fulfilling senior level responsibilities. In the United States it 
is expected that people will make mistakes and we use experience to 
estimate potential losses and then figure the cost of manpower, if a system 
is developed to reduce those losses. 
 
In Korea, however, banks considerably relaxed their policy of requiring collateral. 
Bankers extended loans to creditees without collateral if the loan applicants had a 
promising business plans. The share of deposit monetary banks’ loans that was extended 
without real assets, deposits, and other forms of collateral was 26.5 percent of the banks’ 
total credit in 1970, 34.9 in 1975, 30.8 in 1980, 43.8 in 1985, 49.2 in 1987, and 46.7 in 
1989 (Park and Kim 1994: 206). When banks accumulated nonperforming loans, the 
government grudgingly intervened to turn bad loans into equity, rescheduled them, or 
provided the additional new loans needed to meet repayments. Given that it is the 
government that has been ultimately responsible for credit allocation decisions, the 
problem of moral hazard on the part of commercial banks has been serious. A senior 
official (interview, summer of 2003, Seoul, Korea) of Financial Supervisory Commission 
commented: 
 
They [bankers] used to be risk-taking in loan extension since they 
expected the government would intervene between the concerned banks 
and the debt-ridden big firms. In a way, the state deprived bankers of a 
chance to take prudential banking into account. Late setup of the Korea 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1996 reflected bankers’ lack of attention 
to risk in financial business. 
 
IV. The Agricultural Sector 
The fact that two poor agrarian societies after the Second World War experienced 
miraculous late-late industrialization suggests that their agricultural sectors were 
undergoing a transformation. Farmers in Korea and Taiwan constituted 83.1 and 76.1 
percent, respectively, of the total employment in 1930 but they were 6.4 and 6 percent in 
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2005. How did farmers and agriculture sail in the storm of such rapid urbanization and 
industrialization in both countries? 
 
Rural and Urban Bias in Industrialization 
The Japanese empire colonized both Korea and Taiwan mainly for cheap 
agricultural products, especially rice and sugar cane, so the colonies were heavily 
agrarian societies dominated by feudal landlord / tenant relations. After World War II, 
new governments in those three countries rammed through land reform under the guide 
of the American hegemon in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was a revolution from 
above and without. Destroying the landlord class and traditional elites anxious to protect 
plantation and tenant system was a great measure that eased the transition to an industrial 
society, which is a rarity in the Third World.  
Although sharing the initial condition of land reform, the two developmental 
regimes were different in accommodating the interests of farmers and the agricultural 
sector in their industrialization process. As Taiwan’s balanced and stability-oriented 
coalition and Korea’s unbalanced and growth-oriented coalition suggest, the two 
governments developed agriculture, infrastructure, and industry in different sequences. 
Taiwan followed the sequence of “first developing its agriculture and rural infrastructure 
and then rapidly expanding its industrial sector with the help of resources (labor, savings 
and foreign exchange earnings) diverted from agriculture” (Ho 1982: 983). In Korea, on 
the other hand, “rural transformation has followed and been caused by industrial and 
urban development rather than the reverse” (Mason et al. 1980: 210). 
Institutional support and development priorities have clearly benefited agriculture 
more in Taiwan than in Korea. Although the agricultural sector was relatively smaller in 
Taiwan, fixed investment in agriculture averaged 20 – 30 percent of total fixed 
investment in the 1950s and 15 – 20 percent during 1960s. The share in Korea was only 
10 to 15 percent during these years. Furthermore, rural electrification began relatively 
early in Taiwan, and by 1960 electricity reached 70 percent of its farming households. In 
Korea, only 13 percent of farming households had electricity in 1964 (Ho 1982: 983-4). 
Although retarded rural development in Korea was mainly due to national destruction 
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from the Korea War (1950-53), basic developmental priorities in the countries were 
different.  
 According to Lipton and Bates, urban bias is prevalent in developing countries, an 
important drag on overall economic performance, and a cause of economic inequality 
(Lipton 1977; Bates 1981). Taiwan was an exception. The KMT regime intentionally 
implemented a rural-to-urban spillover policy to consolidate its power in an alien rural 
society, while authoritarian governments in Korea followed the path of urban-to-rural 
spillover to secure industrial growth as soon as possible under the condition of periodic 
electoral competition with opposition parties. Table 3-10 is about sectoral allocation of 
U.S. aid, which shows how the countries supported agricultural development in the 1950s 
and 1960s when U.S. aid was actually an economic lifeline to both poor and small 
countries.   
 The KMT government allocated 21.5 percent of the total U.S. aid for agriculture 
while Korea used a meager 4 percent for the sector. Korea spent more American aid on 
infrastructure, mining, and manufacturing. Commentators criticized the urban bias in 
Korea’s economic development by saying that “except for land reform in the late 1940s 
and the early 1950s, the government’s attitude toward farmers could be described as 
basically one of neglect prior to the 1970s” (Mason et al. 1980: 241). 
Figure 3-4 demonstrates how the two countries accommodated farmers’ interest 
while pushing export-oriented industrialization. It details the farmers’ balance sheet 
between income from agricultural products and the production costs incurred on the basis 
of the price index with 1990 being the base year. Generally speaking, Taiwan’s farmers 
have gained from the late 1950s to the late 1990s, with some exceptional years. Korean 
farmers sold their products to urbanites at a loss, except in the 1970s. The average 
balance for Korea and Taiwan is -0.6 and 0.8, respectively, in 1959 – 70, 0.67 and 2.87 in 
1971 – 80, and -3.34 and 2.84 in 1981 – 94. The cumulative balance amounts to -47.1 for 
Korea and 80.14 for Taiwan.  
A commonality of agricultural policies in Taiwan and Korea is that both 
governments during the 1970s embarked on a dual price system where they purchased 
rice from farmers at a higher price and then resold it at lower price to urban consumers. 
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Why did political leaders in both countries launch such programs resulting in a fiscal 
deficit? 
In the case of Korea, the Park government was surprised to see a decline in rural 
political support in the 1971 presidential election. Thus, launching two subsidy programs, 
the Grain Management Fund and Fertilizer Account, the government increased its 
purchase of rice from farmers and allowed them to receive average annual grain price 
increases of 20 percent during the 1970s, a time when the country was losing its 
comparative advantage in agriculture (Haggard and Moon 1990: 222). As one can see 
from figure 3-4, Korean farmers’ balance sheet of producing rice turned positive for the 
first time; figure 3-5 shows a rapid increase of rice price after early 1970s. Note that 
cross-country comparison by the figure 4-6 is not appropriate due to different production 
costs in the two countries. 
Taiwan has a similar story. The KMT government launched the New Agricultural 
Policy (NAP) in the early 1970s when Chiang Ching-kuo, a Taiwanese-oriented populist, 
assumed control of economic policy as premier. He emphasized the popular sectors such 
as SMEs and agriculture to consolidate his political succession to his father, Chiang Kai-
shek. He dramatically increased the amount and price of rice purchased, turning 
agriculture from an export sector to a subsidized one. Figure 3-4 shows a sharp increase 
of the farmers’ balance in the late 1960s and mid-1970s. Figure 3-5 also indicates that the 
KMT government paid more than before when purchasing rice from farmers.    
 Unfortunately, the rural bias of the 1970s did not last into the 1980s in Korea. The 
authoritarian Chun government, the successor of the Park regime, lacked political 
legitimacy since he came to power in a military coup in 1979-80. He needed political 
backing from U.S. allies who were eager to pry open the highly protected agricultural 
sector in Northeastern Asian countries. Furthermore, the government’s policy priority 
was to streamline the Korean economy to cure overinvestment, inflation, foreign debts, 
and fiscal deficits that had originated from overheated HCI in the 1970s. Thus, fiscal 
deficits from the dual rice price system were a bête noire in the eyes of neoliberal 
technocrats who decided to open the domestic market to American agricultural exporters. 
As figure 3-4 shows, farmers in the 1980s suffered from trade liberalization that caused 
their balance sheet to sharply turn negative.  
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In contrast, the Nationalist regime was politically stable well into the 1980s with 
insignificant challenges from a newborn opposition party. The KMT government was 
reluctant to increase American agricultural imports considering its social base in the rural 
society. They chose to increase non-agricultural imports from the U.S. protecting the 
farmers’ interest in the domestic market. Furthermore, the Nationalists kept subsidizing 
farming households in the 1980s. As figure 3-4 shows, the average ratio of rural to urban 
income in Korea in 1978-90 was 0.71, while the ratio for Taiwan was 0.81. 
 
Government Institution and Farmers’ Organization 
 Governmental agricultural agencies in Korea were the Office of Rural 
Development (ORD) and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). The former is 
basically a farming technology research institute and did not enjoy policy making 
authority (Brandt 1980). The latter is the ministry of all agricultural affairs, although its 
minister did not enjoy policy autonomy from the economic control center, EPB. An MAF 
minister was considered a marginal position in cabinet, inferior to ministers of industrial 
and financial affairs. This inter-ministry status reflected an urban bias in the economic 
development of Korea. 
 Interestingly enough, Taiwan has not had a formal Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) (Moore 1993: 109). The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction (JCRR; 1948-79) played the organizational substitute of MOA. Chastised 
by the consequences of its neglect of agriculture and peasants on the mainland, the 
Nationalist government abolished the MOA, assigned all agricultural affairs to the JCRR, 
which was originally initiated in the form of the American China Aid Mission. Although 
the JCRR was subordinate to the Executive Yuan (i.e., cabinet), it enjoyed great 
autonomy in policy making and implementation because the authority was delegated to 
the director of the Agency for International Development (AID) in Washington, who 
exercised policy discretion and fiscal control over the JCRR (Shen 1970: 27-28). The 
American hegemon itself took charge of agricultural policy in cooperation with the KMT 
officials.  
As a well-funded and flexible organization with autonomous and supra-
ministerial status in government, the JCRR was able to exert strong influence on policies 
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by governmental and nongovernmental organizations at the national, provincial, and 
county levels. With its focus on rural reconstruction, the JCRR provided a broad vision of 
the integration of policy formulation and implementation. This integrative role extended 
beyond agriculture to agriculture-related industries and rural health (Park and Johnston 
1995: 200). It was the JCRR that introduced incentives for SMEs to embark on their 
business in small towns and counties so that farmers could commute to factories earning 
extra-farming income especially during idle season. Praising the JCRR’s performance in 
developing agriculture and enhancing rural life, Kuznets argues that the JCRR is the 
institutional factor that differentiates Taiwanese from Korean agricultural policy (Kuznet 
1980: 58). 
 In comparison, the KMT government managed to take care of farmers and 
agriculture, while the Korean government did not. This statement, though, does not mean 
that farmers in Taiwan were more influential as an interest group in politics than those in 
Korea. The autonomy and power of the farmers’ associations were severely constrained 
in both countries.  
In Korea, the Park government integrated the Farmers Bank into National Farmers 
Cooperatives (NFC) to control the agrarian society in 1961. The speed and scope of the 
state’s penetration into rural society was striking; NFC units at the sub-county level 
increased from 895 in 1960 to 21,518 in 1962, covering 90 percent of all farming 
households (Byun 1995: 46). The Park government revised the NFC law so the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fishery could nominate the NFC chairman and supervise the 
association. It was illegal for the NFC to participate in any type of political action. On the 
other hand, the NFC was allowed to enjoy legal and actual monopolies to distribute major 
agricultural inputs (i.e., fertilizers, insecticides, farming machines, seeds, and fodder) and 
to collect major agricultural products from farmers and sell them in the urban market 
(National Farmers Cooperatives 1991: 978-9). In sum, farmers in Korea were organized 
into the “state corporatism” (Schmitter 1979) in the sense that the NFC and its local 
branches exchanged their loss of associational autonomy for a monopoly on profitable 
agriculture-related businesses.    
 The KMT government reorganized the Farmers Association in 1950, largely 
along the lines recommended by Professor Anderson of Cornell University. Thus the 
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associations were engaged in a very wide range of income earning activities, including 
processing, storage, and distribution of agricultural products, rural credit business, grain 
procurement, agricultural insurance, supply of agricultural inputs, and the collection of 
land tax. But the government rejected some aspects in the professor’s report which would 
have given the associations considerably more autonomous economic power and 
organizational coherence (Moore 1993: 103-5). 
 The Provincial Farmers Associations had a high proportion of mainlanders on 
their staff and were obliged to employ the KMT and political intelligence apparatchiks in 
their security departments. In 1974 the government introduced a range of measures to 
assert even more direct control over the Association. In particular, chief executive 
officers, even at the level of the township Farmers Associations, were to be directly 
nominated by the state, rather than chosen locally by members’ representatives (Moore 
1993: 103-5). In summary, farmers in Taiwan were more accommodated economically in 
industrialization than their Korean counterparts, although they were not allowed to voice 
their own interests or organize themselves with autonomous associations in either 
country. 
 
V. Labor and Political Demobilization 
 Theoretically speaking, import-substitution industrialization (ISI) encourages a 
stimulation of domestic purchasing power to support industrial development, and thus it 
partially mutes the contrary pressure from employers to restrict labor costs, justifying 
government efforts to increase welfare expenditure by firms. According to Deyo (1987: 
183), this linkage between domestic purchasing power and industrial production was 
weaker in the case of export-oriented industrialization (EOI) where, by definition, 
immediate consumers are foreign buyers. 
The theory suggests that Korea and Taiwan, small open EOI economies, register 
repressive labor policy to keep labor costs low and keep workers disciplined and 
compliant, which is the way the countries’ products remain competitive in the foreign 
market. Figure 3-6 shows weekly working hours in Korea, Taiwan, and other countries, 
which suggests that although Taiwanese workers consistently worked less than Korean 
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counterparts, both countries resorted to more input of cheap labor to sustain the EOI 
strategy than other comparable countries did.  
History shows that both governments feared workers’ politicization mainly due to 
the two nations’ struggle against labor-friendly communists during the state building 
process after the Second World War. Crossing the Taiwan Strait, Nationalists brought 
with them most of the repressive labor legislation, especially the Labor Union Law of 
1929,9 enacted in the mainland context of protracted civil war. In addition, the martial 
law after the KMT’s relocation to the island banned strikes of any type by compulsory 
arbitration of industrial conflicts, restricted wage bargaining by unions, and subjected all 
unions to supervision by local governments. Local security units determined if a union 
was politically and ideologically legitimate, supervised their daily operations, and 
sometimes directly assumed the union leadership role.  
 On the other hand, the KMT government was eager to coopt workers in its favor. 
Unions were strengthened by the requirement that workers had to join a union where one 
already existed, subject to the penalty of loss of employability in the relevant industry in 
the case of refusal to join. Under the 1932 Factories Act, large enterprises were required 
to establish factory councils consisting of representatives from labor and management. 
Employers were also obligated to provide welfare, housing, and educational and other 
forms of employee assistance (Deyo 1987: 184; 1989: 117). In a nutshell, Nationalists 
wanted to disintegrate proletariats and then reorganize them in the name of the ‘people’ 
with some preemptive measures and material benefits.             
 The Korean labor regime also registered the depoliticized mobilization of 
workers. Right after his coup of 1961, General Park refurbished the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU) with an industry-based union system organizing workers into a 
“state-corporatist scheme” (Schmitter 1979; Choi 1988). The Yushin Constitution 
“revitalized” the labor-repressive regime in Korea in the 1970s. It prohibited strikes 
altogether in the state sector, public enterprises, local government, utilities, and any 
 
9 The KMT was affected by Sun Yat-sen’s Minsheng Principle that, in a way, connoted struggle against 
the working class. When he criticized Marx but praised Bismarck’s welfare dictatorship, he devised the 
Principle for rapid industrialization from above without being trapped by class struggle, which is typically 
found in corporatist and Fascist thinkers. The principle served as an antidote to the spirit of class. See Sun, 
Yat-sen (1927: 396-398); Schmitter (1979); and Moore (1966: 187-201). 
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business that affected the national economy in important ways. In addition, a 1973 
amendment to the Labor Disputes Adjustment Act prohibited any collective bargaining 
without prior Labor Committee certification of legality. The same law gave the Office of 
Labor Affairs substantial supervisory authority over the Labor Committee, thus 
interjecting direct government authority in industrial mediation (Deyo 1989: 136).  
Figure 3-7 shows unionization rates in both countries since 1961. Prior to the 
1980s, the Park government mobilized two times more workers into the state corporatist 
scheme than the KMT did. The average unionization rate as a percentage of the total 
employed workforce was 21.6 for Korea and 11.5 for Taiwan before the 1980s.  
 Political liberalization and democratization in mid-1980 gave workers a chance to 
organize themselves. When the June Uprising, activated by democratic oppositions, 
students, and urban middle class, made democratic transition possible in Korea in 1987, 
urban workers were reactivated, going on massive strikes especially from July to 
September of that year. It was a big bang. The number of industrial strikes skyrocketed 
from 276 in 1986 to 3749 in 1987, working days lost from 72,000 to 6,946,935, and 
workers involved from 46,900 to 934,900 (National Statistical Office 1995: 401). As 
Figure 3-7 shows, worker’s union membership increased after the 1987 democratic 
opening but decreased sharply in the 1990s. Why did Korea not experience 
institutionalization of labor politics even after political democratization? 
 Post-democratization governments, despite democratic achievement in some 
areas, sustained a labor-repressive stance by “stabilizing” the overheated labor 
movements and arresting more union activists than the previous authoritarian 
governments. On the other hand, the Korea Employers Federation (KEF), the employers’ 
peak organization, launched new managerial strategies including reinforcement of labor 
control, market-oriented flexible employment, and rationalization of production. For 
example, unions were influential at the factory regime since union staffers were often 
senior workers and thus head of operation units. But after the adoption of new managerial 
rationalization, senior workers became dependent on high production technology which 
deprived them of industrial authority at the production line. They had to tolerate the 
deskill process to secure their job, which contributed to the unions’ influence being 
diminished in the factory regime (Choi 1993: 263-91; 1996: 319-357). 
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Workers in Taiwan also started to organize in the mid-1980s as the first official 
democratic opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed in 1986 and 
the forty-year-long martial law was lifted on July 15, 1987. As Figure 3-7 shows, 
unionization rates increased from 18.7 percent in 1981 – 85 to 24.3 in 1986 – 87 to 30.2 
in 1988 – 90. Taiwan’s rate of unionization became higher than Korea’s after 1983. Does 
this mean Taiwanese rank-and-filers were more organized than their Korean 
counterparts? It should be noted that post-democratization organizational power cannot 
be judged by merely reading the data. It is generally recognized that Korean workers are 
better organized and militant than their Taiwanese counterparts. It should be noted that 
much of the growth in union membership on the island was concentrated in occupational 
unions, rather than industrial ones. A Taiwanese scholar (Chu 1996: 499) commented 
about the occupational unions as follows: 
 
Since the early 1980s the KMT government has significantly relaxed the 
process of licensing newly established occupational unions especially for 
taxi drivers, small traders, and self-employed workers. Since the 
government did not specifically require occupational unions to verify their 
members’ working status, many people, working or not, joined an 
occupational union to get benefits from the state-sponsored health 
insurance. Moreover the KMT employed preemptive measures to 
encourage its members to found unions and seize leadership posts. In this 
sense, when the occupational unionization is discounted, the actual level 
of unionization in 1992 is no different from that of 1987. 
 
Difference of Labor Politics: Socio-Economic Variables   
 Statistics show that the average number of workers involved per industrial dispute 
during 1961 to 2000 is 446 for Korea and 34 for Taiwan (National Statistics Office 1995: 
399). Why are Korean workers more militant and organized than Taiwanese ones even if 
the populations of both countries are considered?10 According to Aristide Zolberg, 
national variations of economic and political structures contribute to different working 
class formations in each country. Economic structure can be thought of as a combination 
 
10 Labor force in industry in 2000 is 6.2 and 3.8 millions in Korea and Taiwan, respectively. Korea has 
1.63 times more workers than Taiwan. CIA, Word FactBook (https://www.cia.gov/c ia/publications/fact 
book/index.html). accessed Sept. 13, 2006. 
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of several variables, including the 1) extent of industrialization; 2) the degree to which 
the industrial sector is capital intensive; and 3) the mechanism for procurement of 
industrial labor force (Zolberg 1986: 430-3). I’ll discuss these two countries in that order. 
The two Asian NICs are similar in their levels of industrial development: sectoral 
contributions to GDP in Korea of 1995 are 5.7 % by agriculture, 37.7 by industry, and 
56.5 by service; in Taiwan those in the same categories are 3.5 %, 36.4, and 60.1.  
But the capital-intensiveness is a very different story. Launching industrial 
deepening in the 1970s and 1980s, developmental governments in Korea funneled 
financial resources into capital-intensive heavy chemical sectors (shipbuilding, steel, 
petrochemical products, and machines), sacrificing agricultural and SME sectors. 
Predominance of chaebols in the sector contributed to larger unions, more membership of 
male workers, and more organized and disciplined workers in Korea. The working class 
formation in Korea was more rapid than in other early developers of the western world 
since rapid industrialization means rapid working class formation (Choi 1988). 
Although Taiwan also experienced a rapid industrial transformation as Korea did, 
the backbone of its national economy are the SMEs, rather than big business, that 
specialize in less capital-intensive products such as electronics, computer, and auto parts. 
This SME dominance contributes to smaller union size, lower membership of male 
workers, and serious problems for orchestrating collective action among regionally 
dispersed small firm workers. A scholar (Huang 1997: 7) commented on SMEs’ unions 
as follows: 
 
Many members of the occupational unions in Taiwan joined for the health 
insurance. Among these so-called occupational workers, many are self-
employed professionals or entrepreneurs of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Since members of the occupational unions are generally 
indifferent, if not opposed, to the interest of the working class, this is 
damaging to the labor movement. Even more frustrating for industrial 
workers is that, at the regional and national federation level, elected union 
officials are usually from the occupational unions. This is so not only 
because the number of occupational unions usually far exceeds that of the 
industrial unions, but also because leaders of the occupational unions tend 
to be members of the ruling party [KMT] or have close ties with it. 
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Table 3-11 shows the enterprise structure in Korea and Taiwan. Obviously, large 
firms employing more than five hundred workers dominate the Korean manufacturing 
sector. They hire 32.1 percent of the total employees in the manufacturing sector and 
produce almost half of the total production. In contrast, Taiwanese firms in this category 
hire 15 percent and produce 26.8 percent of national wealth. 
The national variations in industrial structure contribute to different patterns of 
labor disputes. Table 3-12 proves that the “small number of big unions” in Korea and 
“large number of small unions” in Taiwan affected different pattern of industrial disputes. 
Although Korea had fewer industrial disputes than Taiwan (A columns), Korean unions 
mobilized more workers to disputes than Taiwanese unions did (C columns). A caveat is 
that Korean workers are more than Taiwanese ones: labor force in industry in 2000 is 6.2 
and 3.8 millions in Korea and Taiwan, respectively; Korea has “1.63” times more 
industrial workers than Taiwan. But the average number of workers involved per dispute 
in 1961 – 2000 is 446, the number of the same category is 34 in Taiwan; the number of 
Korean workers participating in disputes is “13.1” times more than that of Taiwanese 
workers. It is clear that Korean workers are more densely organized and militant than 
their Taiwanese counterparts when discounting differential number of workers. 
Different mechanisms for procurement of industrial labor force also effected 
different patterns of working class formation in the countries. In Korea, urban 
manufacturing industries have been the main sites of working class formation. Due to the 
small-holder structure of Korean agriculture and the underdevelopment of rural 
industries, Korean working class formation started from a large-scale rural-to-urban 
exodus (Koo 1990: 675). City dwellers in total population changed from 33.6 percent in 
1966 to 57.3 in 1980 to 74.4 in 1990. This increase is more rapid than in Taiwan where 
urbanites were 31 percent in 1966, 47.2 in 1980, and 55.4 in 1990 (National Statistical 
Office 1995: 61; Executive Yuan 1991: 17). 
Furthermore, those immigrants concentrated in a few industrial centers. In 1984, 
about half of all manufacturing workers resided in the Seoul-Kyungin area and another 
40 percent in the Youngnam area in the southeast (Koo 1990: 675). “Young migrant 
workers in the cities were unlikely to return to rural areas. Rather, they lived in 
increasingly well defined, class-specific communities that divided the organizational and 
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social lives of workers from nonworkers” (Koo 1990: 676). As Katznelson suggests, the 
urban-based and geographically concentrated industrialization pattern encouraged 
permanent migration from rural areas and full commitment to urban industrial work, 
thereby facilitating a full-scale working class formation (Katznelson 1981).  
 In Taiwan, industry developed in a more dispersed fashion with a greater share of 
industrial employment in rural areas, than in Korea, which is due to the early 
development of commercialized agriculture and of diversified agro-industry on the 
island. The rural shares of manufacturing establishments in the size categories of 50 – 99 
workers, 100 – 499 workers, and 500+ workers were respectively 49, 49, and 46 percent 
in 1971. In contrast, in Korea, the rural shares in these same size categories were 37, 28, 
21 percent in 1975 (Ho 1982: 981). With decentralized industrial growth, rural household 
members could participate in non-agricultural activities by commuting while still taking 
part in farm work as a sideline or during busy farming seasons. Statistics shows that the 
average off-farm income as a percentage of total farm family income is 33.9 percent in 
the 1960s and 52.2 in the 1970s. The same percentages in Korea were 16.0 in the 1960s 
and 16.3 in the 1970s (Oshima 1986: 804). The SMEs-based economy and rural-urban 
nexus contributed to a “landed” or “part-time” working class formation in Taiwan (See 
Gates 1979; Moore 1993; Park and Johnston 1995). 
 In addition it is a typical pattern in Taiwan that average workers leave factory 
work to marry and start their own small business after years of “selling their youth to the 
company.” “The Taiwanese have a joke that if you throw a stone in the streets of Taipei, 
you are likely to hit a chairman of the board. With one company for every 18 people in 
Taiwan (the highest density in the world), it could almost be true” (Economist, Nov. 7, 
1998). This class fluidity and economic overlapping among farmers, industrial workers, 
and SME petite bourgeoisie undermined a full-scale working class formation in Taiwan. 
 
Difference of Labor Politics: Political Variables 
Political variables also affected national variations of working class formation in 
the two countries. Although both countries imposed repressive state corporatist schemes 
that did not allow autonomous interest representation of rank-and-file workers, they were 
different in dealing with labor disputes. The central government in both countries wielded 
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the most power, but Korea allowed less narrow space for local autonomy than Taiwan 
did. True, Korea’s first local elections were not held until 1991. Before then, local 
officials were appointed by the central government that controlled and supervised 
important policy agendas in local administration. In this situation, if there happens to be 
an industrial strike in Ulsan, an industrial city on the Southeast coast where Hyundai 
Motors is positioned, central government agencies directly and immediately intervene to 
resolve the dispute, often with repressive measures. The local government in Ulsan 
hesitates to, or is not allowed to, deal with the nation-wide impact that the Hyundai 
dispute should have in the economy. Local disputes, especially in big businesses, tend to 
nationalize very fast so union activists in provinces and towns directly face hard-fisted 
central agencies without any buffer zones. 
In Taiwan, mainlander Nationalists monopolized political society at the national 
level, although they allowed indigenous islanders to participate in local governments. The 
KMT government granted local elites regionally monopolized economic privileges in 
exchange for their political loyalty, and made local elections in the arena for local 
resource competition. Therefore, local politicians have been accustomed to providing 
services and responding to their constituencies (Lerman 1977). Given that the Labor 
Dispute Mediation Law requires labor disputes to be mediated in the jurisdiction where 
they occur, the county and city bureaucrats in charge of labor affairs used to play a 
pivotal role in solving disputes. After democratization, an increasing number of workers 
asked for help from their local elected politicians when they crashed against their 
employers, which affected the labor movement in Taiwan. The easier it is for individual 
workers to solve disputes by eliciting help from local politicians, the less likely it is to 
collectively solve the problem or link their personal grievances with those of other 
workers (Huang 1997: 8). 
On the other hand, all the Union Federations at the county and city level received 
subsidies from local governments and sometimes the central government. Tainan County 
Federation of Unions, for example, earned 45 percent of its 1992 budget from member 
unions’ dues, and 31 percent from the county government and the Council of Labor 
Affairs (i.e., functional equivalent of Ministry of Labor) (Huang 1997: 11). In this 
situation, unionists are less likely to militantly mobilize rank-and-file workers against 
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governments which support themselves in financial terms. If they do, they should loose a 
third of their own budget resource. 
 More importantly, political leaders’ attitudes toward workers in Korea and 
Taiwan have been different when they demobilized workers from politics and 
remobilized them into EOI industrial efforts. Korean elites have been regarding union 
activities as being infiltrated with communism, disturbing industrial peace, and eating 
away at the national wealth. This epistemology biased against workers is understandable 
since economic growth rather than social welfare has been the principle of political and 
social integration. 
In contrast, the KMT leadership employed enlightened and preemptive measures 
to effectively co-opt threats from below so it could survive in the alien island. As the 
KMT has the Principle of Minsheng (people’s livelihood) as an official state ideology, 
political leadership provided a relatively more “material base of consent” (Przeworski 
1985: 133) to workers than its Korean counterpart did. In T.H. Marshall’s terms, the 
Taiwanese were given socioeconomic citizenship in exchange for political citizenship 
(1977: 78). 
 It is now necessary to identify the different levels of material compensation for 
political demobilization in the two countries. The levels can be proxied by working 
hours, wage, wage differentials, unemployment, and working conditions in factories. 
Figure 3-6 showed that Korean workers worked more than the Taiwanese in terms of 
weekly hours. The average work week was 52.1 hours for Korean workers and 48.2 hours 
for the Taiwanese counterparts from 1977 to 1994.  
Then, did the hardworking Korean workers get paid more than Taiwanese ones? 
Unfortunately, Figure 3-8 shows that Korean employees in manufacturing were paid less 
than Taiwanese ones in terms of hourly wage except for the 1977-79 periods when there 
was rapid wage increase due to shortage of labor force.  
Figure 3-9 graphically demonstrates how much wage inequality industrial 
workers in two countries experienced with informative reference to advanced OECD 
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countries. The Theil index,11 a measure of wage gaps in the manufacturing sector, was 
consistently lower in Taiwan than in Korea. Taiwan’s index was lower than even OECD 
countries except for oil shock-affected years (1974-75 and 1978-80). Note that a lower 
index means less wage inequality. The average Theil index between 1973 and 1997 was 
0.026 for Korea, 0.016 for Taiwan, and 0.018 for high-income OECD countries.  
Another indicator of worker’s welfare is unemployment rates which is displayed 
in Figure 3-10. Average unemployment rates between 1963 and 2000 are 4.22 percent in 
Korea compared to 2.08 in Taiwan. Taiwanese workers benefited from greater 
opportunities to work than their rivals did during industrialization.  
Finally, the working environments in factories matters. According to figure 3-11, 
Korea’s annual rates of fatal injuries per 100,000 workers insured are consistently higher 
than in Taiwan. The average rates are 31 fatal injuries for Korea compared to 10.1 for 
Taiwan during the comparable years of 1988 - 2001.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 So far I have discussed on a sector-by-sector basis how and why Korea and 
Taiwan differed in terms of social bases for developmental coalitions. The chapter 
detailed how the political differences were reflected in the social bases of 
developmentalism in two rival economies, as well as how various sectors were 
accommodated along different developmental paths. 
 Korean industrialization heavily depended on chaebols who were private agents 
of political legitimization via economic performance. As the term ‘corporate patriarchy’ 
connotes, the owner controlled almost every important decision of his industrial empire. 
The developmental state consistently discriminated against SMEs in the name of 
“economy of scale” and subordinated them to chaebols, culminating in the SME Linkage 
Law of 1975.  
In contrast, the Nationalists feared the rise of the big bourgeoisie and thus 
counterbalanced them by supporting SOEs’ employees who were usually loyal to the 
KMT. Thus, big firms were discouraged on the island, although there were a few 
 
11 Theil index (http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/tutorials.html) was devised by Professor James Galbraith at 
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business groups that were loosely knit agglomerations of separate firms. SMEs were the 
economic agent of national wealth. They were given moderate, if not full, chances of 
financial access and investment incentives.  
 Banking sectors in both countries experienced nearly identical levels of financial 
development, although mobilization, distribution, and profitability of financial resources 
were totally different in the two industrial rivals. The Korean governments repressed the 
financial sector in order to mobilize cheap industrial funds to chaebols participating in the 
HCI project, culminating with the moratorium measure of 1972. Bankers were generally 
risk-takers in extending loans as the government usually intervened to turn bad loans into 
equity or reschedule repayment terms for debt-ridden big firms. 
 The KMT government employed a high real interest rate policy from the start, 
which was a rarity among developing countries in the 1950s. Bankers were successful in 
mobilizing savings to cover demands for domestic investments. Their loan extension was 
targeted at the broad goals of export industry in general, rather than at the financial needs 
of big firms. Bankers earned high returns on assets, but that was due mainly to the risk-
aversion of state employees rather than to the the desire for profit among private 
entrepreneurs. Savers and financiers in Taiwan gained more benefits than those in Korea, 
where corporate debt crisis and bailout episodes recurred in 1969 – 70, 1972, 1979 – 80, 
1986 – 88, and 1997 – 8. 
 The two developmental rivals were similar in constraining the autonomous 
popular sector, although they were different in providing material compensation in 
exchange for political demobilization. Farmers in Taiwan had a better chance of 
maintaining their businesses thanks to a moderate, if not complete, rural bias in the KMT 
government, smooth rural-to-urban economic transition, and the presence of SMEs in the 
rural community. On the contrary, agriculture in Korea was almost ignored during 
economic development, despite a temporary rural bias episode in 1970s. The government 
was concerned only with the urban industrial center which generated most of national 
wealth. 
 
University of Texas at Austin to measure inequality of wage and household income.   
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Propinquity of the communist threat was the initial condition under which both 
small open economies employed labor-repressive regimes well before the EOI stage of 
the 1960s. But the Nationalists accommodated workers with more material benefits than 
Korean developmentalists. Taiwanese workers were given a relatively more material base 
of quietism compared to Korean rank-and-filers in terms of working hours, 
unemployment rates, wage differentials, and occupational injury. 
 In comparative perspective, the KMT government maintained and was supported 
by relatively broad and balanced social bases during its long political survival. This 
contrasts with Korean developmentalism, which funneled economic resources mainly to 
big business, resulting in narrow and skewed social bases. The next chapter will deal with 
how and why the different social bases of the developmental coalition were reflected in 
differences in central banker’s autonomy and performance in the two industrial rivals. 
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Chapter 4: Different Central Banking Systems in Korea and Taiwan 
This chapter discusses how and why the two central banking systems have 
experienced diverging historical paths up to today. In other words, this chapter examines 
my dependent variable – the different levels of CBI in Korea and Taiwan. I discuss the 
legal stipulations, the turnover of central bankers, their actual power within the 
government, as well as central bankers’ performance (NPL and inflation).12 
The first half of the chapter deals with the Korean case. The first section zeros in 
on the central bank’s historical origin in the colonial period, and its development before 
the military coup of 1961. The second section discusses the “1962 financial system,” 
where the military leadership relegated the central bankers to being a “rubber stamp” for 
developmental technocrats at the MOF. I measure the Korean CBI in terms of legal codes 
and turnover rates. The third section explores economic structures and sectoral 
preferences to see if CBI had a social base in Korea. The fourth section discusses 
financial regulations and supervision in terms of the MOF-BOK relationship and 
conflicts within the supervisory agency.  
 The latter half of the chapter details the Republic of China case. The fifth section 
focuses on the origins of the CBC on the mainland and its resumption on the island. The 
sixth section shows how legal stipulations and governorship turnover contributed to the 
independence of central bankers in Taipei. The seventh section discusses the amount of 
power central bankers actually enjoyed in Taiwanese officialdom. The next section shows 
that the central bankers had a pro-CBI socioeconomic arrangement and thus served as 
guardians of economic stability. The ninth section deals with financial supervision in a 
globalizing era and details CBC’s strategic response to the financial market and the 
process of building an independent supervisory agency.   
12 I assume here that a higher CBI leads to better performance. A ceavat is that the CBI as institutional 
autonomy from political pressures does not always results in good policy results or capacity. In other 
words, autonomous central bankers sometimes lack effective policy tools or are simply incapable to realize 
what they intended to do.  
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I. The Bank of Korea: Its Historical Origins and Development Before 1962 
Colonial Origin and American Proposals 
Putting the feudal kingdom, Chosun, under their control, Japanese colonialists 
provided Daiich Ginko, a Japanese commercial bank, with the exclusive authority to 
issue banknotes, establishing the first unified currency system and assuming the function 
of a central bank for the Chosun government. In 1909 central banking functions were 
transferred to a newly established ‘old’ Bank of Korea, which was later renamed the 
Bank of Chosun (BOC) in 1911. The BOC continued to function as the central bank until 
Korean independence in 1945 (Cole and Park 1983: 44). During the colonial period 
(1919-1945), the central banking system in Korea was owned and controlled by the 
Japanese colonialists. Given that the BOC was also a colonial special bank and a foreign 
branch of the Bank of Japan, Japanese colonialists exploited the system to channel 
savings initially into Japanese industrial and commercial expansions and also into the 
Japanese war effort.  
The BOC served as a pseudo-central bank in Manchuria, the northeastern region 
of China, funding military efforts and stabilizing inflationary pressures in the region. 
According to Baek Doo-jin (1975), a minister of finance in the 1950s, “moving closely 
with the Japanese army, the Bank of Chosun opened its branches and liaison offices in 
small cities to mobilize resources for the war effort. This is how Japan invaded mainland 
China economically and militarily.” After Japan acquired Manchuria in 1931, it set up a 
frontier central bank, the Bank of Manchukuo (BOM), withdrawing the BOC back to 
Korea. Then the Japanese government financially supported its war efforts by 
establishing an inter-regional linkage – between the frontier BOM, the intermediary 
BOC, and the headquarters of the Bank of Japan. The BOC was a channel through which 
money went to the frontier in China and back to the imperial homeland in Japan.     
The BOC almost became bankrupt at the end of World War II because it was 
cross-pressured by inflationary spirals from Manchuria and Japan. In addition, Japan 
exploited the BOC as its main provider of preferential policy loans for the homeland 
economy, which resulted in chronic non-performing loans: as early as the 1920s the ratio 
of non-performing loans amounted to 36.7 percent of its total credits (i.e., 119 million out 
of 325 million won) (Chung 1995: 225). The BOC almost lost its position as the central 
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bank, and was relegated to a poorly-run commercial bank from the 1930s up to 
independence in 1945. Colonial conditions and the political exigencies of warfare 
weakened the BOC and subjected it to political pressures from the homeland and local 
governments.  
After independence from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the economic situation 
was chaotic due to the division of North and South Korea, the collapse of the Japanese-
Korea economic linkage, and rampant inflation. While public discussion started under the 
Rhee government about establishing a new Korean central bank, the BOC, the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), and Cho-Heung Bank competed with each other to take the lead in the 
process of “financial state building” (Chosunilbo Aug. 19, 2005). There was no 
consensus about who would be the institutional builder of the new central bank and 
which model it would be based on.  
In the meantime the Korean and U.S. governments agreed to work together to 
rebuild the central banking system. In 1949 the MOF asked the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System to advise on reorganizing the new central 
bank, drafting new banking legislation, and formulating appropriate banking and 
monetary policies. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York sent two central bank officials, Arthur I. Bloomfield and 
John P. Jensen (1951: 3), to help build up the central banking system in the new born 
nation. The American drafters’ sophisticated knowledge and skills surprised the Korean 
finance officials: Jang Ki-young, later a vice-prime minister, confessed his experience 
with them as follows: 
 
Dr. Bloomfield opened my eyes to the democratic financial system. 
Listening to and learning from him, I found that everything was new. He 
told us the American experience with Guatemala where the Federal 
Reserve had helped them establish their central bank, which fascinated us. 
I got determined with our new central bank. We learned from him the 
term, money supply. And we learned about central bankers’ will to 
stabilize monetary value and thus inflation. (Han 1986: 85) 
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Bloomfield and Jensen proposed their final draft to the Rhee government, most of 
which was passed by the National Assembly in May 1950, a few weeks before the 
Korean War (1950-1953). The main recommendations of their policy proposal included: 
1) transforming the Bank of Chosun into a strong, autonomous central 
bank, divested of its commercial banking activities, and concentrating 
primarily on the management of monetary policy and supervision of the 
commercial banks; 2) creation of a Monetary Board to set monetary policy 
and oversee the functioning of the monetary system; 3) strengthening the 
controls over the commercial banks and transferring them as rapidly as 
possible from government to private ownership; 4) implementation of 
forceful anti-inflationary policies, thereby achieving sufficient stability to 
create conditions favorable for financial growth and further institutional 
reform. (Bloomfield and Jensen 1951: 42-78) 
 
In theory, the BOK was molded on the American Federal Reserve and thus had a 
variety of articles comparable to central banks in advanced countries. It had a specified 
and clear target of monetary stabilization; it was entitled to exert powerful and 
comprehensive authority covering the money supply, credit, foreign exchange, and bank 
supervision; it was politically independent from politicians and the MOF; it was not 
responsible to the government and the Assembly.  
The MOF and technocrats criticized the new central banking system arguing 
“their [Bloomfield, Jenson, and the ECA’s] draft proposed an absolute kingdom of the 
Monetary Board. The Board is expected to have more powerful authority than the 
president. The governor of the central bank will be de facto president while the current 
president will be de jure one” (Bank of Korea 2000: 22-23). 
In practice, unfortunately, the BOK was not as powerful as the statutes stipulated. 
Shortly after the bill was passed, the Korean War (1950-53) broke out, and the most 
progressive elements of the Central Banking Act had to be abandoned or severely 
compromised in the interests of financing the war. With the end of the War, attention 
turned to the reconstruction of the war-devastated economy. The Rhee government 
established the Korea Development Bank (KDB) in 1954 to grant medium- and long-term 
loans to industries. The Bank’s average share of total bank lending by all banks was 41.7 
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percent in 1955 – 1960. The KDB was placed directly under the authority of the MOF 
and was thereby independent of any control by the BOK. 
In response, the Monetary Board opined against the government and the KDB. 
The Board argued that the KDB was illegal since it violated the General Banking Act that 
stipulated the BOK-led monetary and financial system. Furthermore, the Board rejected 
the KDB’s request to print more money for purchasing the Industrial Bonds in 1954. On 
the other hand, as Bloomfield and Jensen had recommended before the War, the 
government privatized the commercial banking sector. The BOK welcomed the 
privatization package since it found it easier to regulate and supervise private banks than 
government-owned ones (Bank of Korea 2000: 399-400). 
In general, the BOK’s political independence and economic performance in the 
1950s was not poor. The Monetary Board voiced its own policy alternatives to the 
government with external support from the American advisors and ECA that pressured 
pro-BOK stabilization packages in early 1957. The packages kept inflation within 
tolerable ranges: whole sale prices in Seoul increased 116.5 percent in 1952 but they 
nosedived to 6.3 percent in 1957-59. 
 
II. The “1962 Financial System:” Subordination to Developmental Desires 
Legal Changes and Frequent Turnover of Central Bankers  
 The Park government after the military coup of May 1961 chose industrialists as 
its developmental partner to compensate for its democratic deficiency. Industrialists and 
their peak organization, FKI, were quick to respond to the developmental requests from 
the government. The capital-hungry FKI offered its own policy proposals that were in 
turn accepted by the government in mid-1991. Those proposals were mainly for free 
inducements of foreign loans and “the central bank’s support for their financing” (FKI 
1991: 76). Furthermore, government-big business relations were direct, periodic, and 
intimate. In early 1962, Park set up the Monthly Conference for Export at his Blue House 
(i.e., the Korean presidential residence) to discuss what his coalition partners needed and 
what the state could do to help them. “The government promised a total support system to 
the FKI members” (FKI 1991: 84).  
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Then the Park government took control of the “financial nerve of industrial 
muscle.” The culmination of the institutional changes came in May 1962, when the 
government revised BOK law so as to bring the central bank under the control of the 
MOF. The legal changes in the Central Banking Act were a “developmental manifesto” 
of the new government’s policy orientation towards state-led industrialization. The 
principles of the BOK’s autonomous power espoused by the American drafters were 
repudiated by the military leadership, who wanted to hold the nation-wide financial 
institutions in a tighter rein. There were several subsequent revisions during the 1960s 
and 70s, although they did not change the major format of the Central Banking Act of 
1962 that I focus on here to show how it made the original Act fit into the developmental 
plans.13 
First, the autonomy of the Monetary Board shrank. The military leadership 
increased the government-affiliated members from 3 out of 7 to 6 out of 9 on the Board 
(Article 8). Those members were the MOF minister (ex officio the board chairman) and 5 
members recommended by three government ministers. In addition the MOF minister 
could request the Board to reconsider its policy decisions and, if rejected, the cabinet 
intervened to judge the final decision for policy coordination (Article 39, Section 1 and 
2). 
Second, the original Act stipulated that the president appoint the governor with 4 
years in office guaranteed, while the grounds for the governor’s dismissal were not 
clearly stipulated. The 1962 revision tipped the balance toward the government. The 
governor was put in office by the MOF minister’s recommendation and then the cabinet’s 
ratification (Article 23, Section 1). The president could oust, upon the minister’s request, 
the governor even before the end of his term of office if he violated various banking rules 
(Article 114, Section 1). The government was legally authorized to dismiss governors 
who were disloyal to its developmental drives. 
 Third, the developmental leadership took hold of the BOK with a tight rein. The 
original law made it clear that it was the Board that ratified the annual budget plan of the 
BOK. But the 1962 revision removed the budgetary autonomy. The BOK should report 
 
13 See Bank of Korea. 2000. The Fifty Years of the Bank of Korea. Volume II. 222-323. 
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its budget plan to the cabinet which then could ratify or reject it (Article 7, Section 5). 
Furthermore, the MOF minister was authorized to supervise the BOK’s monetary and 
financial affairs (Section 40). Thus the MOF was able to control the BOK’s resources and 
policy decisions in its favor.  
 Fourth, from the perspective of two American architects, Bloomfield and Jensen, 
the central bankers were expected to take charge of foreign exchange affairs, especially in 
the poor and inflation-stricken country. Erasing Section 3 of Article 3, the revision 
authorized the MOF to take these affairs away from the BOK. The central bankers could 
not play the role of gatekeeper of financial transactions across the national borders while 
the MOF officials were capable of controlling massive amounts of American aid and 
foreign capital – both of which were lifelines for the war-devastated nation.  
 Fifth, the original law specified that the BOK could supervise banking institutions 
of any type within Korean territory. But putting the KDB, a major government-owned 
special bank, outside of the definition of “banking institutions” (Article 10, Section 1), 
the government gave carte blanche to the expansionist bankers without being supervised 
by the central bankers. In addition, the government involved the BOK fully in its 
developmental scheme by specifying that, if necessary, the BOK could purchase 
government bonds (Article 83, Section 2). 
The 1962 revision brought what might be called the “1962 financial system,” in 
the sense that the government held the central bankers on its tight leash to facilitate 
monetary and financial support for its developmental desires. The central bankers could 
not play the role of “the repository of reason against the short-term claim of passion” 
(Elster 1979: 89). 
 The 1962 financial system required central bankers to accept the developmental 
requests from the government whose social base was capital-hungry big industrialists. 
This structural relation suggests that one will see high turnover rates of central bank 
governors in Korea: government will oust “defiant” central bankers from their 
governorship for stubborn refusal to surrender to the governments’ developmental 
pressures. Economic expansionists may expel “compliant” central bankers just because 
their performance is poor. Either way, the central bankers’ lack of autonomy should 
result in high turnover rates for governors. Does Korea register a high turnover rate? 
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Table 4-1 lists the BOK governors since its inception in 1950. There were 22 
governors in 55 years which shows the high turnover rate of central bankers: 0.4 
governors a year and 2.5 years per governor. The shortest term of office was just three 
months held by Bae Ui-Hwan in 1960. 
 An interesting episode in 1963 reflects the status of the BOK vis-à-vis the 
developmental government. In 1963, the Park government made every effort to introduce 
foreign loans from France which in turn requested a certification for a possible default. 
Byung-Do Min, the seventh governor, was invited to the cabinet discussion. He refused 
to issue the certification due to the lack of foreign exchange reserves, which surprised 
and angered the cabinet members. Ten days later, the MOF sent a letter to the Monetary 
Board in order to legitimize its effort to put financial supervision under its jurisdiction. 
Min and the Board criticized the policy proposal in their reply letter. The government 
classified the letter to hide it from public attention. In response, Min chose to violate 
secret document regulations: he held a press conference to reveal the reply letter, making 
public the BOK-MOF conflicts over banking supervision. He resigned in protest after the 
conference (Han 1986: 461-6). 
 
Central Bankers and Democratic Openings: A Historical Pattern  
 Historically speaking, the BOK’s journey toward independence was characterized 
by a pattern of struggling for autonomy following democratic openings caused by 
governmental changes. After independence in 1945, the Bank of Chosun was criticized 
for its cooperation with Japanese colonial rule, and some bankers insisted on the 
democratic and autonomous operation of monetary and financial policies. This effort 
came to fruition when Bloomfield and Jensen drafted, in 1950, the first central bank 
charter, following the model of the American Federal Reserve system. Since then, the 
BOK’s struggle for autonomy has been a “return to the 1950 charter spirit.” Although the 
charter did not realize its own legal codes, in reality it taught the central bankers what an 
independent central bank should be. 
When the authoritarian Rhee government (1948-60) was brought down by a 
democratic upsurge in 1960, some BOK staffers initiated the drive toward “political 
independence and neutrality,” since senior officers of the BOK proved to be involved in 
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money laundering for the ruling Liberal Party’s election campaign (Bank of Korea 2000: 
34). Thus, the BOK drafted a bill of their own and proposed it to the democratic Chang 
Myon government (1960-61), which later failed to pass because of the military coup of 
1961. 
In the 1962 financial system, the BOK remained a “Namdaemun branch” of the 
MOF (referring to the Seoul district where the bank was located), which demonstrated the 
BOK’s subordination to the political will of the developmental government. After the 
Yushin regime fell in 1979 due to Park’s assassination, there was a brief period of 
democratic opening, followed by the Kwangju Uprising in early 1980. The BOK’s 
journey toward autonomy restarted. Chun Sung Kim, the thirteenth governor, obtained a 
promise from the MOF to allow the self-determination of operational budgeting, which 
was reflected in the fifth revision of the charter, but other things remained status quo 
(Bank of Korea 2000: 46-7). 
How did the democratization in the mid-1980s affect BOK’s status vis-à-vis 
developmental government? The “June Uprising” in 1987 forced the authoritarian Chun 
government to grudgingly accept a democratic transition, which prompted the BOK to 
take action. Officials at the Pusan BOK branch publicly pronounced their hope for the 
BOK’s political autonomy, which was followed by supportive announcements from 
every branch as well as the headquarters. Since the presidential and general elections 
were scheduled for late 1987 and early 1988, respectively, each political camp promised 
to support the BOK’s autonomy in order to win those “founding elections,” which would 
determine post-transition politics.  
The course of a great debate between new democratic government and opposition 
parties was concerned with two issues: the central bankers’ independence and bank 
supervision. In July 1988 three opposition parties drafted a joint proposal for a new BOK 
charter which started a great debate in the political realm. The proposal was in favor of 
the BOK, suggesting that the Monetary Board chairmanship should be held by the 
governor rather than the finance minister, and the supervision of non-bank financial 
institutions and foreign exchange affairs should be put back under the central bankers’ 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, to appease possible resistance from the government, the 
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opposition parties allowed the finance minister some legal authority over the Board’s 
important decisions (Bank of Korea 2000: 49). 
As a preemptive measure, the Roh government (1988-1993) and the governing 
Democratic Justice Party announced their version of central bank charter in December 
1988. Grudgingly accepting that the governor should assume the Board chairmanship, 
they proposed a plan where the bank supervision authority would be taken away from the 
BOK and given to the Financial Supervisory Service under the control of the MOF (BOK 
2000: 49). This proposal was a typical divide-et-impera strategy since the government 
was trying to divide the BOK into two agencies – the BOK, as the monetary agency, and 
the Service, as a separate financial regulation/supervision agency. 
In response, the 17th governor, Kim Kun, rejected both of the proposals from the 
opposition and the government. His plan was to “return to Bloomfield-Jensen’s origin.” 
He supported the original charter which stipulated the BOK’s complete independence and 
comprehensive jurisdiction including monetary, financial, foreign exchange, and 
supervision affairs. The governor chose to launch a “petition signature drive” which 
succeeded in mobilizing 1 million signatures from citizens in the streets in only two 
months (BOK 2000: 51). 
The standoff between the bargaining players continued till 1989. In the summer of 
1989, the MOF proposed its own bill to the government-party joint committee which then 
passed to the Assembly. The opposition parties also submitted their version to the floor. 
But the Assembly could not reach a compromise so the great debates fizzled in late 1989 
(BOK 2000: 53).  
The 1990s saw the persistence of the 1962 financial system. The story of Cho 
Sun, the 18th governor, demonstrates the persistence. In late 1992, Chung Ju-Young, an 
opposition presidential candidate, stated in public during his campaign that Governor Cho 
had arbitrarily ordered the printing of money worth 300 billion won to contribute to Kim 
Young Sam, the candidate of the ruling party. In response, Cho appealed to the court 
accusing candidate Chung of misrepresentation in public. After Kim won the presidential 
election, the governor withdrew his lawsuit. President Kim put him out of office upon his 
taking the presidency, saying that Cho himself resigned for personal reasons. But the fact 
is that his resignation was due to his “rudeness:” he withdrew the legal case without 
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consulting the president-elect in advance (Bank of Korea Labor Union 2002: 27). He 
served just one year, March 1992 to March 1993. 
In the first year of Kim Young Sam’s government (1993-1998), support was 
voiced for the BOK’s autonomy in learned circles. In May 1994, forty-one economics 
scholars pronounced at a news conference the urgency of the central banker’s 
independence, which triggered a policy debate among the ruling party, the opposition 
parties, and civil organizations. But the debate repeated the process of 1987-89 and 
fizzled out without any policy compromise among them (BOK 2000: 54-55). 
 The debate resurged in early 1997 when President Kim made public the exigency 
of financial reform at a presidential news conference. The government formed Financial 
Reform Committee introducing a public forum to discuss the almost 50-year-long issue 
of central bank independence. In June there was a “four-man pact” among the 
presidential economic secretary and the heads of the MOFE (Ministry of Finance and 
Economy), the BOK, and the Committee. Unfortunately, the pact heavily reflected the 
old MOF proposal of the past. Many BOK officials mobilized fierce street protests 
blaming their boss, Lee Kyung-Sik, for his behind-the-scenes collusion with the 
developmental technocrats. The turmoil continued until the Asian financial crisis hit 
Korea hard in late 1997. The situational urgency made the Assembly pass in December 
1997 a bill of compromise between the government and the opposition parties (BOK 
2000: 62-82). 
The compromise improved the central bankers’ autonomy at the expense of their 
authority to supervise. The BOK made some gains: the government-recommended 
members decreased from five to two out of seven Monetary Board members; the 
governor took the Board chairmanship; the Board membership was legally guaranteed for 
four years; the finance minister lost his authority to ratify the BOK operation rules (BOK 
2000: 83). 
 On the other hand, the central bankers lost in terms of financial supervision: the 
MOF divested bank supervisory authority from the BOK, establishing the Financial 
Supervisory Service (KFSS) which covered the whole gamut of the banking industry, 
stock market, and insurance companies (BOK 2000: 84). It should be noted that the FSS 
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is not an independent agency: it is under the jurisdiction of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (KFSC) which is heavily subject to the government’s and MOF’s pressures.  
 In sum, BOK officials have always been active during political openings caused 
by government changes in hopes of achieving autonomy from government pressures, but 
have always failed to do so. Why is it that even political democratization in mid-1980s 
was not able to break through the 1962 financial system? Why is the old system 
persistent? This suggests that there is a socioeconomic structure which determines 
whether CBI in a country is sustainable or not. The next section deals with the social 
arrangement of group preferences toward monetary and financial stability. 
 
III. BOK: Captured by Big Industrialists and Guarding Bank Loan Capitalism  
 How did the social bases of developmetalism in Korea affect central bank 
independence? As indicated by table 3-3, the main industrial bases of the top 10 largest 
companies were electronics, petroleum, chemicals, motor vehicles and transportation 
equipment. Table 3-1 shows that the top 5 companies produced 45 percent of the GDP in 
the manufacturing sector. These data suggest that capital-intensive industries have been 
the backbone of big industrialists.  
Since it is hard to move assets of heavy and chemical industry to another use due 
to a high ratio of fixed capital investment and long duration of profit gestation, big 
industrialists are closely wedded to their current activities and have great incentives to 
obtain government policies that favor their business operations. Furthermore, since the 
developmental government decides which firms will invest how much to which sector 
when technocrats draft an economic plan, the capital-intensive asset holders have great 
incentives to lobby for government policy because their assets’ rate of return depends on 
public policy (Frieden 1991: 20-1).  
On the other hand, industrialists in Korea consist of a small number of big 
businesses. Geographically they are concentrated in a few industrial regions (Seoul-
Kyungin area and Youngnam area in the southeast) which contributed to the great 
internal cohesion of the capital-intensive industry sector. The political influence that the 
capital-intensive sector has brought to bear on the government has been great: 
109
developmental governments have been accepting almost 90 percent of FKI’s policy 
recommendations (Shafer 1990: 137).  
 The government – big industrialist relationship suggests that central bankers will 
have a problem in controlling monetary supplies because of inflation. Since it is 
theoretically obvious that high inflation favors debtors vis-à-vis creditors, inflation is 
tolerable and even favorable to debtor industrialists. Figure 4-1 shows cross-national 
variation in inflation rates from 1960-1990. It is clear that the big industrialist-driven 
Korean economy was subject to a higher inflation rate than its industrial rival: the three 
decades’ average inflation rate is 15.6 % for Korea and 5.7 % for Taiwan. Korea 
experienced inflation almost three times higher than Taiwan did. 
 Given that Korea experienced a relatively similar level of financial development 
measured by the ratio of total financial assets to the GNP as indicated by Figure 3-1 in 
the previous chapter, why did the financial sector in Korea not bring its sectoral 
preferences for price stability, and thus central bank independence, to bear on the 
government as much as their counterparts in Taiwan? In the 1960s and 1970s, when 
commercial banks dominated the financial market, the developmental government always 
intervened by choosing heads of commercial banks among top banking officials to put 
financial institutions under the politicians’ expansionist control. Since the 1980s when 
NBFIs ruled the financial market over commercial banks, a few groups of industrialists 
and chaebols often owned the NBFIs, replacing the state as the largest shareholders. This 
is why the financial sectors could not voice their own sectoral preferences toward price 
stability. A dependent financial sector results in a dependent central bank.  
 SMEs and agricultural sectors may counterbalance big industrialists’ expansionist 
desires. If the political leadership cares about subordinate groups (mainly about 
canvassing votes from those sectors), the government will not overinvest its material 
resources in capital-intensive sector. Unfortunately, SMEs and farmers were excluded 
from the narrow developmental coalition, which prevented them from organizing and 
having their interests represented. There have been no serious distributive conflicts in 
which the developmental government felt it necessary to support subordinate groups, 
thereby compromising big business-oriented economic strategy. What do the central 
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bankers do when they are forced to be obedient to a government “captured” by big 
bourgeoisies?  
 The other problem related to monetary supply that central bankers faced was 
preferential credit extension. “In a repressed financial system, a government maintains 
artificially low interest rates. Because this induces an excess demand for credit, the 
government is drawn into the process of rationing financial resources among competing 
uses, i.e., preferential credit schemes”(McKinnon 1973). Therefore, if central bankers do 
not wield authority independent from the government, they will do a poor job when it 
comes to regulating preferential loans that increase financial risks in the financial sector. 
Central bankers’ independent authority can be proxied by non-performing loans (NPL) of 
commercial banks as a percentage of the total credit, which Figure 4-2 graphically 
shows.14 
It was mainly “long-term” foreign loans that the Park government borrowed from 
Japan and the U.S., which resulted in the low NPL ratio in the 1960s. But this did not last 
long. As foreign loan repayments began a decade later, the NPL ratio rose rapidly in 
1969. In response, the Park government launched stabilization packages right after the 
1969 presidential and general elections. Serious and chronic NPL problems in the 1980s, 
and the early and late 1990s were due to the extremely weak financial structure of private 
businesses. The debt-to-equity ratio of private firms in Korea was 250-320 percent during 
1976 to 1990, whereas the ratio in Taiwan was 100-120 percent in the same period (Lee 
1999: 409). Central bankers were not able to prevent private bankers from extending 
credit to debt-ridden firms since they were under the tight control of the technocrat-filled 
EPB and MOF which were eager to funnel capital, domestic and foreign, to the industrial 
sector. The BOK simply could not perform what it was supposed to do. 
The Taiwan case shows that there, the NPL ratio has been relatively well 
controlled. The Central Bank of China (CBC) enjoyed full delegation of supervisory 
authority from the MOF and KMT government. Covering all the financial intermediaries 
in their responsibility, they were “harsh” in monitoring and punishing any inappropriate 
credit extension. The central bankers’ authoritative regulation and supervision 
 
14 Unfortunately pre-1981 data for Taiwan are not available.  
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contributed to a sound financial balance and immunity to external shock, especially in the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  
Dependent central bankers in Korea were not only incapable of supervising the 
NPL of commercial banks, they were also active in extending preferential credits to debt-
ridden big firms. The Haneun Tukyung (BOK Special Credits) is a typical example of the 
central bankers’ financial intervention in the market. This means that the BOK granted a 
low-interest, long-term “special credit” to financially troubled banks and firms. The BOK 
simply printed more money to prepare the special funds. In 1972 when the Park 
government launched the heavy-chemical industrialization, it increased the foreign 
exchange rate by 18 percent to encourage the export industry. But the measure led to 
financial troubles (i.e., debt service) for debt-ridden big firms that had depended on 
borrowed foreign capital. So the government forced the central bankers to extend special 
low-interest loans to troubled firms and banks (Bank of Korea 2000: 445-50). The 
mechanism of the special credit was as follows: The government allowed debt-ridden 
banks to issue 200-billion-won bonds which the BOK in turn purchased at a 5.5 % 
interest rate compared to the 20 % interest rate in the money market. In this way, the 
relieved banks rescheduled the firms’ debt service, spreading costs over a long period. 
Thus, the money went from the BOK to high-leveraged firms through the bond-issuing 
private banks (Chung 1995: 272-4). 
The central bankers extended other special loans in the middle of the industrial 
restructuring of 1985. In July, the BOK faced pressures from the Chun government which 
was then struggling to streamline its inefficient industrial structure. The BOK revised its 
own charter, under the MOF’s tacit approval, to manipulate the legal foundation for the 
“Industrial Restructuring Fund.” In three times, it extended 1.72 trillion won to six 
commercial banks at the low interest rate of 3%. The central bankers volunteered to 
shoulder the loss incurred by their constituent commercial banks which were trapped by 
debt-ridden big firms (Chung 1995: 274). 
In a way, the Korean central bankers were “successful” in employing preemptive 
measures to alleviate possible banking crises. The BOK’s preferential credit extension, 
however, alleviated policy loan-led banking crises through printing more money. In other 
words, it was “government intervention” for “government failure.” Its mechanisms 
112
progressed as follows: expansionist policy loans led to debt-ridden firms which caused an 
insolvent debt and an insolvent banking operation which led to a looming financial crisis 
and a special credit by the central bankers.  
 The BOK’s credit policy violated Bagehot’s principles (1878) about the lender of 
the last resort. First, by stipulating that the central bankers lend freely at a high interest 
rate, Bagehot emphasized the penalty imposed onto private bankers’ insolvency. The 
BOK’s credit was a very preferential benefit, considering the low long-term interest rate 
of 3 % in the inflation-stricken Korean economy. Second, by stipulating that the central 
banks protect not individual institutions but the market in general, Bagehot called 
attention to the central bankers’ neutrality and fairness. In Korea, the beneficiaries of the 
credit were specific firms and banks highly leveraged due to the risky and inefficient 
management of their assets.    
 In sum, the central bankers in Korea may have been successful since they 
effectively prevented banking insolvency in the 1970s and the 1980s through preemptive 
credit extension. In doing so, though, they contributed to a moral hazard on the part of 
private bankers and entrepreneurs since they lost an opportunity to learn to prudentially 
use the financial resources in their hands.   
 
IV. BOK: Poor Regulation in Financial Liberalization  
 In theory, the role of the lender of the last resort leads to a “moral hazard” on the 
part of market agents because they tend more often to be risk-takers than they would be 
without a central bank of the last resort. This suggests that the role of the “lender of the 
last resort” cannot function without proper financial regulations and supervision.  
 According to the original Central Banking Act drafted by Bloomfield and Jensen, 
the BOK was powerful in financial regulation and supervision; the Department of Bank 
Supervision at BOK was expected to regulate most of all the financial institutions’ 
operations. Under the 1962 system, the MOF regulated and supervised special banks and 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). How many financial resources did the BOK 
regulate and supervise in the developmental era? Table 4.2 shows the composition of 
financial intermediaries in terms of loans and investments of the total credit in Korea. 
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Given that the BOK regulated commercial banks, it took charge of 42.80 percent 
of the total credit in the 1970s, 37.75 in the 1980s, and 20.55 in the 1990s. The central 
bankers’ coverage of financial supervision was quite limited compared to the MOF which 
covered all the rest of the financial institutions. Financial bureaucrats controlled 57.2 
percent of the total credit in the 1970s, 62.25 in the 1980s, and 79.45 in the 1990s.  
Interestingly enough, specialized and development banks that used to be the main 
financial channel of capital-intensive industry in the 1970s-1980s lost their financial 
ground as the economy liberalized, especially in the 1990s. Their shares decreased from 
49.27 percent of the total credit in the 1970s to 17.46 in the 1990s. Instead the chaebol-
dominated NBFIs such as merchant banks, investment companies, mutual credits, trust 
accounts of banks, insurance, and securities grew rapidly, with their shares increasing 
from 7.93 percent of the total credit in the 1970s, to 23.68 percent in the 1980s, and to 62 
percent in the 1990s. NBFIs gained profits by channeling short capital, foreign and 
domestic, to the capital-hungry industrial sector.  
The Korean case shows that financial deepening and liberalization have 
differential impacts on the state agencies. The central bankers lost while the MOF gained. 
In addition, financial liberalization does not always force the government to shed its 
power over the market. The state does not simply deregulate. The MOF bureaucrats could 
re-arrange their control over the market by putting the increasing number of NBFIs under 
their jurisdiction.  
 How does the “division of labor” in financial regulation shed light on Korea? The 
division of labor led Korea to the crisis. The Ministry of Finance and Economy 
(MOFE)15 governed most financial resources, foreign and domestic, although it lacked 
onsite regulatory and supervisory skills and techniques; it specialized in financial 
“policy-making.” Thus the MOFE could not update supervision-related laws to fit the 
financial globalization era. It sometimes delegated its examination authority to the Bank 
Supervision Service at the BOK on a case-by-case basis. But the temporary delegation 
did not include law enforcement power for the BOK examiners. The partial and 
 
15 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Board was integrated into Ministry of Finance and 
Economy in 1994. After the Asian crisis, the MOFE delegated its economic authority to other ministries in 
1998. 
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intermittent delegation of supervisory authority connotes inconsistency of “authority and 
responsibility” or “examination and discipline.” An official at the BOK confessed, 
“Frankly speaking, we were not that hard-working with onsite examination because, even 
if we reported inappropriate operation cases to finance officials, they often took no action 
with the troubled banks” (interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea). 
 The MOFE was active increasing number of its policy constituents under its 
jurisdiction: they approved a lot of merchant banks in the name of financial liberalization. 
There were only six merchant banks in the early 1990s, but thirty merchant banks 
operated in 1997. In addition, to the MOFE’s indiscreet issuing of licenses, the urgent 
financial needs of debt-ridden big industrial firms contributed to the rapid increase of the 
NBFIs. Those firms resorted to NBFIs which were subject to less strict regulations under 
the MOFE, compared to banks regulated by the BOK (Choi 2002: 105). Inexperienced 
branches of Korean merchant and investment companies were concentrated in the 
Southeast Asian region, especially Hong Kong, where the financial sector usually dealt 
with short-term capital and did not require strict eligibility for business operation 
compared to the U.S. and European markets (Choi 2001: 49). When the Asian crisis 
occurred, the impact transmitted along financial nerves back to Korea. 
 It should be noted that a behind-the-scenes reason for the MOFE’s inability to 
maintain prudential operation in NBFIs was the traditional convention by which ex-
officials who retired from the Ministry often took office at the NBFIs. The Ministry had a 
“good relationship” with the merchant banks that later triggered the 1997 crisis in Korea. 
The chairman and vice chairmen of the Merchant Banks Association of Korea at the time 
of the Asian crisis came from the Ministry. Their presence made it difficult for MOFE 
officials to supervise and discipline the NBFIs, since MOFE officials are notorious for 
their esprit de corps. Koreans used to call them mofia, referring to the mafia. The 
convention resembles the Japanese MOF-jusen (companies that specialized in extending 
collateral loans for housing facilities) in the sense that senior officials at the jusen 
consisted of retired Japanese MOF ex-officials. Thus the lack of prudential supervision of 
the jusen contributed to the nation-wide bubble economy and finally the banking crisis in 
the early 1990s (Choi 2001: 41).  
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A labor unionist (interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea) at the BOK 
commented on political and institutional status of MOFE:  
 
The MOFE is a kind of developmental dinosaur as they have tremendous 
power over the Korean economy. We cannot challenge them…. They have 
a lot of official and unofficial dense institutional connections with 
chaebols, bankers, and the non-banking sector. The personnel network 
clearly demonstrates that. Nearing retirement, senior officials are eager to 
find positions available to them, especially advisor positions at a private 
big company, investment companies, and state-owned corporation…. 
When we see the government try to set up a new economic institution, we 
joke “Oh, there should be a lot of retirees at the MOFE.” Facing the 
powerful MOFE, frankly speaking, we BOK staff have a kind of defeatism 
vis-à-vis the Ministry. 
 
The inconsistent regulation and supervision led to a lack of financial prudence in 
the Korean financial sector. As Figure 4-2 in the previous section shows, the NPL ratio 
clearly demonstrates the trouble. The developmental finance regime was quick to 
liberalize the financial sector in the early 1980s but slow to prepare protective measures 
for savers, corporate and individual. The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) 
started its operation on the first day of 1997, the year of the Asian crisis. In contrast, 
Taiwan established the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in 1985, 12 years 
before Korea. 
 In fact there is no agreement among economics scholars whether a financial 
supervisory institution independent from central banks contributes to financial prudence 
in the globalization era (Kim 2002: 12-6). As Barth, Caprio, and Levine argued, although 
financial supervisory practices lead to accurate information disclosure and limit the moral 
hazard incentives, it is not clear whether measures of supervisory independence are 
linked with better banking performance or stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2002: 39). 
This suggests that the institutional arrangement may often be determined by historical 
and political conjunctures. The MOFE accomplished its long-time wish for an integrated 
supervisory institution by depriving the BOK of its supervisory function and establishing 
the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (KFSS) after the Asian crisis.  
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Does the KFSS enjoy autonomy within its operation? Unfortunately, the 
government still controls the KFSS by putting the private organizations under the 
jurisdiction of the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission (KFSC), an arm of the 
government. The KFSS follows directions determined by the KFSC. A top labor unionist 
(interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea) at KFSS commented on their unfriendly 
relationship with the KFSC: 
 
The Monetary Board and the BOK are an integrated single unit, but the 
KFSC and KFSS are different organizations. They are state officials; we 
are not. We are private. The KFSC has its own executive office for policy 
planning and implementation. So they often tell us, “follow our lead.” It is 
very suspicious if they can really regulate the financial industry fairly and 
neutrally. There are many cases that prove our suspicions. As you know, 
most of the senior KFSC policy-makers came from the MOFE. When we 
argue for fair and clear supervisory operations, they often ignore our 
appeals. This is why we fight them. If not, they won’t let us share 
supervisory authority with them. 
 
The high turnover rate of the KFSS chairmanship reflects its lack of autonomy 
vis-à-vis the KFSC and the government. Table 4-3 lists the chairmen since 1998. There 
were five chairmen since its initiation in 1998. The turnover rate, measured by the 
number of chairmen per year, is 0.71 chairmen per year. Each chairman served, on 
average, for 18 months. Most of them used to be senior officials at the MOF/MOFE, 
which suggests that the KFSS is dependent on the MOFE in terms of its personal 
network.  
 Given that central bankers take charge of the supply of money and credit as well 
as the role of “lender of the last resort,” they need accurate information about the 
domestic financial sector. Do KFSC and KFSS provide the information to central bankers 
and cooperate with each other for better regulatory performance? A mid-level official 
(interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea) at the KFSS confessed, “Not really:” 
 
We [the KFSS] are not in a good relationship with the BOK and MOFE. 
Our unfriendliness is echoed in the activities in international 
organizations….They [the BOK] joined the EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting 
of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks), established in 1991, while the 
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MOFE attended an inter-governmental organization, the ACC (BIS Asian 
Consultative Council), even though those organizations shared a lot of 
operations. When the BOK joined it, they deliberately alienated the KFSS. 
We don’t share discussion materials and data with BOK officials….. As 
you say we may have to cooperate with BOK to counterbalance the power 
that MOF(E)-KFSC group has…. But we don’t cooperate with central 
bank officials since they [BOK] opposed setting up of our institution 
[KFSS] and we still remember the bad feeling that we had a few years ago 
[1998]…..I would say that we are subject to so-called organizational 
egoism. 
 
In sum, the central bankers did not enjoy independent authority under the 1962 
financial system that still lingers over the Korean financial sector – even after 
democratization in mid-1980s. Captured by the interests of capital-hungry big 
industrialists, government politicians and bureaucrats did not allow central bankers 
autonomy to do what they are supposed to do. The BOK’s independence is very poor in 
terms of legal codes, governors’ turnover, central bankers’ status within the state, and 
performance (i.e., inflation and NPL). 
 
V. The Central Bank of China: Its Historical Origins and Development 
The CBC on Mainland China 
 The year 1906 witnessed the birth of the first government bank, the Hu-Pu (Board 
of Revenue) Bank which was reconstituted as the Bank of China in 1912. The charter 
granted it the right of note issue and made it the government fiscal agency. But at the 
same time the government granted a similar charter to anther government bank, the Bank 
of Communications on the recommendation of the Board of Posts and Communications 
(Chang 1958: 174). The government did not regard the central bank as the single 
commanding height of the financial system distributing central banking privileges to 
those two aforementioned government banks. The government simply hesitated to 
determine “who will be the central bank?” 
Assuming office in Canton as the Supreme Commander of the Army and Navy in 
1923, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, “the Father of Modern China,” and his government suffered from 
lack of public finance because taxes levied were completely under the control of local 
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warlords. In 1924 the Sun government resolved to launch Central Bank of China (CBC) 
in Canton (Central Bank of China 1996).  
The historical origin of the CBC was the government’s financial need to fund the 
budget deficit and support the war efforts against local landlords, communists, and later 
the Japanese empire under the condition that domestic commercial banks were merely 
money shops. The Bank was Dr. Sun’s “financial state-building project.” The CBC 
shares with European central banks the historical origin: the government’s financial need 
for resource mobilization. Early commercial bankers in Western Europe usually started 
their central banking business by getting temporary licensing charters in exchange for 
funding governments’ debts from war efforts during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (Chung 1995: 74). As Kindleberger (1984: 7) argues, “War is a hothouse and 
places enormous strain on resources, which finance is used to mobilize. Financial 
innovation occurs in wartime.” 
Unfortunately, Dr.Sun’s efforts for a central banking system failed to establish its 
status as the leading center of the financial community in mainland China because the 
CBC did not command a monetary monopoly, nor was it a leader in the banking 
community. First, the government could not provide the CBC with the charter to 
monopolize the right to issue notes. With the creation of the CBC, the Bank of China and 
the Bank of Communications were willing to forego their right of note issue and to 
withdraw their notes from circulation as soon as the government had repaid the 
outstanding balance of their advances, amounting to CNC $100 million. The government, 
however, was not able to liquidate its debts with the two banks and thus two banks 
continued to issue their own notes as before (Chang 1958: 176). 
Second, the CBC was not the center of the financial industry. It still struggled for 
recognition in a banking community dominated by the old and well-established Bank of 
China and the Bank of Communications. Furthermore, the CBC could not significantly 
influence the supply of credit by manipulating the rediscount rate since the volume of 
transactions in the discount market was small. It was unable to conduct open market 
operations in bonds. Basically, the CBC was a local bank limited to Canton without 
significant financial policy tools it could exploit. 
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In 1927 some finance officials in the Chiang Kai-shek government tried again to 
establish a central banking system, creating the Statute of the Central Bank of China. This 
measure announced that the CBC was the national bank and had a number of special 
privileges conferred upon it by the Nationalist government. The Chiang government 
accepted policy recommendations drafted by Sir Frederick Lieth Ross for far-reaching 
monetary reforms. Following American and English central banking systems, the draft 
advised that the CBC take responsible for note issue, rediscount, control of money 
markets and the credit supply. Unfortunately, the plan aimed to ensure independence for 
the CBC but failed to be ratified and was dropped (Chang 1958: 175). 
 The CBC under the Chiang government was not able to perform as an 
independent central bank at the national level. The board of the CBC was dominated by 
government nominees, and sound financial and monetary principles could not be 
maintained against the considerations of political expediency (civil war and the Sino-
Japanese War). Moreover, the Chinese banking industry was concentrated in Shanghai 
money markets. Although the modern banks wanted to extend their businesses into the 
interior where they could operate without competition from the foreign banks, they feared 
that local governments and warlords would levy heavy “political taxes” onto their 
financial businesses. Even in Shanghai the banks were not entirely free from central 
government interference (Chang 1958: 179-181). 
As a result, the CBC was unable to control macroeconomic stability within 
tolerable limits. Tables 4-4 and 4-5 show the CBC’s failure to stabilize monetary value 
and the government’s deficit due to war efforts. Inflation spirals were disastrous. The 
price skyrocketed from 100 in 1937 to 163,160 in 1945 in the Free China area. 
Furthermore, government finance ran into huge budget deficits. Between 1937 and 1948 
the expenditures increased from 1,992 CNC million dollars to 655,471,087 while the 
revenue did not catch up with the expenditure increases, which caused a serious crisis in 
public financing. The deficit increased from 560 CNC million dollars to 434,565,612. It 
was an increase of 776,010 times. 
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The CBC on the Island: Delegation and Resumption 
Following the Chiang government, the CBC moved to Canton, Chungking, 
Chengtu, and finally to Formosa (i.e., the old name of Taiwan) in December 1949. The 
government delegated all functions of the CBC, except for fiscal-agency, to the Bank of 
Taiwan (Central Bank of China 1996: xxi). The delegation was due to the fact that the 
CBC was not familiar with the financial situation on the alien island and needed time to 
prepare for its own operations. Another reason was that the Nationalist leadership in the 
1950s did not give up on the unification of China by military rollback. They did not want 
the CBC to take root in the small island, since that would mean a consolidation of divided 
state-building in the eyes of the KMT leadership. Instead, the Bank of Taiwan performed 
the ‘local’ central banking business. 
In order to speed up economic development, the KMT government announced in 
1959 its “19-Point Program for Speeding Up the Process of Economic Development” 
which stipulated that a central banking system should be established. In 1961 the CBC 
started its operations in Taipei. The 1961 resumption took place when the Nationalist 
leadership gave up on the idea of military rollback for national unification and instead 
regarded economic growth as another form of competition vis-à-vis the communist 
regime on the Mainland.  
In comparison, the CBC’s experience resembled the historical experience of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The Reichsbank, established in 1875 according to the advanced 
English model, did not dominate the financial community and thus grudgingly allowed 
32 local commercial banks to issue their own notes. During World War I, the central 
bankers cooperated with the German government by printing paper money and wartime 
bonds and extending huge loans to the government for war efforts, which led to the 
depreciation of paper money and hyperinflation. After taking office in 1933, Hitler and 
the Nazi government held the central bankers on a tight leash and thus the German 
central bank cooperated with their rulers for the war effort during World War II. As the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, now the world’s most autonomous and powerful central bank, 
was created only after the historical experience of war, the KMT government established 
the independent CBC on the island after experiencing hyperinflation in the mainland.  
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VI. The CBC’s Legal Status and Turnover of the Governorship 
Legal Stipulations: The Central Bank of China Act 
Has the CBC enjoyed independence from the KMT government since 1961 when 
it resumed operation? Let me first discuss the legal aspects of the 1979 Act of the Central 
Bank of China to examine the level of CBC independence. 
 In general, an independent central bank tends to have the narrow and explicit 
macroeconomic aim of the external and internal stabilization of monetary value, which is 
meant to strengthen policy credibility in the eyes of financiers and savers, domestic and 
foreign. If a central bank has multiple aims in its charter, there may be policy conflicts 
among them. For instance, when high inflation occurs, central bankers may have the 
excuse that the monetary instability was due to another aim that the central bank has to 
respect such as promotion of economic growth (Chung 1995: 212).   
 The CBC had multiple aims in its charter, including promoting financial stability, 
guiding a sound banking system, maintaining the stability of the internal and external 
value of currency, and fostering economic developments. So there arose possibility of 
conflict among the policy objectives. A political economist (interview, summer of 2003, 
Taipei Taiwan) commented about it: 
 
You might say there could be inconsistency in the CBC’s goals in the 
charter, say, between monetary stabilization and contribution for economic 
development…. I would say from my experience that such policy conflicts 
occurred rarely in the past. That’s because there has been a consensus of 
macroeconomic stability among the members of the Board of Directors…. 
In my opinion, the multiple aims, rather, reflect the fact that the central 
bankers have the power to control monetary policy as well as other 
relevant economic affairs. 
 
In addition to multiple policy aims, the CBC charter was loose. It has only 44 
articles, compared to the 119 articles in the Bank of Korea charter. The original American 
drafters of the latter thought that detailed specifications would clarify operations, thus 
reducing possibilities for policy failures. Thus the BOK charter included articles that 
were absent in the CBC charter. Among those were articles and sections about how to 
dismiss members of the Monetary Board, who could not be a Board member, how to take 
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responsibility for the loss incurred to the BOK due to the Board members’ policy failure, 
etc.   
In contrast, the KMT government delegated to the CBC a considerable range of 
monetary and financial policies, not detailing what it was expected to do or not to do. A 
mid-level CBC official (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) claimed “the loose 
and short legal codes connote room to maneuver that we [the CBC] can exploit and 
enjoy.” 
 According to Article 5, the Board of Directors consisted of eleven to fifteen 
directors to be nominated by Executive Yuan (i.e., cabinet) and appointed by the 
president. The standing Executive Board of Directors, the power center of the CBC, 
included seven directors from among the members of the Board. Those seven directors 
were the governor, the ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs, and one representative 
each from the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and banking sectors. In comparison, 
the composition of the directors suggests less governmental influence in Taiwan than in 
Korea. According to the CBC charter, two out of seven Board members came from the 
government while in Korea six out of nine Board members were government officials or 
government-recommended members. In addition, the CBC governor’s term of office was 
five years and he might be reappointed upon the expiration of the term (Article 10). He 
was the chairman of the Board of (Executive) Directors (Article 23) in contrast to the 
BOK where the MOF minister was the chairman of the board.  
 Which policy area did the CBC Board of Directors cover? Article 6 specified its 
powers and functions as follows: 
to examine policies concerning money, credit, and foreign exchange; to 
examine the adjustment of the Bank’s capital; to approve the operation 
plans of the Bank; to examine the budget and fiscal reports of the Bank; to 
examine and approve major by-laws and regulations of the Bank; to 
examine the establishment and abolition of the Bank’s branch offices; to 
approve the appointment and the removal of the Banks’ department heads 
and their deputies, and branch managers; to examine matters proposed by 
the Governor. (Central Bank of China 1996: 260-1) 
 
Legally speaking, the Board enjoyed more autonomous authority than its Korean 
counterpart BOK did. Before the 6th revision in 1997, the MOF in Korea decided whether 
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it would approve the fiscal statements and budget plans that the BOK reported. The 
Monetary Board could not approve major regulations of the BOK. Instead the Board 
members had to explain to the MOF why they wanted to change the operation rules, then 
wait for a bureaucratic okay. The MOF’s monopoly over making and revising the BOK-
related laws was the legal tool that developmental bureaucrats had over the central 
bankers. 
 Article 38 of the CBC charter was about the central bankers’ financial 
jurisdiction. “In conformity with the powers and functions authorized in this Act, the 
Bank shall undertake the examination of the operations of all financial institutions in the 
country. The above examination may be performed in coordination with the bank 
examination program delegated to the Bank by the Ministry of Finance” (Central Bank of 
China 1996: 269). In contrast, the BOK covered only commercial banks with the 
exception of specialized banks and development banks that are under the control of the 
MOF. 
 Taiwan, as a small open economy, emphasized the external value of money, i.e., 
foreign exchange. The CBC charter clarified in Articles 33 and 35 that central bankers 
should hold international monetary reserves and undertake the overall management of 
foreign exchanges including authority to appoint and supervise banks engaging in foreign 
exchange operation, to examine and approve private outward and inward remittances, and 
to supervise private enterprises’ foreign borrowing guaranteed by approved banks 
(Central Bank of China 1996: 268-9). 
The CBC took full responsibility for foreign exchange transactions, which was 
not within the jurisdiction of the BOK. Although the American designers made the 
transaction the main coverage of the BOK, the 1962 revision authorized the MOF to take 
these affairs away from the central bankers.  
 In a nutshell, the central bankers in Taiwan are more autonomous and 
independent in a legal sense than their Korean rivals. In reality, though, legal codes might 
not always match the actual practices. Have the central bankers in Taiwan actually 
enjoyed as much autonomy and power as the charter specified? The next section deals 
with turnover rates of CBC governors comparing ones of BOK. 
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Low Turnover Rates of the Central Bankers 
The turnover rates of the central bank governors represent levels of the CBI in the 
sense that it is easy for government officials to change governors if central banks do not 
enjoy independent authority. Tables 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8 list the CBC governors in Taiwan 
since its inception in Canton. The CBC governors before the Nationalists’ relocation to 
the island enjoyed their terms of office for 2.6 years on average. The turnover rate 
measured by number of governors per year was 0.38, comparable to the Korean rate, 0.4. 
That period registered the CBC’s poor performance, as proved by the disastrous 
hyperinflation and its subjection to the Nationalist government’s war efforts.  
 After the KMT’s defeat and withdrawal to the island, the government started to 
put a high priority on macroeconomic stability. The turnover rates decreased 
significantly, compared to the Mainland period. The CBC had 3 governors in 12 years, so 
governors enjoyed, on average, 4-year terms of office. The turnover rate was 0.25 which 
suggests that CBI is higher after relocation than in the mainland. The turnover rate will be 
even lower if one omits Fei-perng Yu, since he was actually a two-month-long deputy 
governor who acted temporarily on behalf of the governor.  
 The CBC enjoyed more autonomy after the resumption in 1961. The governor 
turnover rate was 0.16; there were 7 governors in 45 years and each governor assumed 
governorship, on average, for 6.4 years. During the “economic miracle” era between 
1960 and 1990, there were only 3 governors; the turnover rate was 0.1 and each governor 
enjoyed the governorship, on average, for 10 years. 
 Those three tables show that the turnover rates changed from 0.4 to 0.25 to 0.1, 
which suggests that the CBC sustained its institutional autonomy from political pressures. 
This is a stark contrast to Korea where there were 22 governors in the 55 years of the 
BOK history with a turnover rate of 0.4. 
 A caveat with the turnover rate is that a low rate might be possible when 
compliant central bank governors do what the government wants them to do in order to 
serve long terms of office. In the next sections I look into the CBC to see if central 
bankers actually wield power and enjoy autonomy from the government.  
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VII. Central Bankers’ Power: “Still Powerful” 
Frustrated, but learning from the hyperinflationary spiral in the Mainland, Chiang 
Kai-shek guaranteed the CBC authority over economic affairs ministers. He put the CBC 
under the direct jurisdiction of the Presidential Office, ranking higher than the MOF. In 
comparison, such an institutional arrangement is a rarity in the world (Shieh 1994: 14). 
Thus, the CBC did not have to respond to legislators’ questioning during sessions of the 
Legislative Yuan while the other economic agencies had to suffer from political and 
administrative enquiries. The CBC was insulated from political pressure. 
Furthermore, the Board of the CBC took the full responsibility for monetary, 
financial, and foreign exchange policies; it was actually the command center of economic 
policy-making in Taiwan. Although the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Economic Affairs were ex officio Board members, the CBC governors usually led the 
Board, coordinating policy differentials among the government branches. Since the KMT 
government’s top priority was monetary and financial stability, the government fully 
supported the policies and rules that the CBC came up with. A professor (interview, 
summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) commented on the power of the governorship: 
 
During economic development periods up to the 1980s, the CBC was very 
powerful vis-à-vis other government agencies…. The first governor [Po-
yuan Hsu] was a relative of Chiang Kai-shek, which suggests how much 
power the CBC governor had from the start since the power an official 
could enjoy was determined by the proximity to Chiang…. The power 
ranking was Chiang – premier – CBC governor in hierarchy.  Kuo-hwa 
Yu was the most powerful man in CBC history. This way the CBC 
assumed the role of command center. 
 
A characteristic of the KMT’s strategy to implement industrialization was that 
economic planning agents did not enjoy autonomy as much as the EPB in Korea. Rather 
central bankers were always influential in the economic planning and implementation. 
Reshuffling economic agencies in 1973, Chiang Ching-kuo set up the Economic Planning 
Council (EPC) which had a weak chairman and did not wield power as a supraministerial 
shadow cabinet. EPC analyzed macroeconomic situations and offered projected economic 
plans to the government, but lacked substantial leverages to implement those plans.  
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Instead, Yu Kuo-hwa, a Central Bank of China (CBC) governor and Chiang 
family insider, held the real policy-making power as he headed a new “five-man Finance 
and Economic Small Group of the Executive Yuan (FESG).” Serving the CBC 
governorship for fifteen years (May 1969 to May 1984), Yu was one of a few high-
ranking officials who could communicate directly with the president.  
When the second oil crisis hit Taiwan, the KMT government felt it necessary to 
reorganize its economic planning authority scattered among a few agencies. In 1977 the 
government replaced the EPC and FESG with the “Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD)” consisting of economy-related ministers. It was a commanding 
height of industrialization policy making on the island, taking full charge of macro- and 
micro-planning, industrial financing, and sectoral coordination. Since the CEPD was 
under the sway of Yu, the policy preferences and choices of central bankers were 
influential in decisions the CEPD made (Gold 1986: 92, 102). 
 The revised CBC charter of 1979 stipulated, however, that it would be under the 
jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet). The governor became subject to the 
legislators’ monitoring and was questioned twice a year during the two sessions of the 
Legislative Yuan concerning the economic situation and monetary policy. In addition, the 
governors had to face an annual budget debate and respond to enquiries raised by 
legislators from both the Finance and Budgeting Committees of the Legislative Yuan. 
“Independence from government” during the 1960s and 1970s changed to “independence 
within government” after 1979.  
Nevertheless, its independent role as a government bank and the highest monetary 
policy-making agency has not changed even with the change in jurisdiction. While the 
MOF is also partially in charge of financial administrative matters, the CBC is still totally 
responsible for the implementation of monetary and foreign exchange policy, and the 
financial supervision of the banking system in Taiwan. The positions of the CBC and the 
MOF have been parallel, especially since the 1990s (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan). In comparative perspective, the CBC falls in between the U.S. where the 
Federal Reserve System is independent of the government, and Japan where the Bank of 
Japan is subordinate to the MOF (Shieh 1994: 15).  
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So far, I have discussed Taiwanese central bankers’ independence by showing 
legal codes, turnover rate of governors, and their institutional position in the state. In the 
next section, I show how and why CBC’s independence was sustainable in terms of 
socioeconomic arrangements as well as discuss its performance.  
 
VIII. CBC: The Guardian of Economic Stability and Balance 
 How did industrial structures affect central bankers’ independent implementation 
of monetary and financial policies in Taiwan? Although it is politicians who delegate to 
central bankers independence for realizing what they are supposed to do, domestic 
socioeconomic arrangement can also affect the CBI delegation. Did the Taiwan have 
social bases that are favorable for the KMT government to allow central bankers 
significant autonomy? 
 According to Table 3-11 in chapter 3, in 1991 shares of total manufacturing 
production in the size categories 1-9, 10-49, 50-99, 100-499, 500+ employees were 8.1, 
22.6, 12.9, 29.5, 26.8 percent, respectively, in the early 1990s. In addition, Table 3-8 in 
the same chapter indicates that SME’s share of export ranges from 59.2 to 69.7 percent 
with an average of 65.2 in 1981-1988. These statistics show that SMEs are prevalent in 
industrial sectors or, at least, countervailing the market power which the big industrialists 
maintain on the island.  
 SMEs may prefer cheap credits for their operations but their preference is weak 
and inconsistent compared to big industrialists. SMEs’ assets are less specific and easier 
to move to alternative uses therefore they do not have as much incentive to lobby for 
more preferential policy loans as big industrialists do. Given that asset specificity is 
higher in industries with high barriers to entry and unique technology and skills, the 
KMT government’s established policy for low entry barriers and exit costs helped the 
manufacturing sector have less asset specificity. Furthermore, the fact that SMEs in 
Taiwan are dispersed all over the island and their sector consists of large number of small 
units suggests that it is not easy to mobilize and organize their interests in order to bring 
pressures to bear onto the state.  
 There exist big firms in Taiwan whose assets were specific to the capital-intensive 
sector and who exert their strong lobby for cheap credit. But the émigré KMT 
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government discouraged the growth of indigenous big industrialists by employing an 
anti-branching-out policy. As a result they are not a dominant actor in the market. Once 
big industrialists entered the heavy and chemical sectors, their power to lobby public 
policy in their favor was countervailed by SOEs and a myriad number of SMEs as 
evidenced by the petrochemical sector. In sum, the composition of the Taiwanese 
industrial structure prevented industrialists, large and small, from organizing their 
preferences and interests for cheap credits, a source of loose monetary control and high 
inflation. 
 The financial sector has a strong preference for price stability since inflation 
favors debtor over creditor; bankers and financiers do not like to see their assets values 
falling. Furthermore, until recently, most of all the commercial banks were owned by the 
KMT government. In other words, banks represented state capital itself. In this situation, 
high inflation would mean a disaster for the émigré government’s economic power on the 
island: the government itself was the creditor. Thus, the Nationalist government and the 
CBC, the financial manager of state capital, tried their best to secure monetary and 
financial stability. A professor-turned legislator (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan) commented that the relationship between commercial bankers and central 
bankers is: 
 
Basically they [commercial bankers] respect the CBC. That’s because they 
know that CBC have been discouraging growth of NBFIs that are their 
major competitors in the financial market. Furthermore they understand 
that CBC has been effective in controlling inflation and NPL which is 
what they like to avoid. Some bankers complain the CBC for its restrictive 
regulation policy due to which they cannot venture into new financial 
operation especially in 1990s. But they came to understand after 1997 
Asian crisis that those strict regulatory measures may be necessary. 
 
Governments of developing countries may want to channel financial resources 
into the private sector when they own or control banks. So why did the KMT government 
not pour its resources into the private sector to speed up economic growth when it could 
do so? This alternative choice was blocked on the part of the mainlander minority 
government due to their political distrust of local capitalists. In this sense, a 
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counterfactual explanation suggests that even with the traumatic experiences of 
hyperinflationary spirals in the mainland, the Nationalists might have adopted the Korean 
path if the mainlander industrialists had crossed the Taiwan Strait with the KMT.  
Taiwanese farmers, as producers, prefer cheap farming credits but they prefer 
price stability as sellers of seasonally fluctuating agro-products fluctuating seasonally and 
as consumers of industrial products. In addition, they are scattered all over the island and 
are usually small-holders due to the successful land reform.  The crosscutting of 
interests, geographic dispersion, and large-number-of-small-unit problems dictate their 
weak and inconsistent preference for monetary stability. 
Organized workers usually have the same preferences as the industrialists since 
their welfare often depends on the profitability of the sector which they are in. But their 
preference toward inflation is weak and inconsistent due to their cross-cutting interest as 
consumers. As chapter 3 explains, Taiwanese workers are not organized into labor unions 
due to SMEs-dominant industrial structure and myriad of occupational unions.   
Although subordinate groups like farmers and workers have weak monetary and 
financial preferences, they are a majority of the workforce and can counterbalance the 
desires of unbalanced but seedy economic development. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
Nationalists’ broad developmental coalition included the subordinate groups, at least at 
the socioeconomic level. Since siding with a special interest becomes costlier if number 
of coalition partners increase, the KMT government maintained a “distant and fair” 
attitude toward each group that was in the coalition. Thus the government delegated 
monetary and financial authority to the central bankers. Furthermore, the CEPD case 
shows that although the government had developmental technocrats in its officialdom, 
political leadership invited central bankers supervising economic planning and 
implementing authority. 
The subordinate status of big private bourgeoisie, SMEs-oriented industry, state-
bank nexus, and the inclusion of subordinate groups into broad but loose developmental 
coalitions contributed to socioeconomic arrangements conducive to the emergence of an 
independent central banking system in Taiwan during the “economic miracle.”  Central 
bankers were not seriously pressured by societal interest groups for cheap preferential 
credits and thus loose monetary and financial regulation.  
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According to Charles S. Maier, who tries to demystify monetarist notion of 
inflation, “the granting of price and wage claims beyond the given money value of the 
national product produces inflation” which is “one of the major forms of distributive 
conflicts in contemporary society.” The prerequisite for low inflation is the “balance of 
social forces” and “economic growth pursed in an effort to reconcile all important social 
groups” (Maier 1978: 41, 59). If that was the case, one should see that the CBC was 
independent and good at controlling inflation within tolerable limits since Taiwan 
registered a balanced growth strategy and a broad but loose developmental coalition.    
The CBC’s performance was outstanding in keeping the national economy stable. 
Figure 4-3 graphically shows inflation rates, measured by the annual change in GDP 
deflators, in Taiwan, in comparison with OECD countries for three decades. GSUS refers 
to Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S., where central bankers are known to be the most 
powerful and autonomous in the world. Taiwan averaged 5.7 percent inflation during the 
three decades, while OECD member countries and the GSUS averaged 8.4 and 4.3 
percent, respectively. In general, the GSUS did better than the Taiwanese central bankers 
who, though, performed far better than average OECD countries. 
As a small open economy, Taiwan depends heavily on exports, which suggests 
that the island is more subject to changes in the world market than other big countries 
with large domestic markets. Thus, the inflation rate skyrocketed in 1973-4 and 1979-80, 
mainly due to the first and second oil shocks. The two peaks of inflation in the 1970s did 
not come from inability or policy failure on the part of the central bankers in Taipei. If we 
exclude these two peak years, the CBC has been more successful than the OECD and 
GSUS in maintaining economic stability: the Taipei central bankers sustained, on 
average, a 3.72 percent increase in inflation, while the OECD and GSUS experienced 
7.73 and 3.99, respectively. 
In fact, the central bankers extended cheap credits to various sectors in order to 
boost economic growth. But they cruised skillfully between Scylla in ignoring sectoral 
needs for financial resources and the Charybdis of being captured by private narrow 
interests.   
Given that the CBC charter officially stipulated that it has to “foster economic 
development” [Article 2], the central bankers have been active in extending preferential 
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credits to sectors. The CBC has often adopted selective credit financing measures by 
allowing commercial banks to provide low-interest loans for exports and to obtain re-
accommodation for the CBC. In addition, the central bankers made efforts to mobilize 
financial resources from savers into a pool of industrial funds. For instance, the CBC 
used the postal savings system to meet the needs of long-term industrial projects. The 
branches of the postal service agency all over the island accepted savings deposits as well 
as time deposits from the general public, although the central bankers prohibited the 
agency from gaining profits through loan extensions at its own discretion. The CBC 
ordered that most of the agency’s deposits had to be redeposited into an account at the 
CBC, and then used the postal savings for a “Special Fund for Medium- and Long-Term 
Credit” to satisfy industrial financing (Shieh 1994: 26).  
 It should be noted, however, that the Taiwanese central bankers’ loan extensions 
are different from those of their Korean counterparts, which have often selectively 
provided low-interest and long-term “special credits” to financially insolvent banks and 
firms. The CBC followed the KMT government’s prudential financing policy, such as the 
“six criteria of credit extension,” which includes “a big value-added effect, a big forward-
backward linkage effect, high market potential, high technology intensity, low energy 
consumption, and low environmental pollution” (Shieh 1994: 25). Those products 
selected with these characteristics consisted mainly of products from mechanical, 
information, electronics, biochemical, and material industries.  
The distribution and management of CBC credit has been based on a sector-wide 
plan, not a specific firm-by-firm plan. Since a large number of SMEs constitutes a certain 
sector, the CBC’s credit extension could not selectively favor certain firms in the sector. 
There were not many big firms, even if funded, that could boost the sector-wide 
performance as in Korea. The CBC cooperated with the KMT government in observing 
“field manipulation,” by which they appeared relatively neutral to sectoral or regional 
interests. In this sense, the CBC observed the Bagehot’s principle (1878) stipulating the 
central bankers’ neutrality and fairness: the CBC protected not individual firms but the 
market in general. 
 Furthermore, industrial credit extension has remained relatively inconsistent and 
temporary. When the economic ministries asked the CBC for more financial mobilization 
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for their industrial plans, “the conservative Board directors at the CBC hesitated using 
their policy tools for helping spending agencies” (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan). In addition, even if there were various kinds of selective credit policy measures, 
their total amounts were quite small in terms of the percentage of the CBC’s total assets. 
The amount was consistently below 10 percent during the period from the 1960s to the 
early 1990s (Shieh 1994: 25).   
 
IX. CBC’s Supervision in the Financial Liberalization 
 How can central bankers sustain their leadership in the globalization era when the 
market pressures all government agencies to shed their regulatory authority? The 
Taiwanese central bankers’ responses to the ever-increasing pressures of financial 
liberalization were 1) discouraging non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), 2) strategic 
withdrawal from non-bank financial institutions, 3) cooperation with the MOF, and 4) 
restructuring the financial supervisory system. 
 First, the CBC was skillful in maintaining its financial constituents. As financial 
liberalization tends to introduce non-traditional financial intermediaries to meet the 
diversified needs of the market, NBFIs including merchant banks, investment companies, 
credit co-ops, money markets, and insurance companies started to operate in Taiwan in 
the mid-1980s. The conservative CBC, as “the bank of banks,” made discouraged those 
NBFIs from flourishing and dominating the Taiwan financial community. They wanted 
commercial banks to keep dominating the market since they were under the central 
bankers’ jurisdiction and those banks were the central bankers’ social base in the 
financial community. 
Table 4-9 shows that the central bankers’ aforementioned efforts were successful. 
Although the full-service banks’ share of the total loans and investments decreased from 
82.0 percent in 1961 to 68.3 in 1990, they still controlled quite a majority of loans and 
investments, almost seventy percent of the financial resources available in Taiwan during 
1990. Foreign banks, investment and trust companies, and insurance companies still 
comprised a small amount of the market share. Their shares in 2001 were 3.0 percent, 
1.0, and 5.5, respectively. The share of investment and trust firms nosedived after the 
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Asian crisis. SME banks, credit co-ops, and accounts at farmers/fishermen’s associations 
and Chunghwa Post constituted 10.0 percent, 9.2, 6.3, and 0.2 , respectively, in 1990. 
 The second reaction of the conservative CBC to financial liberalization was a 
strategic withdrawal from covering NBFIs. Originally the central bankers supervised all 
the financial intermediaries as their charter stipulated in Article 38. But financial and 
political liberalization since the mid-1980s allowed some indigenous Taiwanese 
financiers to establish new financial firms that were often aggressive and risk-taking in 
their asset management. “They are not experienced and skillful in dealing with financial 
transactions compared to established bankers who used to follow prudential loan 
extension before the financial liberalization” (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan). 
As globalization tends to foster and diversify NBFIs, some of which often falling 
into poor performance or even insolvency, the central bankers chose to strategically take 
NBFIs out of their jurisdiction in 1991. The CBC wanted to “pass bugs” to other 
agencies. As a mid-level CBC official (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) said, 
“The CBC wanted to stay away from the possible trouble makers.” When the MOF 
licensed 16 new banks and 14 financial holding companies in 1991, the central bankers 
concluded a deal with the MOF for a “division of labor” in financial regulation and 
supervision. The CBC covered domestic private banks established before 1991 and 
foreign banks; the MOF took charge of all new banks set up after 1991, the stock market, 
and all private financing companies; and Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) 
had in its jurisdiction the SME banks and community financial intermediaries like local 
credit co-ops and credit departments of farmers’ and fishermen’s associations. A 
legislator of an opposition party and top officials at CDIC, respectively, commented 
about the compromise among the state agencies: 
 
Old banks established before 1991 were big commercial banks, while 
post-1991 banks were new and small banks. Since new banks often had 
liquidity problems or even insolvency, the CBC did not want to get 
involved in their financial turmoil. It was strategic non-involvement…. 
The Bureau of Monetary Affairs (BOMA) at the MOF chartered new 
banks and they liked to increase their financial power through their 
constituent banks and private firms of insurance, investment, and trust…. 
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So both parts, the CBC and BOMA, agreed with the division of labor in 
financial regulation and supervision. (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan) 
 
Originally, we did not want to take charge of small local credit institutions 
because they were not skillful in dealing with sophisticated financial 
transactions…. They were often in bad situations. For example, farmers 
did fierce collective action last year [in 2002] due to their agricultural 
association’s bankruptcy as well as massive imports of agricultural 
products. But we could not help accepting the division of labor, since we 
were under control of the MOF. The CBC also controls us as a big 
shareholder of the CDIC. (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) 
 
Thanks to the division-of-labor agreement, central bankers “passed bugs” to the 
MOF so they could keep their major constituents, big commercial banks, performing 
well. On the other hand, the MOF, by taking over nonbanks, could increase its 
constituents in its jurisdiction exerting regulatory power over ever increasing NBFIs in 
this global era. 
 It should be noted that even with the agreement, the CBC still plays a critical role 
in the financial sector in terms of its constituents: commercial banks are well functioning 
and intermediate almost 70 percent of national wealth; foreign banks mainly from the 
U.S., Japan, France and Germany are vital to the small island since they relieve the KMT 
government of diplomatic isolation from the world; overseas Chinese capitals in 
Southeast Asia, if not attracted, may shift their investments and loyalty to mainland 
China. Central bankers have financially and politically important constituents in their 
jurisdiction. In contrast, the MOF has small and new NBFIs in its jurisdiction that are, 
although promising in the future, still infant industries that lack financial expertise. The 
CDIC has in its jurisdiction local small financial intermediaries that still lack financial 
skills often falling into insolvency. In a nutshell, the power hierarchy runs in the order of 
CBC to MOF to CDIC in terms of constituent intermediaries. 
Does the CBC-MOF division of labor usher in institutional compartmentalization 
or policy conflicts over financial regulations? According to my interviews with officials 
at the BOMA, CBC, and CDIC, there seem to be not many policy debates or conflicts 
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among those three agencies. A mid-level official (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei 
Taiwan) at the BOMA says:  
 
There is no big problem with the policy coordination. We share financial 
reports of various kinds with them. Also, we set up a joint committee to 
deal with problems in financial policy implementation. The committee 
gets together once a month. 
 
Indeed, there were concerted efforts at prudential regulation among those 
government agencies. To gain a grasp of the operating status and financial conditions of 
risk management at all financial intermediaries, the MOF, CBC, CDIC, and Taiwan 
Cooperative Bank together organized the “Financial Examination Task Review 
Committee” as early as in 1986. Furthermore, the MOF commissioned the CDIC to set up 
a “National Financial Early Warning System” that enabled all relevant state agencies to 
share detailed information about all financial intermediaries’ business operations. 
Showing the system running on his desktop computer to the author, the CDIC president 
(interview, summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) proudly said: 
 
We share information with the CBC and MOF through the system, which 
started 5 years ago [in the summer of 1998]. The member financial 
institutions are required to report once a day what we like to know. Our 
supervisors examine their reports before they are allowed to update their 
data online. 
 
In addition to the CBC’s concerted operation with the MOF, the central bankers 
divested themselves of financial supervisory authority to set up the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) in July 2004. The FSC took supervisory officials dispersed 
throughout the CBC, MOF, and CDIC, launching an integrated independent government 
agency. The financial officialdom in Taiwan today is a tripartite format consisting of the 
FSC, CBC, and MOF all of which are enjoying equal legal and political status.  
Why did the government delegate financial supervisory authority to the FSC? 
Why did central bankers agree with the delegation? “After the Financial Holding 
Company Act was passed in June 2001, the MOF found itself facing a growing challenge 
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generated by the ever-increasing mergers and alliances among financial institutions.”16 
The CBC also felt it was more complicated and difficult to supervise the commercial 
banks in its own jurisdiction since they got involved in a densely knit financial network 
with the NBFIs and foreign private capital.17 The central bankers were ready to shed 
their supervisory overloads. This is a typical case of a “solution of delegation” (Elster 
1979: 61, 89). 
It should be noted, however, that their efforts for the FSC were motivated by 
Korea which had established the Financial Supervisory Service (KFSS) two years ago in 
January 1999. The Korean financial industry faltered during the Asian crisis of late 1997 
but recovered to normalcy in a very short time; this was the KFSS’ contribution. 
Impressed by the Korean experience, the Taiwan government seriously pushed for an 
integrated independent agency for financial supervision. A top official (interview, 
summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) of the CDIC confessed, “We learned a lot from the 
preceding Korean experience. We’re closely watching what’s happening in Korea.” 
 Compared to the Korean case, where financial regulation and supervision was a 
historical battlefield between the MOF and BOK, Taiwan’s experience showed a smooth 
institutional transformation to an independent supervisory agency. The FSC was a 
product of the MOF-CBC “pact”. Both parties understood that they had to solve the ever-
increasing financial volatility and agreed that it was necessary to delegate their 
supervisory authority to the third party.  
The smooth transformation was, however, possible due to the fact that the 
Taiwanese government solved the problem of staff salaries before the initiation of the 
FSS, while the Korean government still suffers from the problem. Given that the CBC 
staff’s monthly wage was higher than that of any other government officials, they must 
have resisted their relocation to the new FSS if the government had not guaranteed the 
same amount of money. A mid-level official (interview, summer of 2003, Taipei Taiwan) 
at the CBC said, “We already solved the salary problem. The government promised us to 
 
16 Financial Supervisory commission’s website (http://www.fscey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=659838&ct
Node=453&mp=5). Accessed Sept. 27, 2005. 
17 Central Bank of China’s website (http://www.cbc.gov.tw/Enghome/default.asp). Accessed Sept. 27, 
2005.  
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guarantee highly competitive salaries, which is good for us. Most of my department 
members are expected to go to the FSS next year [July 2004].” 
In the case of Korea, the wage gap between the KFSC and the KFSS is one of the 
behind-the-scene reasons that their policy conflicts continue to exist. To solve the 
organizational duality, the government once suggested to the KFSS, in secrecy, to 
transform it from a private organization to a civil servant one; the government wanted to 
absorb KFSS into the state bureaucracy. The KFSS’ reaction was negative. A director 
(interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea) at the MOFE said: 
 
They [KFSS] argue that they could not exercise fair supervisory authority 
if they join the KFSC which they believe to be politically dependent. But 
it’s not true. They fear that their high wages must be lowered if they 
become civil servants. The KFSS labor unionists do not like it. If they had 
accepted the offer, they should have been blamed by their own members. 
In this sense, it’s all about politics. 
 
Is there any difference in the two East Asian rivals in terms of supervisory 
autonomy? First, the FSC is an independent single-unit agency affiliated with Executive 
Yuan, enjoying legal status equal to the CBC and the MOF (FSC 2004). In fact, 
Taiwanese officials learned from their Korean predecessors and thus avoided conflicts 
from the organizational duality. A top official at the CDIC (interview, summer of 2003, 
Taipei Taiwan) once confessed: 
 
We know that the Korean supervisory system currently suffers from 
conflicts between the KFSC and the KFSS. Senior officials at the KDIC 
(Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation) dropped by my office last week. 
They told us about it. We are currently discussing how to establish an 
organizational format so we can keep away from that kind of problem. 
 
In contrast, the KFSS is under the jurisdiction of the KFSC, which is the 
organizational origin of the conflicts between the government trying to control financial 
supervision and the KFSS seeking for institutional autonomy. A director at the MOFE 
(interview, summer of 2003, Seoul Korea) complained in the middle of my interview 
saying: 
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Our legal system follows the continental tradition, not the Anglo-Saxon 
one. It is impossible to delegate the public function of financial 
supervision to a private organization, the KFSS. I don’t like the KFSS’ 
attitude. They mistakenly believe that they have to have power to do 
something. They always interrupt our business. 
 
Second, as Table 4-3 shows, the KFSS chairmen have been recruited from retired 
or current senior officials at the MOFE, which suggests that the KFSS is an extension of 
developmental technocrats in terms of personal connections. In Taiwan, among the 9 
commissioners including the chairman, 3 came from the private sector, 4 from university 
faculty, 1 from legal circles, and only 1 from the MOF.18 Most commissioners were 
recruited from the non-government sector, which contributed to separate personnel 
networks and thus autonomous supervisory operations. 
 
X. Conclusion: Independent CBC vs. Dependent BOK  
So far I have discussed how and why the central banking systems in Korea and 
Taiwan went through different historical paths – the “independence” path for Taiwan vs. 
the “dependence” one in Korea.  
The military government did away with the 1962 financial system the BOK that 
had been established by liberal American finance drafters. Since then, central bankers 
have not been able to perform what they were supposed to do during industrialization. 
They were on a tight leash controlled by the MOF and developmental technocrats who 
made coalitions with big industrialists for rapid and unbalanced economic growth. 
Powerful big industrialists nurtured by the state, timid commercial bankers controlled by 
the developmental bureaucrats, and subordinate groups ignored by the state constituted an 
unfavorable socioeconomic constellation that the central bankers had to face. 
I have shown that Korean central bankers were dependent by looking into legal 
codes, governor turnover, actual power status within the state apparatus, and its policy 
performance including inflation and NPL. Furthermore they were not effective at 
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regulating and supervising financial intermediaries’ risk-taking operations since the BOK 
was troubled by conflicts with MOFE, the “developmental dinosaur.”   
Frustrated by and learning from inflationary spiral in the mainland, the KMT 
government fully supported central bankers when the CBC resumed its operation in 1961. 
The CBC charter was less specific than its Korean counterpart but provided central 
bankers with “room for policy maneuver” and CBC governors were guaranteed their 
terms of office during successful industrialization. Central bankers were responsible for a 
full range of monetary and financial policy areas delegated by the government. 
Furthermore, during industrial deepening in the 1970s, central bankers were invited to 
supervise the CEPD, the commanding height of economic planning and sectoral 
coordination. In the 1980s and 1990s central bankers in Taipei reacted strategically to a 
changing financial environment: they cooperated with other agencies, drew a deal for a 
division-of-labor, and delegated supervisory overburdens to a third independent agency, 
but still lead the financial community on the island. 
In addition, the central bankers found themselves in a balanced environment 
favorable for their autonomy. As Taiwan experienced balanced economic growth with 
stability, there was a broad but loose coalition in society: the lack of conquering big 
bourgeoisie, myriad of SMEs, a strong financial sector sponsored and controlled by the 
KMT government, and farmers and workers not organized but more or less enjoying 
developmental benefits. This socioeconomic arrangement was a favorable social base for 
central bankers’ autonomy. 
 I have shown in chapters 2, 3, and 4 how and why these two governments’ 
different coalitions with different sectors contributed to varying levels of autonomy that 
central bankers have enjoyed in these two countries. The next chapter asks if my 
argument confirmed in my two cases studies are applicable in the context of Southeast 
Asian countries. 
18 Visit FSC’s website (http://www.fscey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=636241&CtNode=2316&mp=5). Accessed 
on August 11, 2005. Two commissioners from private sector started their career as civil servants, and one 
commissioner with background of professorship used to be in private sector as well as officialdom. 
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Chapter 5: Central Banking Systems in Comparative Perspective: 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia 
 Singapore weathered the storm of the Asian financial crisis that hit the region in 
1997, while Thailand and Malaysia suffered great losses national wealth and 
psychological damage. This chapter addresses the generalizability of my arguments, 
detailed in two cases studies, by exploring three Southeast Asian countries. What 
contributed to each country’s political choice of the developmental strategy within which 
a central banking system operated? What were the social bases of the central banking 
systems? How different were the central banks in maintaining their monetary and 
financial regimes when the storm threatened to engulf the region?  
 The first section explores the Singaporean case, discussing ruling politicians’ 
concerns over separation from Malaysia and how this spilled over into their strategy of 
coalition making and economic development. The latter half of the first section addresses 
the Singaporean central banking system in a small entrepôt state trying to attract capital, 
domestic and foreign, yet keeping its financial regime stable and prudent. 
The second section explores the Malay case. The first half discusses how and why 
the ruling party chose a specific partner among diverse ethnic groups for its economic 
growth. The latter half looks into the Malay CBI detailing the legal stipulations of the 
central bank charter, turnover of central bank governors, actual positions that central 
bankers at Kuala Lumpur have in officialdom, and their performance.   
The last section investigates the central banking politics in Bangkok, Thailand, 
where the regional crisis started. Its first part focuses on the social bases of Thai 
economic growth under the condition of frequent government changes. Examining legal 
codes, turnover of governorship, central bankers’ power relationship with the finance 
ministry, and central bankers’ accomplishments, the latter half analyzes the Thai central 
banking system’s independence and its financial regulation.  
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I. Singapore: Trauma, Broad Coalition, and Prudential Finance in the Entrepôt 
Traumatic Expulsion and Inclusive Developmental Regime 
 Singapore was a British colony after 1824, as part of an administrative unit known 
as the Straits Settlements, which included Penang and Malacca (now modern Malaysia). 
Malaysia received full independence in 1957, and two years later Singapore was granted 
self-governing status within the Malay government for all matters except defense and 
foreign affairs. The vociferous rhetoric of the Lee Kuan Yew government (1959-1990) 
arguing for rapid economic development of Malaysia annoyed Kuala Lumpur leaders, 
raising disputes over governmental spending and representation of the states in the Malay 
federal parliament (Haas 2001: 67). 
In fact, Singapore, a largely Chinese urban center of Southeast Asia, did not have 
a good relationship with the Federation of Malaysia, where indigenous Malays were the 
majority in ethnic terms but less privileged than the Chinese in socio-economic terms. 
Ethnic conflicts were dominant during the nation-building period after independence. 
Finally, the debates and conflicts led the Malay government to expel Singapore from the 
Federation. Lee lobbied long and hard for Singapore to remain in the federation so that 
his country would be a part of the larger economic market and would enjoy national 
security, but Malaysia still showed the cold shoulder to the tiny entrepôt (Haas 2001: 67). 
 Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 was a historical trauma that caused 
mass psychological and national insecurity and threatened socio-economic collapse. One 
example demonstrates the insecurity that the entrepôt-state faced: Singapore depended 
entirely on water resources imported from Malaysia, and any problems with the water 
supply or quality could damage the city-state. 
To make matters worse, Singapore’s political leadership had to build a nation out 
of an ethnically diverse immigrant society given to individualistic pursuits. “The constant 
in- and out-flow of immigrants meant the society was imbued with the characteristic 
preoccupation of short-term goals and a reliance on extensive intra-group social 
networks” (Fong 1988: 221). The historical trauma led to “the politics of survival, a set of 
policies and strategies aimed at curbing domestic dissent, promoting stability, and 
industrial peace to attract much-needed foreign investment while instilling in the island’s 
ethnically diverse population a sense of national identity”(Chee 1971). 
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How did the political leaders decide how to build the nation and grow the 
economy? They chose to integrate heterogeneous social groups into the political system. 
The People’s Action Party (PAP), the ruling party of the Lee government, emerged as an 
anti-colonial and socialist party in 1954 when the Peking-led communist ideology was 
widespread among Chinese workers in the entrepôt. After leftist extremists left the PAP 
in 1961, the party changed its political base from workers to a multi-racial, multi-lingual, 
and multicultural mass. The editorial of the Petir opined in 1963: 
As a non-Communist socialist party, the base of our party remains firmly 
rooted in the working class. It cannot be otherwise. But at the same time 
we must enlarge our scope and pay equal attention to other groups in our 
society. It is only in this way that the party can change its emphasis from a 
purely working class movement to a national movement with a broader 
base…. The aspirations of all classes and communities must therefore find 
expression in the policy and activities of the Party. (Lian 1971: 72)  
 
Transforming the party into a “party of integration,” the PAP leadership swept the 
general election of 1963, a “critical election” in the sense that it defined the party’s 
coalitional politics and froze Singaporeans’ voting behavior up to the present. In 
comparison, its closest counterpart may be the Mexican Party of Revolutionary 
Institutions (PRI), which until the 1990s was victorious in virtually all elections even 
though other parties existed and were legal. The PAP developed its party membership to 
reflect the racial composition of the society, so the party reflected social diversity. In 
1966, Singapore’s demographic compositions by race were Chinese (78.7%), Malays 
(12.1%), Indians (6.6%), others (2.5%); the PAP membership roughly reflected the racial 
shares: Chinese (67.9%), Malays (14.0%), Indians (16.5%), and others (1.6%) (Lian 
1971: 52).  
The PAP government integrated the racial groups mainly through education and 
housing policies. It expanded educational opportunities based on a multilingual – 
Chinese, Malay, and Tamil languages – educational system with English as a second 
language, and steered students into technical and vocational studies. The parallel 
educational system assured the population that cultural diversity would be respected. In 
addition, the Parliament accepted a quota system for minorities, allocating them public 
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housing facilities. These efforts led 86 percent of the total population to live in their own 
houses, and prevented the growth of ethnic residential enclaves (Haas 2001: 71). The 
primary goal of the public housing program was to “win the electoral support of the 
population by providing decent and affordable housing, with a secondary goal of building 
a sense of community and national commitment through financing occupants’ ownership 
of their public housing units” (Lim 1999: 110). 
The financial sector was one of the main pillars supporting the Singaporean 
developmental coalition. Since the Singaporean government faced economic and national 
insecurity, it started economic development with an eye towards taking advantage of its 
entrepôt status: Singapore was traditionally a hub of financial transactions in Southeast 
Asia during the British colonial era. After a few years of inward economic development 
which failed in the 1950s, Goh Keng Swee, the Minister of Finance, persuaded the 
political leadership to embark on industrial development based on foreign capital. The 
problem was “how to attract foreign capital and make it flow through the city-state.” The 
Lee government’s strategy was to set up an efficient financial infrastructure to exploit the 
maximum creditworthiness in the eyes of international investors. The government and the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) regarded a stable and efficient financial system as a core of 
their political and national survival from. Figure 5-1 shows that their efforts were 
successful.  
 Financial growth proxied by M2 as a percentage of the GDP was spectacular in 
Singapore, even in the early 1960s. In 1964, money intermediated through financial 
institutions was 58 percent of the GDP for Singapore, 23.7 for Malaysia, 21.0 for 
Thailand, and 8.4 for Korea. The level of financial development that Singapore reached 
in the early 1960s was achieved by Malaysia in 1985, Thailand in 1989, and Korea in 
1999. 
 Since 1968, when Singapore started to attract offshore banks, it has hosted one of 
the largest offshore financial markets in the world, the Asian Dollar Market. Therefore, 
the tiny city-state played a key part in channeling capital to corporations and government 
agencies for development in the Asian region. This success also made the tiny city-state 
rank fourth behind London, New York, and Tokyo in foreign exchange dealing, and fifth 
in terms of derivatives trading (Peebles and Wilson 2002: 203). 
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Were workers invited to the developmental coalition? The PAP government, 
committed to a social democratic ideology in the early years, incorporated labor during 
its industrialization. The government employed a tripartite system, consisting of 
representatives of government, employers, and labor, to determine labor policy issues. 
Workers’ wage is determined by the National Wages Council which recommend nominal 
wage increase for the entire economy once a year. Its wage guidelines were not legally 
compulsory, but leading public sector respected it and private firms usually followed 
(Yuan 1987: 174).  
 The material base of labor integration was the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a 
compulsory savings scheme paid by employers and employees. The contribution rates 
have been fixed at around 15-20 percent of the salaries for both employees and employers 
(Hamilton-Hart 2002: 94). The balances in each member’s account were usually available 
for withdrawal at the age of 55 or on leaving Singapore permanently (Peebles and Wilson 
2002: 88). The government-operated CPF were used for public housing, welfare needs, 
and retirement pensions. It was also used for a public investment fund providing the 
government with a low-cost source of non-inflationary finance.  
 On the other hand, labor shortages and full employment that Singapore 
experienced as early as the 1970s pressured the government to import foreign manpower. 
Unlike Hong Kong, the PAP government adopted an increasingly restrictive and selective 
immigration policy to attract votes from workers. Unskilled immigrants often handled 
menial jobs, leaving employment in the skilled occupations to Singaporeans.  
It should be noted, however, that the government did discourage workers’ 
organizations outside the control of the PAP. The mass party’s politics registered 
seemingly as a benevolent state-corporatist scheme, preempting autonomous spaces for 
workers by guaranteeing material benefits. The official discourse of the PAP has always 
been pro-labor in a social democratic sense, which encouraged working class formation 
“within the state.” There were no viable opposition parties that could countermobilize 
workers in such a small harbor-state. 
 Although the Economic Development Board (EDB), an economic planning 
agency, guided industrial strategies since 1961, Singapore did not develop big 
industrialists comparable to the Korean chaebols. Instead, the entrepôt-state relied on 
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foreign and public industrialists. In the export-manufacturing sector, an economic pillar 
on par with finance, foreign-owned firms conducted 65 percent of all direct exports and 
foreign-controlled enterprise (i.e., those with more than 50 percent foreign equity) 
accounted for another 16 percent in 1984. Purely domestic firms only provided 11 
percent of the total exports. The capital-intensive sector was dominated by foreign 
industrialists and investors (Krause 1987a: 69). The sector featured high asset specificity 
but firms in it did not bring much pressure on the government, since “foreign” investors 
could go out of market by withdrawing their capital. In Hirschman’s terms (1970), they 
did not resort to “voice” because they have another strategy, “exit.” 
 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) prevented the rise of big industrialists especially 
in capital-intensive sectors like metal products, machinery, transport equipment, 
chemicals, petroleum refinery, and steel. The public sector maintained a huge 64 percent 
of the gross national savings and employed 19.5 percent of the workforce in 1980. The 
sector accounted for 33.4 percent of the gross domestic fixed capital formation in 1984 
(Krause 1987b: 116).  
 After the 1970s, the planning agency embarked on “high tech-intensive” 
industrialization, a new phase in the developmental path, given the fact that the city-state 
lacked labor and space. No longer would policies encourage the expansion of light 
industries that needed a large labor force. Instead, industrial policies encouraged 
investments in skill- and technology-intensive sectors such as computers, electronics, 
machinery, and pharmaceuticals, in order to generate more value-added from the same 
amount of labor. In sum, hi-tech-intensive and FDI- and SOEs-dominant industrialization 
strategies prevented a Korean-style big bourgeois from rising and pressuring the 
government in their favor.   
 The governmental characteristics promoted high CBI in Singapore. First, the 
PAP’s dominant position did not entail bureaucratic corruption; civil servants did not use 
their status to seek personal benefits from the market. A recent study shows that 
Singapore is ranked the 5th “clean officialdom” in the world. Japan, Singapore, and 
Taiwan have fairly developed rational-legal bureaucracies, whereas Thailand, Korea, and 
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Malaysia show considerable deviations from the Weberian standard; Indonesia and the 
Philippines are generally judged the least Weberian of the Asian countries. 19 
Second, the Board was successful in mobilizing domestic financial resources, 
offering real positive interest rates and thus encouraging savings – a good way to foster 
investment without inflationary pressure. According to the World Bank, Singapore had 
an average savings rate equal to 45.5 percent of the GDP during the 1980s and 90s, and 
thus ranked the third in the world. Furthermore, from 1970 until today, the PAP 
government has never experienced deficit financing; the average difference between 
government revenue and its final expenditure during the period is 14.99 percent of GDP 
(World Bank 2003). High rates of savings and no budget deficits meant that political 
leaders did not have an incentive to exert pressures on the central bankers in order to 
cover the deficit.  
 Third, the Lee government did not make extensive use of direct measures such as 
licenses, quotas, or price control to influence private decision-making. In consequence, 
both producers and consumers in the city-state had to respond to price signals from world 
markets. Because their governments avoided direct measures, powerful interest groups 
dependent on licenses and official favors did not grow and entrench themselves. Instead, 
Singapore emphasized policies that benefited the general public rather than some specific 
interest group (Fong 1988: 236). 
 In sum, Singapore has very favorable conditions for high CBI: a broad but loose 
developmental coalition, its position as the financial center of the region, no capital-
intensive private industrialists, labor integrated into the state, and Weberian bureaucrats. 
In addition, the size and geographic position of the city-state might have affected the 
Singaporean developmental coalition. The entrepôt-state is tiny enough for the PAP 
government to regulate and permeate the “nation,” compared to large countries where 
regional and social interests complicate the government’s ability to integrate those 
heterogeneous groups into the political system. As for its geographic location, Singapore 
is positioned at the center of economic transactions both among Southeast Asia and 
between Northeast economies (i.e., Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea) and Middle East 
 
19 Visit Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.en.html) for corruption 
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oil exporters. The PAP government could exploit those conditions to build its 
developmental project. The next sub-section explores the central banking system in the 
harbor-city, Singapore. Did the social bases of the coalition actually contribute to central 
bankers’ independent authority to regulate the monetary and financial regimes?  
 
Autonomous Central Bankers and Prudential Financial System 
 At the time of independence from Malaysia, various monetary functions 
associated with a central bank were performed by several government departments and 
agencies. In the late 1960s, the labor force was exhausted, the M2 approached 60% of the 
GDP, and the light industrialization was saturated. The PAP government planed to 
deepen the economic structure toward capital- and high technology-intensive 
industrialization, attracting foreign financial resources for its political survival. Thus, the 
country wanted to establish an efficient and integrated financial and monetary control 
tower to guide its economy. The government collected financial/monetary functions and 
personnel dispersed among government agencies to set up a central banking system. The 
Parliament passed the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Act leading to the 
formation of the MAS, the de facto central bank, on the first day of 1971.20 
Like the Central Bank of China Act, the MAS Act provided the central bankers 
with broad authorization. The MAS [Article 4] had various functions: 1) acting as the 
financial agent of the government; 2) promoting stable monetary control, credit 
extension, and foreign exchange; 3) fostering a sound and progressive financial sector; 
and 4) issuing currency notes and coins. The broad coverage was mainly due to the PAP 
government’s decision to empower the MAS as Singapore developed its financial sector. 
In 1971, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) transferred to the MAS all the functions and 
powers of the Commissioner of Banking, the Commissioner for Finance Companies, and 
the Controller of Foreign Exchange [Article 21 Section 1]. Again, in 1984 the MOF 
empowered the MAS by transferring more authority to regulate the non-bank financial 
intermediaries (NBFIs). The MAS assumed the powers of the Commissioner of 
 
index. Accessed on August 15, 2005. 
20 MAS’ website (http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Home.htm). Accessed August 4, 2005. 
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Insurance, the Registrar of Companies, and the Accountant-General under the Security 
Industry Act [Article 21, Section 2].21 
The charter also protected MAS staff from possible hostile actions from the 
constituent financial firms against the MAS. Article 21 specified “no action, suit or other 
legal proceedings shall lie against any director, officer, or employee of the MAS; there 
shall be no legal action for anything done or omitted to be done in the MAS’ employees’ 
good faith.” 22 
The Act guaranteed the MAS autonomy. The chairman was appointed by the 
president on the recommendation of the cabinet. Interestingly enough, Article 8 specified 
“the directors shall not act as delegates on the Board from any commercial, financial, 
agricultural, industrial or other interests with which they may be connected.”23 In Korea, 
the BOK charter specified the members of the Monetary Board including representatives 
of agriculture, industry, and the financial sector so as to improve democratic 
representation of interest politics into the central banking system [Article 8]. The MAS 
charter eliminated interest group politics from central banking function. 
 It should be noted, however, that the MOF controlled the Singaporean central 
bankers. The MOF minister recommended the MAS chairman to the president who then 
appointed him. Furthermore, the MOF Minister himself sometimes assumed the MAS 
chairmanship (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 89). Dose this mean there was a gap between the 
aforementioned legal CBI and the actual CBI in the central banking system?  
 The Singaporean central bank-MOF relation is that the MAS has danced with the 
MOF to conservative monetary and financial music. According to Hamilton-Hart, 
although the MAS chairman and the Board of Directors were under the control of the 
MOF, they rarely had inter-agency conflicts. Rather, the MOF’s policy protected the 
MAS from the Economic Development Board (EDB), the architect of Singaporean 
industrialization. For instance, the MOF guaranteed the MAS’ independence by 
 
21 MAS website (http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Monetary_Authority_of_Singapore_Act.htm). 
Accessed on August 4, 2005. 
22 MAS website (http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Monetary_Authority_of_Singapore_Act.htm). 
Accessed on August 4, 2005.  
23 MAS website (http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Monetary_Authority_of_Singapore_Act.htm). 
Accessed on August 4, 2005. 
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separating the central bankers’ role of financial regulation and supervision from the 
industrial policy role of the EDB (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 98). The MAS-MOF coordination 
vis-à-vis other state spending and planning agencies was possible because of the political 
context where the financial stability was the core interest in the eyes of the PAP 
leadership.  
 The turnover of the central bank governorship reflects the MAS’ independence 
backed by the MOF. Table 5-1 lists the MAS chairmen over the years since its inception. 
The table shows the low turnover rate of the central bank chairmanship. There have been 
5 governors for 34 years. The turnover rate measured by the number of governor a year is 
0.147 per year. Chairmen served, on average, 6.8 years. In comparison, the turnover rate 
is roughly the same as the Taiwan central bankers (i.e., 0.1 a year during economic 
miracle era between 1960 and 1990). The Singaporean turnover is much lower than the 
Korean one, 0.4 governors a year. 
 I assume that independent central bankers will produce better results than 
subservient ones. Indeed, the Singaporean case supports my assumption. Figure 5-2 
illustrates MAS’ feat in maintaining the supply of money in the financial hub of the 
region. The average rate of inflation for Singapore from 1961 to 1990 is 3.37 percent of 
the annual changes in prices while countries with world-known independent central 
banks (Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S.) averaged 4.28. 
 On the other hand, the MAS took full responsibility of financial supervision of all 
financial institutions, even foreign non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), which is a 
stark contrast to Thailand. After the Thai government hosted in 1993 offshore financial 
firms in its Bangkok International Banking Facility in a bid for regional economic 
hegemony, the central bankers in Bangkok stood idle by the footloose capital they 
attracted to the Facility (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 66-8). In contrast, central bankers 
in the harbor-state watched financial transactions closely.   
The financial regulatory and supervisory agencies are under the jurisdiction of the 
MAS (MAS 1997/98: 16). Four MAS departments dealt with the affairs: the Supervisory 
Policy Department, the Banking Department, the Securities and Futures Department, and 
the Insurance Department. According to a recent study, the MAS regularly studied 
legislation to modify and remedy “gray” areas and “loopholes” to cope with the growing 
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sophistication of the financial structure in Singapore. As one Singaporean Banker said, 
“the main actions MAS undertook during the international debt crisis in early 1980s were 
all part of a carefully thought out plan that demonstrated extreme caution and concern for 
the vulnerable individual investor” (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 87). The prudent financial 
system, backed by the MAS and MOF, helped the entrepôt city-state avoid the Asian 
crisis. While the crisis hit the region in late 1997, Singapore and Taiwan survived the 
storm that short-term speculative private capital caused. 
 
II. Thailand: Financiers-Dominated Economy and the Rush to the Crisis 
 Government Captured by Finance Capital at Bangkok   
 People in Thailand were ethnically diverse, but the Thais constituted the majority 
at 75 percent of the total population. The Chinese were 14 percent and other various 
minorities were 11 percent. Ethnic Thais usually subsisted on paddy lands in rural areas, 
often expanding rice cultivation by clearing new lands. In contrast, Chinese immigrants 
controlled the financial and commercial functions critical to rice cultivation and 
marketing in urban centers. In the 1950s, ethnic Chinese constituted 70 percent of all 
business owners and senior mangers in Bangkok (Laothamatas 1994: 197). 
By the late 1930s, the military faction within the People’s Party, led by General 
Phibun Songkhram, controlled national politics. The Phibun government was 
characterized by xenophobic nationalism. It implemented programs designed to stimulate 
a Thai entrepreneurial class distinct from the Chinese, imposing limits on Chinese 
immigration and occupational eligibility while executing policies to establish state 
control of Thai industries and commerce (Connors 2001: 43). Furthermore, the nationalist 
government made serious efforts to establish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to offset the 
ethic minority’s economic power. Between 1932 and the mid-1950s, 90 state enterprises 
and public companies with substantial government holdings were launched in a series of 
attempts to “indigenize” the economy.  
Relations between Chinese-dominated business and government began to change 
in the late 1950s with the advent of the Sarit regime, whose pro-market packages 
vigorously streamlined the government sector and placed trained liberal economists and 
technocrats in key policy positions. Sarit’s market-oriented reform aimed to privatize 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which constituted a major political base for his rivals in 
the military (Laothamatas 1994: 199). In fact, the U.S. seriously recommended that the 
government stabilize and privatize the economy. The American officials threatened 
cutback of military aids if Sarit would not follow the recommendations. The market 
reform not only destroyed the former ruling elites of economic expansionist persuasion, 
but also promoted the private sector, especially the banking industry. In other words, the 
Sarit government’s emphasis on “growth with economic stability” was a convergence of 
four relevant parties’ interests: 1) Sarit’s need to undermine his political competitors; 2) 
the U.S.’ need to build a “showcase” state withstanding communist threats in Indo-China; 
3) the Bangkok financiers’ need to drive out an inefficient government sector from the 
market; and 4) the military’s need to get more American aid (Phongpaichit and Baker 
1995: 125-8). 
Most of all, the post-Sarit government made a coalition with the commercial 
bankers in Bangkok whose businesses gained profits from their investments in 
agricultural exports (especially rice, tapioca, maize, and sugar) and the rice-milling 
industry, the backbone of Thai national wealth. Food export averaged 55 percent of the 
total export goods from the 1960s to the 1970s (World Bank 2003). Furthermore, 
commercial banker-controlled agro-export businesses helped support the fiscal balance of 
the government: trade tax amounted to 24.3 percent of the total revenue during the 1970s 
and 80s. The private bankers supported Thai rulers as their main political constituents 
while the government favored macroeconomic stability by not intervening in the 
monetary affairs of the BOT. 
The political power of Bangkok bankers is based on two conditions. First, the 
Thai financial system has been dominated by a few commercial bankers. In 1970, 
commercial banks held 79.6 percent of total assets in the financial sector; in the 1980s, 
three banks, the Bangkok Bank, the Thai Farmers Bank, and the Krung Tahi Bank 
consistently topped the list, together accounting for 55-66 percent of total assets held by 
domestic banks (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 76-7). Figure 5-3 shows cross-national 
variation in banking concentration ratio in selected developing countries measured by the 
top 5 banks’ share of the total assets in 1999. Thai land’s top 5 commercial bankers in 
Bangkok controlled 75 percent of the total assets in financial community. 
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Second, the small number of critical actors in the financial sector made it easy for 
banks to coordinate their behavior. The Thai Bankers Association (TBA) was the most 
powerful interest organization in Thailand. It held regular meetings with the BOT and the 
MOF to lobby for a hand in shaping financial and monetary legislation. For example, 
when the revered central banker Puey proposed his plan to license new regional banks 
which were expected to counterbalance the Bangkok financiers, the TBA protested the 
plan and it was quickly shelved (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 79). 
The ethnic Chinese’s dominant economic power spilled over into other relations 
in Thai society. Along with their economic power, the majority of the ethnic Chinese 
business people acquired Thai citizenship and family names, and received a Thai 
education. By 1973, 63 percent of Chinese-dominated trade association members and 87 
percent of their presidents held Thai citizenship. Conversely, a significant number of the 
family members of the indigenous bureaucratic elite were eager to enter the ranks of the 
Chinese-dominated business elite (Laothamatas 1994: 202). The absence of a Malaysian-
style ethnic riot of 1969 was mainly due to the fact that most Chinese were Thai-ified and 
there was significant interconnection between two ethnic elite groups.  
 Thailand was a typical agro-exporter up to the early 1980s. But in the process of 
curing the banking crisis of 1984-86, the government executed a currency devaluation 
which transformed Thailand’s competitive advantage as an industrial exporter. Financial 
conglomerate leaders were quick to switch over to exports. Manufactured products 
constituted 75 percent of exports in 1980s, far exceeding agricultural exports which were 
declining in the same period (World Bank 2003).  
It should be noted that Japanese foreign direct investments (FDI) contributed 
more to the manufacturing exports than domestic industrialists did. FDI was ready to exit 
Thailand if profitability was low, although a comparative advantage of cheap labor kept 
the FDI in the country. Thai conglomerates focused less on the export economy and more 
on the growth of the domestic market caused by the multi-national firms; their new 
investments flew into property development, the service sector, and urban infrastructure 
development. Phongpaichit and Baker (2000: 18) described the Bangkok bankers in the 
economic boom as follows: 
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Four or five major banks became such a large factor in the whole economy 
that their decisions on allocating credit were fundamental not only to their 
own profits but to the overall direction and health of the economy. These 
banks became the centers of sprawling business conglomerates. With the 
big banks often acting as their planners and consultants, these 
conglomerates dominated each area of business opportunity which opened 
up through this era – first agroprocessing, then import-substituting 
consumer industries, the basic process industries, and then urban services. 
 
In contrast to powerful commercial bankers, the Thai politics experienced 
frequent regime changes back and forth: eight regime changes in the last three decades. 
Furthermore, the Thai party system featured a fragmented and fluid structure, which left 
the government with internally weak coalitions that were constantly subject to fission 
attracting the military’s invasion into politics (Zhang 2005: 14). No groups or factions – 
civic or military – could maintain a prolonged or exclusive grip on power. Volatile and 
fragile, the Thai political system tended to encourage politicians to treat their offices as 
personal property to maximize their short-termed interests before their government 
collapsed or before a military coup occurred. This condition made the Thai state 
permeable to special interests, especially financial and industrial groups.  
Figure 5-4 illustrates the backgrounds of members of the Assembly from 1933 to 
1991 and Figure 5-5 shows the number of businessmen in the post-Sarit cabinet. 
Legislators with business backgrounds became more than bureaucrats-turned legislators 
during the Sarit cabinet (Feb. 1963 – Dec. 1963), whose market-oriented policies took 
root deeply in Thailand under U.S. pressure. The latter also demonstrates that the 
politicians from the business sector have been prevalent in the cabinet, especially in the 
Kukrit and Chatichai cabinets. These figures suggest that the weak and porous Thai state 
has been captured by private business interests. 
Thai society and economy was dominated by Bangkok commercial bankers. Is 
this a good social base for CBI in Thailand? I argued in chapter 1 that financial capital 
favors monetary and financial stability, which is exactly what central bankers desire. The 
next subsection explores the answer. 
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The Bank of Thailand: From Autonomy To Dependence and Incapacity 
 The Thai National Banking Bureau, set up in 1939 with the status of a department 
attached to the Ministry of Finance, was the first organization to assume central banking 
activities in Thailand.24 In fact, external challenges surrounding World War II led to the 
creation of the Bureau, which was designed to preserve Thai sovereignty during the war 
and to stabilize the country’s economy after Japan’s defeat. Japan, which occupied 
Thailand in 1941, asked the Thai government to establish a central bank with Japanese 
advisers and department heads, as they had in Korea by setting up the Bank of Chosen. 
The Prince Viwat, the financial advisor, succeeded in persuading the Japanese 
government that Thailand already had a central bank (i.e., the Bureau) and that a new 
institution was unnecessary. The Bureau quickly expanded its functions by establishing 
the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in 1942 (Doner and Unger 1993: 98). How did the BOT 
charter stipulate the CBI? 
According to the BOT Act of 1942, which has not changed substantially, the 
Court of Director of the BOT is responsible for general directions, although the Minister 
of Finance is empowered to oversee the overall affairs of the BOT. The Minister has the 
following powers vis-à-vis the BOT: 
 
1) to supervise general affairs of the BOT [Section 14]; 
2) to decide the question over which the Governor disagrees with a decision of 
the majority of the Directors [Section 17 and 29]; 
3) to recommend the Crown to appoint or remove the Governor and the deputy-
Governor from their offices [Section 19 and 29-13]; 
4) to appoint the manager of the “Financial Institutions Development Fund,” 
which is for financial restructuring [Section 29-3 and -11]; and  
5) to appoint the President of the Audit Council [Section 37] and to get an audit 
report by the Auditors of the BOT [Section 29-23]25 
Legally, the MOF could hold the central bankers on a tight leash. The BOT, 
however, enjoyed high status as a result of its having deterred Japanese domination and 
maintained its own professional integrity during the war. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
 
24 Bank of Thailand (BOT) website (http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/index/index_e.asp). Accessed on 
Sept. 8, 2005. 
25 BOT’s website (http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/index/index_e.asp). Accessed on Sept. 1, 2005. 
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Sarit government appointed Dr. Puey Ungphakorn as the governor of the BOT, and he 
was a revered figure among technocrats and academics. He extended a spirit of integrity 
and performance; the BOT was considered to be only institution that was not corrupt in 
the eyes of Thai people. This reputation gave it considerable moral authority and prestige, 
allowing it to “enjoy de facto autonomy, overriding its de jure subservience to the finance 
minister” (Siamwalla 1997: 12). 
Let me introduce the BOT governors to examine their turnover rates, a proxy of 
the CBI. Table 5-2 displays the central bankers of Bangkok. The table shows a medium 
level of turnover for the BOT governorship: there have been 20 governors over 63 years. 
The rate measured by the number of governors a year is 0.32 a year. Each chairmen 
served, on average, 3.15 years. In comparison, the Thai overall turnover rate is higher 
than Singapore’s (0.15) but lower than the Korean one (0.4).  
Table 5-3 breaks down the post-Puey BOT governorship from the 1960s up to the 
present. The central bankers at Singapore and Taiwan enjoyed low turnover rates, while 
the BOT governors had higher turnover rates especially in the 1990s. Thai central 
bankers’ turnover rates approached Korean counterparts in the 1990s. This disaggregated 
data suggests that the BOT was becoming more dependent. Why did the central bankers 
at Bangkok lose their once-established CBI? Let’s examine the BOT’s relationships with 
the MOF, politicians, and financial community in the 1990s as well as the BOT’s internal 
organization. 
 First, conflicts in the inter-agency alliance that the central bankers previously 
benefited from led to the decline of the BOT’s authority. In a democratic era, the 
macroeconomic technocrats lost their corporate sprit previously imbued with financial 
and monetary conservatism. In the 1990s, the BOT and the MOF competed with each 
other to achieve capital account liberalization. This inter-agency competition prevented 
both parties from sharing information about the risky and fraudulent operations of private 
financiers. The central bankers tried to mobilize social support in their conflicts with the 
MOF and therefore became more receptive to private bankers (Zhang 2005: 13). For 
example, central bankers proposed in 1992 the Bangkok International Banking Facility 
(BIBF), an offshore banking facility that opened in the next year. The BOT granted BIBF 
licenses to 47 banks: all fifteen of the domestic commercial banks were allowed to run 
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their businesses at the BIBF (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 68). The offshore facilities 
were expected to intermediate “out-out” transactions, but huge amounts of money flowed 
into the mainland. The BIBF loan was about $11 billion in 1994; they quadrupled to 
about $43 billion in 1996 (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 69). Much of the fund was 
short-term in maturation and channeled into the property and real estate sector sponsored 
by big commercial bankers in Bangkok. In contrast to the Singaporean MAS that kept a 
close eye on global finance coming in and going out of the entrepôt-state, the BOT did 
nothing to regulate the huge flows of footloose hot money. In a way, the BIBF, a cause of 
the 1997 debacle, was the product of unfriendly and uncoordinated inter-agency 
problems.  
 Second, the inter-agency rivalry also encouraged politicians to infringe upon the 
authority of the BOT. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the MOF acted as a buffer 
between the monetary authorities and politicians, separating the BOT from distributive 
pressures from the government. With the protective buffer gone, politicians and special 
interests broke into the central banking system to gain access to distributive benefits for 
their constituents (Zhang 2005: 13). The Nukul commission investigated the causes of the 
1997 debacle and reported that “in [the] recent past, top BOT officials were inclined 
toward political interests” (Haggard 2000: 25). 
 Third, the BOT was a close ally of private financiers in the 1960s and 1970s 
during which time the Bangkok bankers benefited from agricultural processing and food 
exports. As the Thai government liberalized capital accounts and devalued foreign 
exchange from the mid-1980s and especially 1990s, financial moguls clashed with central 
bankers over entry barrier deregulation, regulatory reform, and exchange rate 
realignments. The BOT lost its leadership of the financial community (Zhang 2005: 12). 
In the mid-1980s, a BOT official lamented as follows: 
 
We could order a bank to improve on any shadowy operations; but if it 
refuses, there is nothing much we could do apart form imposing nominal 
fines…The [present] law doesn’t allow us to remove unqualified bank 




Fourth, the BOT governorship collapsed from within. After the revered governor 
Puey gained power, organizational authority was highly concentrated in the governor 
who could defend against political threats. The governor’s power and autonomy worked 
as far as the gap of authority remained between top and lower officials. However, as 
BOT-sponsored graduates who earned Ph.Ds in the U.S. returned to become the mid-
level managers, the governor was now considered only “one among equals.” The 
factional fighting among the Ph.D economists-turned central bank officials eroded the 
coordinated teamwork of the BOT (Siamwalla 1997: 12). Furthermore, there was a 
“technocrat flight” to the private sector in the 1990s when Bangkok financial firms 
offered higher salaries to senior BOT and MOF officers. Private firms needed their 
expertise and personal connections to monetary and financial authorities. These inner 
conflicts and technocratic flights undermined the BOT’s authority and credibility in the 
eyes of private business as well as Thai citizens. 
Let me examine the BOT’s performance in terms of maintaining price stability 
and a prudential financial system. Figure 5-6 illustrates the inflation rates from 1961 to 
2001 comparing Thailand and Singapore. The inflation rates were 1.47 in the 1960s, 8.93 
in the 1970s, 4.49 in the 1980s, and 3.89 in the 1990s for Thailand; the rates were 1.34, 
6.3, 2.79, and 1.28 for Singapore, respectively. The overall averages are 4.7 percent for 
Thailand and 2.92 for Singapore. Thai inflation rates are comparable to ones in Germany, 
Switzerland, and the U.S that register high CBI: they averaged 3.65 in the same period. 
The BOT has been very successful in maintaining price stability.  
Were the central bankers at Bangkok successful in keeping a prudential financial 
system, the other policy area? Unfortunately, the BOT did not keep pre-crisis 
nonperforming loan (NPL) data in an “official” sense. A data archivist (email interview, 
Sept. 7, 2006) at the BOT told me, “I’m sorry that we’ve no data before July 2000 
because we started collecting the NPL data after the financial crisis occurred in 
Thailand.” Delhaise (1998: 82) explained the lack of data as follows: 
 
Truthfulness in financial accounting was, and still is, pretty limited in both 
countries [Malaysia and Thai], but at least the central bank in Malaysia 
came public with the level of NPLs in the books of its charges, while little 
was admitted in Thailand. In both countries, individual banks were 
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allowed to camouflage their non-performing assets and to rehabilitate 
themselves over the years. 
 
There is a proxy indicator that is an equivalent to the NPL data. Figure 5-7 shows 
nonguaranteed private debt as a percentage of total external debts in Thailand and 
Malaysia. The Thai private sector borrowed a lot of debts in the first half of the 1970s, far 
exceeding the level that they could endure, although the rates reduced to around 20 
percent in early 1980. As the Thai government put into practice capital account 
liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the rates skyrocketed. To make matters 
worse, the BOT propositioned the government to build an offshore financial center, the 
BIBF, and the rates skyrocketed again in 1993. Speculative short-term foreign capital 
showered into Thailand without any prudential filtering system, which the BOT lacked. 
Malaysia followed the same path. Non-guaranteed debt in both countries far exceeded the 
average of the World Bank-defined middle income countries. 
 There is another proxy indicator that reflects the quality of financial supervision. 
As Table 5-4 shows, I selected 10 survey questions asking about the number and the 
authority of the supervisors, the disclosure of risk management and credit rating, and the 
protection of deposits. I assigned 0 or 1 point and summed each point up to make an 
index. The data that I used was Banking Regulation and Supervision Database surveyed 
in 1999 by the World Bank. My index measurement is somewhat arbitrary, but it shows a 
rough picture of banking supervision in 5 countries that my study covers. The ranking 
reflects who survived the 1997 debacle and who faltered. The ranking order is Taiwan – 
Singapore – Malaysia – Korea – Thailand. The BOT and banking supervisors simply did 
not want to regulate and supervise their financial constituents. 
 It is a stark contrast with the BOT which was successful in keeping inflation low 
while it was poor at prudential regulation and supervision. What explains the gap 
between Thai central bankers’ macroeconomic (i.e., price stability) strength and their 
microeconomic (financial prudence) weakness? Doner and Laothamatas (1994: 445), and 
LoGerfo and Montinola (2001: 75) pointed out exactly why the inconsistency occurred: 
 
Thai government has been more successful in macroeconomic 
stabilization than in trade and sectoral reforms, and this was due to an 
159
implicit bargain between state officials, politicians, and private sector 
actors. 
 
Thai officials often had the capacity to promote macroeconomic stability 
because it was a public good desired by the financial industry. But they 
were weak in the area of financial sector supervision, where gains to 
financial actors were particularistic. 
 
Commercial Bankers, mainly constituted by Thai-Chinese families, were skillful 
and smart in exploiting the Thai state to regulate the public goods, monetary stability, 
within their desired limits but they resisted the state’s supervisory intervention into their 
particularistic sectoral interests. This suggests that the financiers were powerful in Thai 
society, especially after the capital account liberalization during the 1990s.  
The BOT’s interest policy also reflects private financiers’ skillfulness. Table 5-5 
shows four Asian countries’ interest spread (i.e., difference between lending rate and 
deposit rate) from 1977 to 2001. The more interest spread commercial bankers enjoyed, 
the more profit they gained. The Bangkok commercial bankers gained more than the 
other three countries; the spread was 0.54 for Korea, 3.06 for Singapore, 3.30 for 
Thailand, and 2.26 for Malaysia. Commercial bankers left the BOT untouched so the 
central bankers could do what they are good at, while denying the central bankers’ any 
supervisory intervention into the financial community that they controlled. The BOT was 
not trapped by industrial financing, mainly due to the fact that Thai government usually 
limited itself to the role of macroeconomic manager, rather than delving into making 
specific industrial policies, as was the case with Japan and Korea. In fact, it was not 
necessary for the BOT to do so, since private oligarchic financiers as “cores of large 
conglomerates of nonfinancial concerns”(LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 76) actually 
planned and operated the economic projects. Bangkok bankers approach what Rudolf 
Hilferding described as “finance capital” in the sense that “the magnate of capital 
increasingly concentrates his control over the whole national capital by means of his 
domination of bank capital” (Hilferding 1910[1981]: 225). 
In chapter one, I proposed that politicians’ coalition with commercial banks, 
farmers, and SMEs contributes to central bankers’ independent authority. The BOT’s 
uneven capacities over the two policy areas (i.e., inflation and financial stability) look 
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inconsistent with the proposition. Two explanations shed light on this inconsistency. 
First, my hypothesis brings up an effect on CBI that the inclusion of heterogeneous 
sectors might have, which were found in Thai during 1970s when the BOT was still de
facto autonomous from the MOF and bankers. In fact, central bankers were skillful in 
taking advantage various social groups mobilized in the mid-1970, aiming at enhancing 
the BOT’s status vis-à-vis oligarchic financiers (LoGerfo and Montinola 2001: 82-3). 
 
Students, farmers, factions of military and industrialists not affiliated with 
bank groups supported monetary officials’ move to weaken the oligarchic 
power of bank groups in the 1970s… Students, influenced by Marxism, 
protested against the power of capitalism, most clearly embodied in the 
banking community… Monetary officials were also supported by farmers 
in their bid to induce competition in the financial sector… Many farmers 
lost their land due to foreclosure on loans. After the 1973 revolution, 
farmers formed an organization, the Peasants Federation of Thailand… By 
the mid-1990s, the issue of market concentration in the financial industry 
was no longer a salient political issue… due to the economic boom that 
began in 1987. Students were busy taking advantage of the new job 
opportunities created… Non-bank affiliated industrialists… scrambled for 
the opportunities opened up. 
 
When the loose distributional coalition broke down, there were no allies for 
central bankers to mobilize for their autonomous authority in the 1980s, when the CBI 
started to deteriorate.  
Second, one might think about whether financiers made a “coalition” with the 
government. In the cases of Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia, government 
intervened in the economy and society, and selected different social groups as their social 
bases. The Asian crisis of 1997 showed that Taiwan and Singapore benefited from 
“virtues of commission” while Korea and Malaysia committed “sins of commission.” 
 In Thailand, the government was friendly with commercial bankers, but their 
relationship was different from those in the other four countries mentioned above. Thai 
bureaucratic autonomy was poor, the governments were ever changing and fluid due to 
frequent cycles of military coup – democratic restoration – another coup. State power was 
fractionalized. Thus the state did not make coalitions with bankers from a position of 
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strength. Bankers just infiltrated the state, holding it on a tight leash. One might call it 
“capture,” rather than “coalition.”  
 If there is what one might call a “coalition” between the government and Bangkok 
financiers, then the Thailand-born Asian catastrophe of 1997 suggests an effect of 
“finance capital” on CBI – that is, the danger from powerful financiers when they are not 
counterbalanced by any significant social groups and the governmental regulatory 
authority.  
 
III. Malaysia: Politics of Ethnic Diversity and Partial Central Banking System 
Politics in Multiracial Society: the UMNO and Bumiputera Industrialists 
During the late 18th and 19th centuries, Great Britain established colonies and 
protectorates in what is now current day Malaysia; Japan occupied the area from 1942 to 
1945. In 1948, the British-ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula formed the Federation 
of Malaya, which became independent in 1957. Malaysia straddles the Malay Peninsula – 
from the border of Thailand to Singapore, and the northwestern part of the island, 
Borneo. Its more than eighteen million people consist of three main ethnic groups: 
indigenous bumiputeras (sons of the soil) most of whom are ethnic Malays (accounting 
for about 48 percent of the population); and sizeable immigrant communities of Chinese 
(36 percent) and Indians (9 percent) (CIA 2005; Bowie 1994: 168). 
 Malays, descendants of migrants from Central Asia, are mostly concentrated in 
rural areas with a small portion residing in urban areas. The Chinese came as traders and 
tine miners in the 19th century, and their descendants are most numerous in the towns and 
cities where they dominate locally owned commerce and small scale industry. Indians 
were “imported” from South India by British plantation businesses to work on sprawling 
estates during the rubber boom of the turn of the century (Yap 2001: 61-2). 
 Nation-building in Malaysia in 1957 was made possible by the “Bargain of 1957,” 
an “elite settlement” (Burton and Higley 1987) between majority Malays and minorities, 
which was codified in the Constitution. Elites from various ethnic groups agreed that 
Malays should dominate government. In return, the immigrant Chinese and Indian 
communities were granted full citizenship and protection from ethnically motivated 
official interference in their economic and cultural affairs. The compromise was 
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contingent on each ethnic group respecting the boundaries that had been established. 
Those ethnic groups coexisted peacefully, but with suspicion and fear – a potential source 
of political unrest (Yap 2001: 61).  
Three parties reflected Malaysia’s ethnic diversity: the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) represented the majority of Malays while the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) represented Chinese and 
Indians, respectively. The UMNO has been the dominant party in the two coalitions, the 
Alliance (1957-74) and then National Front (Barisan Nasional) that formed all 
governments since 1957.26 
In the 1960s, inter-ethnic relations worsened. Despite continued growth, the 
disparities in unemployment rates and income increased between the wealthy urban 
Chinese and the poor Malays. “On 13 May 1969, race riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur in 
the aftermath of a general election where Chinese and opposition parties appeared to have 
made significant electoral gains at the expense of the Malay-dominated governing 
coalition” (Bowie 1994: 170). Armed Malays attacked and looted Chinese shops and 
houses. “Severe rioting, looting, and arson continued for two days… Property damage 
left 6,000 people homeless and social calm was completely restored only after two 
months” (Yap 2001: 62).  
The 1969 riot was a historical event that dominated the Malaysian path of 
industrialization. The UMNO leadership learned from the riot that it was a political 
imperative to “cure” the disjunction of ethnic and economic power. They introduced a 
“new regime involving extensive state regulation of the private sector with the explicit 
objective of stimulating Malay economic participation” (Bowie 1994: 170-1). The 1969 
riot contributed to the National Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971. It aimed to get rid of 
poverty, restructure society, and eliminate the identification of race with economic 
position.  
The policy thus aimed to create Bumiputera (i.e., sons of the soil) entrepreneurs. 
The UMNO government helped Malays launch their business by offering cheap policy 
credits, and inculcated skills, expertise, and “capitalist spirit” to the indigenous 
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businessmen to compete with non-Bumiputeras (Bowie 1994: 171). In 1975, the UMNO 
passed Industrial Coordination Act stipulating that any firm employ Malays more than 30 
percent of total workforce. If a firm did not respect the Act, it will be denied any benefit 
from government such as tax relief, policy loans, and protection from imports (Yap 2001: 
63). This measure targeted Chinese SME businesses, since they often use traditional 
family-based employment and ownership practices which effectively precluded Malay 
participation (Bowie 1994: 173).  
Furthermore, Malay government established SOEs to accumulate economic assets 
in its hands and support Bumiputera entrepreneurship. For instance, the National 
Corporation (Pernas), the Naional Equity Corporation, and the State Development 
Corporations were SOEs that aimed to buy corporate shares of  private firms and sell 
them to Malays in cheap prices. Other SOEs such as the Council of Trust for the 
Indigenous People and Bank Bumiputera provided a great amount of preferential policy 
loans to promote Malay entrepreneurship (Yap 2001: 64). Figure 5-8 shows the annual 
increase of the number of public enterprises from 1960 to 1992, demonstrating how the 
ethnicity-motivated state created the big bourgeoisie from above. The Malay government 
emphasized the manufacturing and service sector more than extractive businesses and 
transport.  
 Malaysian economic growth resembles the Korean path in that the two 
governments made serious efforts to foster big business by extending state-generated 
benefits to their economic coalition partners, Bumiputeras and chaebols. The UMNO 
government adopted an industrial deepening strategy, based on the capital-intensive 
heavy chemical sector in the 1980s. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, prime minister, explicitly 
pointed to the Korean “economic miracle” as an exemplar case of growth in developing 
countries. Bowie (1994: 176) describes his strategy as follows: 
 
With high regard for the capabilities of state-led enterprises and suspicion 
of private sector industrial abilities, Mahathir embraced the South Korean 
import-substituting, export-promoting ‘model.’ South Korea appealed 
perhaps not simply because of its industrial record but also because it was 
 
26 The Barisan Nasional was initiated by from British conditions for the granting of independence. One of 
the conditions was the demand that the new government be truly representative of all communities. 
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the only NIC whose people were not ethnically Chinese… Under pressure 
from… the Malay community to more aggressively pursue NEP goals 
using direct state action, Mahathir and the UMNO leadership found in the 
heavy industries policy an attractive vehicle by which to hasten the 
redistribution of economic power as envisioned in the NEP. 
 
The targets of the industrial deepening included a project for a national car 
(Proton Saga), motorcycle engine, iron and steel mills, cement, and oil-refining and 
petrochemical project. A public sector agency – the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM) – was established in 1981 to lead the grand national project. The 
HICOM was chartered to plan, identify, initiate, invest, implement, and manage projects 
in the field of heavy industries. “Apart from enormous injections of public funds, the 
targeted industries were heavily protected through tariff and import restrictions and 
licensing requirements. For instance, the effective rate of protection for the iron and steel 
industry rose from 28 percent in 1969 to 188 percent in 1987” (Kanapathy 2000: 3).  
The capital-intensive industrialization proved to be economically inefficient. At 
the end of 1988, federal government liabilities stood at US$ 2.2 billion, of which two-
thirds took the form of contingent liabilities stemming from government–backed foreign 
loans. 37 percent of the total public sector debt (US$ 16.7 billion) was attributable to the 
public enterprise loans (Bowie 1994: 178). Gomez and Jomo (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 
49) describes that the industrial deepening projects favored government-linked big 
bourgeoisies: 
 
Since the 1980s, government policies to assist Malays have tended to 
favor larger business interests rather than smaller companies. Larger, 
politically well-connected enterprises have enjoyed better access to 
government-created rents as business size and political influence have 
interacted as part of the new Malay idiom of power in contemporary 
Malaysia. In addition, commercial banks have also been more inclined to 
provide credit to large establishments. 
 
Figure 5-9 illustrates the amount of credit extended by the banking sector 
measured by a percent of GDP from 1981 to 2001. Roughly speaking, Malaysia had two 
peaks of private credit by the banking sector, one peak in the 1980s and the other in the 
late 1990s. The first peak represents the government’s rush to capital-intensive 
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industrialization by HICOM in the 1980s, while the second peak reflects the Malay 
industrial and financial firms’ rush to the 1997 debacle. In contrast, a relatively smooth 
and level line for Singapore reflects that the Singaporean financial authorities kept the 
banking sector from overextending credit to businesses. In the case of Thailand, 
commercial bankers in Bangkok did not extend as much credit as their Malay 
counterparts did in the 1980, which reflects that Thailand did not experienced capital-
intensive industrial deepening in the same period. But, as the Thai government liberalized 
capital accounts and built the offshore banking facilities in the early 1990s, the financial 
sector was overheated, heading for the Asian crisis of 1997. 
How did the Malay government mobilize the financial resources for its industrial 
deepening project? The UMNO government simply captured the financial sector and 
confiscated the resources. In 1970, the Malay share of ownership in banking and 
insurance was merely 3.3 percent while the Chinese held 24.3, Indians 0.6, and foreign 
financiers 52.2. In 1986, however, “ownership or management control of banking 
services by Bumiputeras and government agencies had increased to between 60 and 70 
percent” (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 60). 
The story of the currently largest bank reveals the situation. Malayan Banking, the 
largest bank in terms of assets, was originally established by the Chinese tycoon, Koo 
Teck Tuat. In 1966, however, after rumors that he took bank funds for his own private 
enterprises, there was a massive run on the Banking. Next year, the Malay central 
bankers intervened to restructure the Malayan Banking, transferring the ownership to a 
government-owned bank.  
Facing inefficient overinvestments during industrial deepening, the UMNO 
government launched economic liberalization in the late 1980s, as other developing 
countries did. Did the privatization package lower the political barrier for the non-Malay 
firms to operate in a “rational” market without the state’s racial discrimination? 
 Liberalization has been politically feasible because the principal beneficiaries are 
foreigners and Malay business elites with symbiotic ties to the UMNO. The losers in the 
economic liberalization have been the Chinese business community. Small and medium 
scale Chinese firms that comprise the largest segment of domestically owned business 
have been, for the most part, excluded from the benefits of liberalization because of 
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ethnic preferences. Because the Chinese tend to focus on retailing, services, and real 
estate and construction, they have not benefited from export-oriented industrialization 
with foreign partnerships with the manufacturing sector (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 66-66-
71). In addition, foreign investors prefer to choose Malay partners in order to smooth 
investment approvals and ensure a sympathetic regulatory ear in positions of power. 
 Although the MCA and MIC were constituent parties of the Malay coalition 
government, they chronically suffered from intra-party factionalism. The rifts within each 
party cost both parties electoral support from key constituencies, which in turn reduced 
their ability to correct the racial bias of the UMNO. The non-Malay political elites have 
been marginalized as the balance of both political and economic power rests with the 
Malay elite. In response, minority businesspeople try to get personal, not institutional, 
access to the UMNO to obtain profitable partnerships in privatized government 
operations and infrastructure projects. 
 Economic growth itself was a political project in the sense that the UMNO 
government pursued its political survival in a racially diversified society by pouring 
national wealth to the bumiputera class. In this situation, central bankers usually faced 
political pressure to mobilize and distribute financial resources in a racially biased way, 
which contributed to less independence. As such, I expect that Malaysian central bankers 
are as dependent on the government as the central bankers in Korea. 
 
Financial System: Singaporean Legacy and Partial Central Banking System  
 The Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the Malaysian central bank, was established 
in January of 1959, two years after independence, under the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Ordinance of 1958. The BNM charter shows that the bank did not enjoy the full 
autonomy from the UMNO government, especially the MOF. First, the MOF has 
influential power with regard to appointing the BNM leadership. The governor is 
appointed by the monarch (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) and the Deputy Governors by the 
Minister of Finance [Article 9, Section 1]. Since the monarch is a merely symbolic entity 
in Malaysia, the central bank leaders have to get the Minister’s approval in order to act as 
members of any government committee dealing with currency, banking, and financial 
matters [Article 9, Section 3]. 
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Second, the government can influence the central bankers’ financial businesses. 
For instance, the BNM needs the finance minister’s approval in order to: 1) issue 
securities in its own name [Article 30, Section 1]; 2) acquire, hold, and sell shares of any 
corporation and government [Article 30, Section 1-j and 1-o] ; and 3) grant loans to 
financial institutions [Article 34A, Section 1]. 
 Third, when a disagreement happens between the BNM and the MOF, the 
Minister has the legal authority to issue directives to the BNM Board and the central 
bankers should observe the directive [Article 34, Section 2]. If the Board disagrees with 
it, the House of Representative jumps into the case as a judge [Article 34, Section 3]. 
Given that the UMNO has dominated the parliament since independence, the House is 
more likely to favor the MOF vis-à-vis the central bankers. 
 Fourth, the legal codes of the charter make it possible for the central bankers to 
provide preferential financial policies to the UMNO government’s core constituencies. 
For instance, the BNM may make advances to farmers [Article 30, Section 1-ff], who are 
more likely to be Malays than Chinese. By establishing the Special Investment Fund, the 
central bankers finance specific projects of public authorities and corporations [Article 
30, Section 1-fff and 1-ffff]. Those government-linked corporations have been an 
economic engine for Malaysia to push racially biased industrialization up to the present 
day. Furthermore, the central bank may establish a Syariah Advisory Council that is 
authorized to manage Islamic financial activities based on Islamic law [Article 30, 
Section 1 and 2]. It is the Minister of Finance who appoints the members of the Council. 
 Do the turnover rates of the BNM governorship reflect the central bankers’ legal 
dependence on the MOF and the government? Table 5-6 lists the BNM governors and 
their terms of office. There have been 7 governors in the past 46 years. The turnover rate 
measured by the number of governors a year is 0.152. The governors served, on average, 
6.57 years. In comparison, the rate is as low as the MAS of Singapore with 0.147 
turnover rate and 6.8 average years of service.  
Why is the turnover rate lower than expected, given the UMNO government’s 
ethnically biased “big push” approach to Korean-style industrialization, and the MOF’s 
legal influence over the Malaysian central bankers? 
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It should be noted that the Malaysian government delegated its ultimate financial 
responsibility to the Singaporean central bankers, not to the BNM. This “foreign 
delegation” of central banking operations originated during the British colonial era. 
Historically, Malaya’s financial system was an offshoot of the Straits Settlements, and 
Singapore, the administrative center, remained the center of the financial system on the 
Malay Peninsula. The changing regulation of money in Singapore determined the 
situation in Malaya. Almost all the institutions for managing the financial resources were 
physically based in Singapore, from the banks’ own system to the gradual assumption of 
governmental responsibility for money. The Currency Board of Singapore issued its notes 
from 1899, which were circulated in the rest of Malaya and in Borneo. After 1938, the 
peninsula of Malaya was formally incorporated into the currency area overseen by the 
Board of Singapore, followed in 1950 by Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo. These 
territories were incorporated to Malaysia during the state building process, but remained 
controlled by Singapore in financial and monetary terms (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 107). 
Malaysia’s foreign devolution of central banking responsibility to Singapore continued 
even after its independence from the U.K. in 1957. The government left currency issue to 
the Currency Board in Singapore until 1967. Fixed exchange rates and exchangeability 
were on par with the Singapore currency until the mid-1970s.  
The central bank never made much use of interest rate controls or credit directives 
to support industrial policy as Korea did. The UMNO government’s most interventionist 
financial policies did not involve the central bankers (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 119-122). The 
government allowed central bankers to do their own work. Figure 5-10 shows annual 
inflation changes in Malaysia and Singapore, demonstrating that monetary values in both 
countries have moved lock-in-step. Their performance was spectacular. The MAS and 
BNM were successful in keeping monetary stability. The average is 2.91 percent and 3.38 
over the period.  
The Singaporean legacy led the government to respect the central bankers’ 
responsibility over monetary stability. Thus, a counterfactual argument is possible that if 
there had not been such foreign delegation and Singaporean influence, the turnover rate 
might have been higher. 
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How did the UMNO government mobilize financial resources to pour into state-
led economic expansion in favor of indigenous industrialists and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) while allowing central bankers to work independently? The financial vehicle was 
government-owned special banks. Government ownership in the banking sector began 
with the establishment of Bank Bumiputera in 1966 and the partial takeover of Malayan 
Banking (so-called Maybank) in 1967. These two banks subsequently became the largest 
in Malaysia and served as the financial engines for expansionist economic growth. 
Although the BNM was responsible for supervising all of the financial institutions in 
Malaysia, it lacked the political will and skills to oversee special banks that the UMNO 
government cherished for its developmental plan.  
 The Bank of Bumiputera serves as an example of the BNM’s incapacity. In 1977, 
the Bank established Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF) as a subsidiary in an effort to 
mobilize financial resources for fostering Bumiputera industrialists. The BMF was 
involved in banking fraud and corruption in 1979 and its huge financial losses were 
absorbed by its parent bank, which in turn was rescued by the state oil company. When 
the scandal broke out, the central bankers folded their arms and did not investigate the 
many irregularities in the transfer of funds from Bank Bumipuetra to BMF. That was 
because Razaleigh Hamzah, the Minister of Finance, had been the chairman of Bank 
Bumiputera before he entered the government. Since he was an important insider of the 
UMNO government, the central bankers stayed clear of the scandal (Hamilton-Hart: 
2002: 120-1). 
 In fact, the BNM was subject to informal political pressures, especially in the 
1980s when the government pushed capital-intensive industrial deepening. For instance, 
the third governor was forced to resign, reportedly because of a disagreement with the 
Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin. Daim was the most prominent of the Bumiputera 
businessmen who made enormous fortunes through close involvement with the ruling 
political party. He removed the powerful Capital Issues Committee from the BNM’s 
control. The committee was responsible for overseeing new issues on the stock exchange 
and thus played a crucial role in UMNO government’s privatization policy and the 
redistribution of wealth associated with the NEP.  
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The Malaysian case illustrates a “partial central banking system” where the 
central bankers provide relatively good performance in the traditional area of monetary 
stability but poor capacity in the financial regulation and supervision, especially in the 
financial liberalization era since the 1980s. The monetary dependence on, and 
synchronization with the Singaporean financial system prevented the UMNO government 
from intervening in the central bankers’ authority over monetary stability. But the central 
bankers did not “intervene” into the highly politicized area of the special banking sector, 
even if the area was their responsibility. If they had dared to regulate and supervise the 
area, the government would likely have forced them to retire from their governorship.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 So far I have examined the extent to which my arguments on Korea and Taiwan 
apply to three Southeast countries, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Each country was 
different in its sensitivity to macroeconomic instability, mainly due to the political 
leadership’s choice of economic growth strategy and developmental partners. In other 
words, each central banking system was put in the larger context of a developmental 
design that affects the central bankers’ autonomy from the government, and thus their 
performance with regards to monetary and financial policies. 
 Singaporean MAS was the most autonomous of all three of the Southeast Asian 
countries. Expelled from Malaysia, the PAP government attracted foreign capital to the 
entrepôt state for its political and economic survival, which led the Singaporean state to 
support the MAS-MOF’s independence with a wide range of financial and monetary 
authority. Although the MAS was not very independent from the MOF, the actual 
autonomy the MAS enjoyed was considerable given that the financial officialdom fully 
supported the Singaporean central bankers. 
 In the case of Malaysia, the UMNO government heavily depended on indigenous 
industrialists, Bumiputeras, after the riot of 1969. The government wanted to survive in a 
society that marked by a disjuncture between economic and ethnic power. It did so by 
promoting its developmental agent, the Bumiputera, while discriminating against ethnic 
Chinese. But the government’s preference for the indigenous industrialists did not 
contribute to the central bankers’ subordination to the government because the Kuala 
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Lumpur government delegated central banking authority to Singapore, which was 
characterized by autonomous and effective monetary management. But Malay central 
bankers stayed away from state-owned banks, such as Bank Bumiputera, which were 
critical of the government’s expansionist growth strategy. Central bankers were 
independent and effective in the monetary issue area, although their financial regulation 
was poor since they “counter-delegated” their financial regulation authority to the 
government. 
 Commercial bankers in Bangkok suffered from the statist Phibun government, 
and then revived under the Sarit government, which launched a pro-market drive to 
destroy the predecessor government’s power base, the government sector. The post-Sarit 
government’s social base was Chinese commercial bankers who dominated agro-business 
financing, the foundation of national wealth of the country. Originally Thai central 
bankers were autonomous and respected from financial community, but after 1980s when 
the government liberalized the economy, especially the financial sector, the central 
bankers lost their autonomy due to conflicts with the MOF and commercial banks. Thai 
central bankers are similar to Malay counterparts in the sense that they maintained stable 
macroeconomy but were incapable of regulating and supervising the financial sector. 
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Chapter 6: Quantitative Analyses of Central Bank Independence  
in The Developing Countries in the 1980s 
 
In this chapter, I employ statistical methods to analyze cross-national variance in 
central bank independence (CBI) in developing countries during the 1980s. In the first 
section, I restate my hypotheses introduced in chapter 1. In sections 2, 3, and 4, I 
operationalize relevant variables to test the hypotheses. In the fifth section, I test the 
hypotheses by using cross-sectional regressions and principal component analyses. The 
final section is a conclusion that summarizes my statistical analyses.  
 
I. Hypotheses 
 As I already showed in chapter 1, two hypotheses are generated in terms of 
political coalition types and their effects on CBI. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If capital-intensive industry and/or organized labor have a strong 
presence in an economy, the country is less likely to have central bank independence. 
Hypothesis 2: If the other groups (i.e., the financial sector, agriculture, and/or 
small and medium-sized enterprises) are dominant in an economy, the country is more 
likely to have central bank independence.  
II. Dependent Variables: Behavioral and Overall CBI 
 Typically, CBI refers to independence from the executive branch of government 
and the legislature and/or protection from “capture” by the commercial banks it regulates. 
The conceptual definition of CBI in this dissertation is the extent to which a central bank 
has discretion to set goals for monetary policies and choose tools (Maxfield 1997). There 
have been efforts to measure CBI, although researchers usually use decade-by-decade 
CBI indicators constructed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1991) since their 
measurement is reliable and systematically constructed and the data coverage is wider 
than any others. 
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They devised indicators of three types: formal, behavioral, and overall indices of 
CBI. The formal index focuses on legal codes governing the appointment of the central 
bank governor, policy formation, and lending policy. Unfortunately the legal index does 
not represent the actual inflation-fighting authority of the central banks, especially in 
developing countries. A central bank may be formally independent but nevertheless 
unable to carry out effective anti-inflationary and prudential policies because it is not 
influential in the formulation and implementation of policies by other governmental 
agencies. Cukierman et al. (1991) and Maxfield (1994) found that the legal CBI is not 
correlated with policy outcomes (i.e., inflation rates) in developing countries. 
 The behavioral CBI index is based on the turnover rate of central bank governors. 
The idea is that if the political authorities frequently take the opportunity to choose a new 
governor, they will at least have the opportunity to pick those who will do their will. One 
might suspect that a low turnover rate does not necessarily imply a high level of CBI, 
however, because a relatively subservient governor may stay in office for a long time. 
But statistical analysis shows that a low turnover rate is highly correlated with the low 
inflation rate that central bankers set as their main goal (Cukierman et al. 1991). 
Furthermore, it is not easy to find any consistent indicator of CBI, other than the turnover 
rates, for large-N analysis. The index is measured by the average annual turnover rate of 
central bank governors from 1980 to 1989. To avoid confusion, I recoded such that: 
 
behavioral index of CBI = 1 – turnover rate 
 
The overall CBI indicator is an effort to combine formal – legal independence and 
turnover by a weighting scheme to obtain an aggregate measure of CBI. Such weighting 
is somewhat arbitrary, but it reduces the arbitrariness by setting the weights equal to the 
coefficients of legal and behavioral indices from the regressions in which they are used to 
explain the variation in the logged inflation rates (Cukierman 1992: 433). Note that the 
behavioral component is given greater weight in constructing the overall CBI index since 
it is more representative of inflation-based CBI than the legal indicator. I use the 
behavioral and overall indexes of CBI as dependent variables in my statistical analyses. 
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In order to carry out the statistical analyses, I created a dataset on 36 developing 
countries in the 1980s.27 The other developing countries and decades are not included in 
my analysis mainly due to missing data on the dependent and independent variables. 
Since Cukierman et. al. reported decade-by-decade CBI data, my independent variables 
are also decade average data (i.e., 1980-89), which means my statistical tests are basically 
cross-national analyses. 
 
III. Independent Variables 
Capital-Intensive Industry [HEAVY]28 
Capital-intensive industry is measured by heavy manufacturing sector comprising 
electronic, metal, and chemical industries as a percentage of the whole industry. The data 
were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Report and I took the average of 
annual values from 1975 to 1989. I chose this time frame since a systemically collected 
cross-national dataset on the dependent variable, CBI, is available only for the 1980s. 
Furthermore, it may take time for the CBI variable to reflect changes of socio-economic 
variables like the HEAVY so I included the latter half of the 1970s for the HEAVY.  
 I expect countries with high levels of capital-intensive industry to be more likely 
to have low CBI, all things being equal. The reason is that central bankers’ main goal is 
monetary and price stability, but capital-intensive industry as a holder of specific assets 
will derive more value from government-induced favorable price changes than holders of 
more liquid assets will. Furthermore, heavy industry in developing countries is usually a 
debtor that borrows the capital it needs and high inflation usually favors debtors over 
creditors. In this sense, capital-intensive industry is expected to have an intense 
preference for low CBI. 
 
27 Included in the dataset are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
28 HEAVY refers to the variable name that represents capital-intensive industry and will be used in 
regression models. 
175
Organized Labor [UNION] 
 Organized labor is proxied by the number of union members as a percentage of 
the non-agricultural workforce. The data on organization rates were available from the 
World Bank’s World Development Report and I took the average of annual data between 
1975 and 1989.  
 My expectation is that the organized labor is negatively correlated to CBI but that 
the correlation is weak. The “weak” correlation comes from the fact that workers have 
conflicting positions with regard to the price stability that central bankers take as their 
main policy goal. As producers, they get benefits from nominal wage increases and price 
increases of the products that they produce, yet as consumers they prefer price stability.  
The strength of organized labor’s negative correlation with CBI is, however, 
mainly due to the fact that producers are more likely to organize to protect their benefits 
than consumers are, as collective action theory suggests (Olson 1965). In addition, the 
cost of tight monetary policy and austerity measures such as cuts in subsidies tend to be 
felt immediately, while their benefits from price stability are usually socially diffuse and 
temporally distant. Lastly, unionized workers are usually found in the capital-intensive 
sector and their material welfare often depends on the profitability of the sector, which 
suggests that they will have the same negative preference as the sector with regard to 
CBI. 
 
Financial Sector [FINPWR] 
 The power of the financial sector is measured by the sum of the indices of 
universal banking, banking supervision, and party fragmentation weighted by M2/GDP. 
Let me briefly explain how each component relates to CBI.29 
First, universal banking heightens the sectoral power of finance because universal 
banking means that there is no competitive divide among financial subsectors in their 
reaction to inflation. Moreover, it is for the sector to reach political consensus on all 
issues, as they already face unified regulations and markets. Thus, a financial sector with 
universal banking should express stronger anti-inflationary sentiment than the sector 
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without. I coded 2 for “unrestricted,” 1 for “permitted” or “restricted,” and 0 for 
“prohibited” in each subsectors of securities, insurance, real estate, and ownership of 
non-financial firms.30 The data on the 36 developing countries during the 1980s were 
taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine’s database (2001).  
 Second, although central bankers’ main policy goal is price stability, some 
countries allow them to carry out an extra function of financial supervision, and others set 
up an independent agency for their supervision. Where the monetary authority restricts 
the allocation of credit or lending rates, individual commercial banks conflict with the 
central bank. Since commercial bankers tend to prefer unlimited freedom of their 
financial business, they may seek to limit the central bank’s supervisory power. 
Conversely, when the central bank has no bank supervisory responsibilities, the financial 
sector has no incentive to oppose the central bank’s autonomy. I coded 1 if the banking 
supervision is not under the central bank, 0.5 if it is shared by the central bank and other 
agencies, and 0 if it is solely the central bank’s responsibility. The data is drawn from 
Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana, and Yago’s data (2002) and Neil Courtis (2001). 
 Third, as the fractionalization of the party system increases, local interests tied to 
particular parties or to even particular members’ constituencies should see their 
particularistic goals better served by the legislative process. Given the financial sector’s 
interest in a national issue (i.e., price stability) and claims to expertise, we can predict 
that where a country’s party system is less fractionalized, financial opposition to inflation 
should be more effective. Conceptually, fractionalization is the probability that two 
legislators chosen at random from a national legislature belong to different parties. It is 
measured by one minus the Herfindahl concentration index. The data are available from 
Beck, Clarke, Keefer, and Walsh’s database (2001). 
 Finally, the relative size of the financial sector is usually measured by M2 as a 
percentage of GDP (Snider 1996) since M2 represents the amount of financial assets 
 
29 For theoretical discussion about universal banking, banking supervision, and party fragmentation, see 
Posen (1995). 
30 Posen constructed the index the sources of which are various national data. The index is either 1 or 0. It 
is 1 if banks are allowed to deal with at least two of securities, insurance, and commercial lending, and 
otherwise 0. But I differentiated them more in detail since Barth et al.’s database (2001) contains more 
diverse information about cross-national banking systems. 
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deposited in financial institutions and money markets.31 The M2 reflects the economic 
power of the sector in an economy, while the aforementioned 3 variables (universal 
banking, bank supervision, and fragmentation of party system) represent political and 
organizational “filter” through which the economic power of the sector gains political 
influence. So, I combined those 4 variables to measure the power of the sector, as 
follows:  
 
Power of the financial sector [FINPWR] = (universal banking + bank regulation  
 – fractionalization) x  M2/GDP. 
 
I expect that the FINPWR is strongly and positively correlated with CBI since the 
financial sector is a creditor that is penalized by price instability. Central bankers assume 
a role of “the bank of banks.” 
 
Agriculture [AGRI] 
Agriculture is measured by agricultural production as a percentage of GDP. I took 
the average of annual data (1975 – 1989) from the World Development Indicator (2003). 
I expect the agricultural sector is positively but weakly correlated with the dependent 
variable, CBI. An economy heavily drawing on agricultural production can be assumed to 
be less capital intense and less asset specific than one relying on industry for a large share 
of domestic products. In addition, agricultural production is usually unstable, mainly due 
to frequent changes of natural conditions (i.e., precipitation, duration of sunshine, and 
average annual temperature). Thus, farmers’ gains from their business are often volatile 
and unpredictable, and they will suffer even more if the market is inflation-stricken.  
But farmers have dual positions (i.e., consumer-cum-producer) and there are large 
cross-national variances within the sector, which means agricultural interests have a weak 
preference for price stability and CBI.  
 
31 M1 is the sum of currency held by the public and checkable deposits. The broader aggregate M2 
includes consumer time deposits at various financial institutions, money-market deposit accounts, and some 
other items. Still broader monetary aggregate M3 includes additional types of financial assets (Barro 2000). 
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Small and medium-sized enterprise [LIGHT] 
 Small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) are measured by light manufacturing 
sectors comprising food, beverage, tobacco, clothing, and textile industries as a 
percentage of all industries. The data were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Report and I took the average of annual values from 1975 to 1989.  
 I expect that light industry, mainly consisting of SMEs, has a weak positive 
correlation with CBI. It is positive since, like agriculture, the sector is usually less capital 
intensive and less concentrated, compared to heavy industries. In addition, light industry 
tends to lose its weight as capital-intensive industry leads industrialization.  
 On the other hand, historically, the stage of light industrialization was often 
related to political liberalism, whereas military authoritarianism or Fascism stepped in 
during the industrial deepening eras in developing countries. Since capital accumulation 
of textile industrialization could be accomplished largely without industrial financing by 
the state, there was an elective affinity between the light industry, commercial banking, 
and the liberal regime (O’Donnell 1973; Kurth 1979). There may be a possibility that 
political liberalism, compared to authoritarianism or fascism, is a favorable condition for 
a government to delegate its financial authority to central bankers or not to intervene in 
the policy process of the central bank. But light industry’s relationship with CBI will be 
weak since light manufacturers, as producers, may sometimes want to secure preferential 
credits and loose monetary policy for their business. 
 For our statistical analysis it should be noted that light and heavy industries are 
negatively correlated with each other for their shares of national production. This causes 




Government partisanship [PARTISAN] 
 Hibbs (1977) argue that rightist governments are likely to allow CBI since they 
tend to prefer low inflation rates at the expense of high unemployment. In contrast, leftist 
governments are against central bankers’ independent authority since they prefer low 
unemployment in expense of high inflation. Based on data from Beck et al.’s Database of 
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Political Institutions (2001), I coded rightist government 1, leftist -1, and centrist 0. I 
expect a positive relationship between the partisanship and CBI. 
 
Political Business Cycle [PBC] 
 Political business cycles suggest an opportunistic CBI theory that inflation rates 
fluctuate according to electoral cycle (Nordhaus 1975). Thus an election-motivated 
government will deny central bankers inflation-fighting authority and print more easy 
money to boost the economy as an election comes near. But, after the election, the winner 
will support CBI so as to lower the election-motivated high inflation. The variable is 
proxied by the difference between the highest and lowest logged inflation rates in each 
election cycle in the 1980s. The data were taken from World Development Indicators 
(2003), Beck et.al.’s Database of Political Institutions (2000), and Marshall and Jaggers’ 
Polity IV Project (2002). I expect that the cycle is positively correlated to CBI. 
 
‘Tying successor’s hands’ theory [SUCCESSOR] 
 Boylan (1998) argued that outgoing authoritarians may seek to protect their 
interests by increasing the CBI that would otherwise be subject to the vicissitudes of the 
democratic process. To control the variable, I measured it by the frequency of changes 
from authoritarian/rightist governments to democratic/centrist/leftist governments in the 
1980s, based on Beck et.al.’s Database of Political Institutions (2000). I expect that the 
control variable is positively correlated to CBI. 
 
Government Financial Needs [GOVDEBT] 
 Since private creditors, domestic or international, regard CBI as a good indicator 
of financial credibility, governments may allow CBI in order to draw money from the 
creditors so they can fund their financial needs (Broz 1998; Maxfield 1997). The variable 
is measured by central government debt as an average percentage of GDP in the 1980s. 
Data were taken from World Development Indicators (2003). 
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International Economic Integration [INTLECO] 
 The more internationally integrated an economy is, the more likely it is that a 
government’s need for finance will yield central bank independence, because CBI is 
taken as both a sign of governmental commitment to desirable economic policies and an 
opportunity for increased creditors’ influence over government policy via a more 
independent central bank (Maxfield 1997). I measured various levels of global economic 
integration by import and export of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Macroeconomic instability [INFLA] 
 The stability of the price level is an important variable to be controlled since the 
macroeconomic conditions are certain to affect CBI. Statistical analyses, however, 
already showed that inflation rates are negatively correlated with the CBI: a low turnover 
rate is highly correlated with a low inflation rate that central bankers set as the main goal 
(Cukierman 1992). Thus, I devised an alternative indicator rather than using inflation 
rates to test the seemingly established argument.  
 Although inflation rates are central bankers’ critical concerns, inflation rates may 
not be a constraint in the eyes of self-interest elected officials. This is because politicians 
will be concerned about the macroeconomic condition only if they feel it affects their 
political welfare. In other words, if they don’t perceive that the inflation will affect their 
welfare, they will not respond to the rate. To measure how important the inflation rate is 
to the elected official, I use a proxy consisting of two components to represent the 
variable. The first component is based on an assumption that the government party’s 
power to manage economic policy will be diminished by macroeconomic instability. So, 
for government elites, an inflation rate will be represented such that: 
 
Inflation 1 = [P1 / (P1 + P2)] – [P1 / (P1 + P2)] / r 
 
where P1 and P2 are the shares of seats held by a government party and the largest 
opposition party, respectively, and r stands for annual inflation rates. Note that the 
governing politicians’ ultimate goal is political survival, that is, winning political 
competition with the largest opposition party (P2). So the first term, [P1 / (P1 + P2)], 
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means governing politicians’ power vis-à-vis their challenger, while the second term, [P1
/ (P1 + P2)] / r, represents their power adjusted by the inflation rate. The difference 
between the two terms is the political loss that incurs from macroeconomic instability 
from the perspective of governing politicians. Note that the inflation in an economic 
sense does not directly relate to a political loss. Rather, inflation is transformed to the 
political loss for governing politicians only when it affects government party’s power vis-
à-vis oppositions, which is what the equation suggests. The relevant data are available 
from Marshall and Jaggers’ Polity IV Project (2002). 
 Another part of the political loss from inflation is related to the “tenure security” 
variable that varying inflation rates might affect. Governing politicians learn from the 
past political history by which they expect their political expectancy in the future. If 
inflation-related government changes were frequent in the past, government officials will 
be serious about the macroeconomic situation. Thus they will consider the political loss 
that inflation partially caused to in the past. It is proxied by the frequency of 
government/regime change weighted by inflation as follows:   
 
Inflation 2 = r |DA| + 0.5 r |DD| + 0.5 r |AA| + r |AD| 
 
where r (i.e., logged inflation rates at the time of government/regime change) = 1 in the 
case of low inflation (0 to 10%), r = 2 in the case of Latin inflation (11 to 1000%), and r 
= 3 in the case of hyperinflation (more than 1000%).32 Government/regime changes are 
categorized as democratic to authoritarian (DA), democratic to democratic (DD), 
authoritarian to authoritarian (AA), and authoritarian to democratic (AD) from the period 
of the 1960s to the 1980s. Different values of k (i.e., 1 or 0.5) are meant to make the 
political loss sensitive to inflation rates.33. I assume that DD and AA are less costly for 
governing elites than the other two, so I employ different weights, 1 and 0.5, respectively. 
 
32 The classification of inflation rates is based on Charles S. Maier (1978: 43). I added different values of 
r and |DD| term to Clark’s formula (1994).  
33 There is a possibility that people rewards governing politicians for their managing inflation rate within 
low or moderate ranges (i.e., less than 10%) and thus the governing party pays off with macroeconomic 
stability. The nature of logarithm matches the situation. If inflation rate is less than 10, logged value is less 
than 1, decreasing political cost in the formula.  
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Note that “|  |” stands for “the cardinality of.” The above formula means that governing 
politicians will face tenure insecurity and thus high political disadvantage if their country 
features a high frequency of government change during periods of high inflation. I expect 
a negative relationship between macroeconomic instability and CBI since politicians will 
replace central bankers if they feel a high inflation rate is politically harmful to their 
welfare. The data is available from Polity IV Project (2002), and World Development 
Indicators (2003). 
 
In summary, the regressions tested are a reduced-form specification of CBI as 
follows: 
CBI = f [AGRI (+), FINPWR (+), UNION (-), LIGHT (+), HEAVY (-),  
, PARTISAN (+), PBC (+), SUCCESSOR (+),  
GOVDEBT (+), INTLECO (+), INFLA (-) ] 
 
V. Regression Analysis and Results 
OLS Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 I carried out statistical tests of my hypotheses using OLS regressions, as Table 6-1 
and 6-2 show. Note that UNION, LIGHT, and HEAVY are correlated with one another, 
causing a multicollinearity problem. Thus I included them one by one in each model.34 
Table 6-1 shows test results of regressing on behavioral index of CBI in developing 
countries during the 1980s. 
The coefficients of AGRI are significantly positive in model 1 and 4, as I 
expected, although the variable is not significant in model 6. FINPWR is not significant 
in model 1, but it has positive coefficients at least at 0.05 level in model 2, 3, 4, and 6, 
which indicates that central bankers are more likely to have independent authority when 
the financial sector is highly developed and organized. LIGHT has a significantly 
positive coefficient in model 2, but not in model 6. HEAVY and UNION have negative 
signs as expected but neither are significant.  
 
34 The other method to address the multicollinearity problem is principal components analysis that will be 
dealt in the next section. 
183
COUNTER is a sum of AGRI, FINPWR, and LIGHT which are expected to 
countervail against capital-intensive industry (i.e., HEAVY). The coefficient of 
COUNTER in model 5 is significant and positive, which suggests that central banks are 
more likely to be independent when agriculture, the financial sector, and SMEs are 
dominant in economies. INFLA has the same sign as I expected and is significant in 
model 1, 4, and 5, suggesting that, if inflation is politically harmful to elected officials, 
they will replace the central bank governor, which reduced CBI. All control variables are 
poor in predicting cross-national variations of central bankers’ independent authority. 
 Table 6-2 shows statistical results of regressing on overall index of CBI in 
developing countries during the 1980s. AGRI, UNION, LIGHT, and HEAVY have 
coefficient signs that I expected, although neither is statistically significant. Various 
models except model 1 show that the coefficients of FINPWR are significant and positive 
as I expected. The coefficient of COUNTER is positive and significant in model 5. 
INFLA has the same sign as I expected, and is consistently significant in all models. 
Control variables are still not good predictors of CBI since their standard errors are all 
larger than their coefficients.  
 In sum, Table 6-1 and 6-2 show that FINPWR and COUNTER survived the 
double tests of regressing on behavioral and overall index of CBI. FINPOWR and 
COUNTER variables support my hypothesis 2, while AGRI and LIGHT are not 
consistent predictors of varying degrees of CBI even if they have the coefficient signs 
that I expected. OLS regressions do not support my hypothesis 1 since UNION and 
HEAVY lack significance in a statistical sense. Hypothesis 3 does not obtain statistical 
support since the coefficients have the opposite signs from that I expected. 
 
Principal Components Analysis: Capital-Intensive Industry, Labor and CBIs 
 According to Table 6-1 and 6-2, capital-intensive industries measured by heavy 
manufacturing sector do not support my hypothesis 1. It may be better to consider other 
capital-intensive businesses to capture the variable since the measurement (i.e., HEAVY) 
does not include, for example, mining, transport equipment, energy, oil, and non-metal 
processing industry, etc.  
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We need additional information about a country’s production profile so we can 
see how much capital-intensive industries matter in an economy. An alternative measure 
of the production profile, for example, is the portion of national income spent on fixed 
capital, under the assumption that those societies that make intensive uses of capital, 
relative to other inputs, in the production process tend to plow a larger share of their 
earning back into capital formation than those that do not (Clark 1994). Thus, indicators 
that represent capital-intensive industry include: 1) unionization ratio; 2) size of the 
manufacturing sector; 3) fixed capital formation; 4) minimum of fixed capital formation; 
5) maximum of fixed capital formation; and 6) heavy manufacturing.  
 The size of the manufacturing sector is measured by the production from the 
manufacturing as a percentage of the GDP. I took the average of annual production in the 
1980s. Fixed capital formation is captured by the decade average of annual gross fixed 
capital formation in the 1980s. The minimum and maximum of the formation are the 
highest and lowest annual values of the variable. All data come from World Development 
Indicators (2003). The source of the ratio of unionized labor and heavy manufacturing 
are mentioned in the previous section.  
 But as Table 6-3 shows, most of the variables for the capital intensity are 
correlated with one another, which causes a multicollinearity problem (i.e., imprecise 
regression parameter estimates due to highly correlated independent variables). To 
address the problem, I used principal components analysis. It is a statistical technique that 
linearly transforms an original set of variables into a substantially smaller set of 
uncorrelated variables that represent most of the information in the original set of 
variables (Dunteman 1989). In other words, I used hypothetic scores produced through 
the technique that still parsimoniously preserve characteristics of the aforesaid six 
variables. I used the first principal component scores since the first component accounted 
for 51.8 percent of the variances of the six variables. The second and succeeding 
components accounted for considerably less variances ranging from 20 percent for the 
second component to 2 percent for the sixth component. 
 Table 6-4 shows coefficients of variables regressed on behavioral index of CBI in 
developing countries during the 1980s. CIIPC, referring to capital-intensive industry 
produced by the principal components technique, is consistently significant and has a 
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negative sign as expected, which supports my hypothesis 1. FINPWR also survives 
various tests, showing a significantly positive sign as expected. INFLA has a significantly 
negative sign in model 3 and 4, but not in model 2. 
 CIIPC and FINPWR in Table 6-5 are less consistent determinants of overall CBI. 
The former is a significant independent variable in model 3 and 4 as we expected, 
although insignificant in model 1. The latter has significantly positive coefficients in 
model 1 and 2, but not significant in model 4. Again, INFLA has consistently negative 
coefficients, all of which are statistically significant. 
 
Principal Components Analyses: Non-Capital-Intensive Sectors and CBIs 
 Table 6-1 and 6-2 show that the non-capital-intensive sector (i.e., COUNTER) is 
a statistically significant determinant as I expected. To confirm this, I executed a 
principal components analyses by using the first component scores (i.e., COUNTERPC) 
that linearly transformed agriculture, light industry, and the financial sector since I 
assumed that those sectors countervail against capital-intensive industry, contributing to 
central bankers’ independent authority.  
 Table 6-6 and 6-7 show the results. I excluded HEAVY and CIIPC from 
regression tests to avoid the multicollinearity problem. COUNTERPC has positive 
coefficient signs that are significant, which suggests that a country is more likely to have 
an independent central bank in behavioral as well as overall terms when the production 
profile is dominated by those non-capital-intensive sectors. The results support my 
hypothesis 2. 
 
VI. Financial Fragility, Supervisory Authority, and Social Interests 
 Although the statistical tests of developing countries confirms my two 
hypotheses, the Thailand and Malaysia cases pose a possibility that monetary and 
supervisory authority might be heterogeneous and different components of the CBI. 
Those two cases demonstrated that central bankers can be powerful and effective in the 
policy area of monetary stability, while they cannot be so in terms of financial 
supervision. Those two “inconsistent” countries are stark contrasts to “consistent” cases: 
Taiwan and Singapore represent strong macroeconomic stabilizers and financial 
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supervisors while Korea stands for a weak macroeconomic stabilizer and financial 
supervisor.   
 I ask if sectoral preferences for central bankers’ supervisory authority and 
financial fragility are the same as their preferences for the CBI that were already 
confirmed by statistical tests above. I used “Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Database” surveyed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001). I test how sectoral interests 
affect central bankers’ supervisory authority and financial fragility. Table 6-8 shows how 
I measured each variable covering 68 countries. Table 6-9 indicates correlation results. 
 As I expected, the correlation coefficient of a central bank supervisory power 
[CBSUPWR] is negative and significant with financial fragility [PRINFRAG]. If central 
bankers do not have supervisory power, the whole financial system will be not prudential, 
vulnerable to a financial crisis. The size of the agricultural sector [AGRI] in an economy 
is positively and significantly correlated with central bank supervision while negatively 
and significantly with financial fragility, which suggests that the agricultural sector’s 
preference contributes to a prudential financial system. 
 Interestingly enough, the power of the financial sector [FINPWR] does not have a 
significant correlation either with supervisory authority or with fragility. In the previous 
regression tests, the sector has a strong supporter of CBI measured by turnover rates and 
legal CBI. What does this inconsistency mean? Although the variable is insignificant, it 
hints that private financiers support central bankers’ independence from the government 
while they might not want their central bank to supervise their own operations. At least, 
their preference for the central bank’s supervision is not as intense as for its 
macroeconomic management. As the Thailand and Malaysia cases indicate, the financial 
sector may want more freedom to run financial operations in a globalizing era, but they 
are reluctant to be supervised. Further research could help clarify this issue. 
 As I expected, the capital-intensive industrial sector [CIIFIXED] has a negative 
correlation coefficient with central bank supervisory independence, but a positive 
coefficient with financial fragility. This result confirms that big firms and big 
industrialists want their government to bring pressures to bear on central bankers. They 
want more cheap credits, a bête noire of conservative central bankers. The capital-
intensive industrial sector has a consistent preference for low CBI and low supervision. 
187
As for light industry or the SME sector [LIGHT], it is not a significant variable in 
affecting the central bank’s prudential regulation, although its correlation coefficient is 
just what I expected. This suggests that the light industry has a weak preference intensity 
when it comes to supervision by central bankers. 
 Degrees of government’s banking ownership [GOVTOWN] are not significantly 
correlated with the CBSUPWR and PRINFRAG variables. This stands in contrast to 
neoliberal economists’ arguments that government’s intervention by public enterprises 
tends to distort the efficient distribution of resources in a society, and thus that SOEs 
should withdraw from the market. The statistics show that this is not the case. One 
possible explanation is that a government’s banking industry may counterbalance private 
banks’ and NBFI’s endless desire for risk-taking operations for profit, especially in a 
globalizing era. The state’s presence in the banking sector might be a source of 
corruption and crony capitalism but, as one sees from the Taiwanese case, government-
controlled financial intermediaries can protect the financial community from speculative 
banking operations since their aim is not to pursue profits, but instead to channel 
financial resources to targeted sectors of a society.  This kind of banking operation may 
be inefficient in the eyes of neoliberal reformists.  
 Short-term debt [SHTRMDET] has no significant correlation with the 
CBSUPWR variable, although it has a positive correlation coefficient with financial 
fragility. The coefficient is significant at 0.01 level. This is quite understandable as one 
sees the dire impacts of short-term speculative capitals on the Thai economy in the 1990s. 
 The previous sections already showed that inflation [INFLA] has a consistently 
negative impact on central banker’s independent authority [CBI]. Likewise, price 
instability [INFLA] has a consistently negative effect on the CBSUPWR variable. But, 
interestingly, it does not affect financial fragility, which hints that, technically speaking, 
monetary and financial policies are different from each other. It should be noted, 
however, that they are often closely related. James Barth et al. (2002) once explained 
how a policy failure in one area can spill over into another policy area. 
 
In case where the central bank has dual responsibility for banking 
supervision and monetary policy, it may pursue a too-loose monetary 
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policy in order to avoid adverse effects on bank earnings and credit 
quality…. [On the contrary,] if the central bank is responsible for bank 
supervision and bank failure occurs, public perception of its credibility in 
conducting monetary policy could be adversely affected. 
 
Lastly, the insurance scheme for savings [INSURE] has an unexpectedly negative 
correlation coefficient with central banker’s supervisory power. It is significant at 0.05 
level. Are prudential schemes provided by insurance programs incompatible with a 
central bank’s supervisory efforts? Do the insured clients, once insured, have more 
incentive for “moral hazard” to commit themselves to risky behaviors that supervisory 
agencies aim to reduce?  
From my perspective, two explanations are possible for the unexpected effects of 
the insurance system on the financial supervision. First, when a government sets up a 
public insurance scheme, it tends to provide the insurance agency with some supervisory 
functions, since the agency has to know information about insured member firms’ risk 
management so that it can impose differentiated insurance premium rates to member 
banks. In this case, the central bank is not the single supervisor. Note that, as shown in 
the definition of the FINSUP variable in Table 6-8, I designate higher value (i.e., 2) if a 
central bank is single supervisor, and lower value (i.e., 1) if a central bank shares 
supervision with other agencies. Thus an existence of insurance scheme causes a lower 
value of CBSUPWR. 
 An alternative explanation is that, since banking insurance program contributes to 
the prudential finance, an economy with the program might have less incentive to 
enhance the central bank’s supervisory function. In other words, savings insurance might 
be a functional replacement of financial supervision. In this sense, it is not appropriate to 
interpret the negative correlation as insurance scheme’s undermining central bankers’ 
supervision power, or vice versa. In other words, both insurance scheme and central 
bankers’ supervision will act “together” to enhance the prudential financial system.  
 In sum, roughly speaking, a social group’s preference for supervision is the same 
as its preference for monetary authority. The financial sector may be an exception since, 
in the previous statistical tests, it has intense positive preference for central bankers’ 
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independence while the sector has a positive but weak preference for supervisory 
authority. 
 
VII. Conclusion: Summary and Interpretations 
Hypothesis 1: Capital-Intensive Industry and CBIs 
 As Table 6-1 and 6-2 show, capital-intensive industry measured by three 
subsectors (i.e., electronic, metal, and chemical industry) as a percentage of all industry 
has negative coefficients as I expected, but is not statistically significant. Organized labor 
also has a negative impact on CBI but it is not significant. 
 But, considering more information about the economic weights of capital-
intensive industry as well as organized labor in a country’s production profile, I found, 
through principal components analyses, that the variable (i.e., CIIPC) is significant and 
has negative coefficients. This supports my first hypothesis that a country is less likely to 
have central bank independence if capital-intensive industry and/or organized labor are 
dominant in an economy. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Non-Capital-Intensive Sectors and CBIs 
 Table 6-1 and 6-2 show that agriculture and light manufacturing have positive 
coefficient signs as I expected, but neither are consistently significant. Compared to those 
two variables, the financial sector is a more consistent predictor since it survived most of 
all my statistical tests including the principal components tests in Tables 6-4 and 6-5.  
 On the other hand, two overall measures of agriculture, light manufacture, and the 
financial sector (i.e., COUNTER and COUNTERPC) are always statistically significant 
and have positive coefficients, supporting my second hypothesis that a country is more 
likely to have central bank independence when the financial sector, agriculture, and/or 
SMEs are dominant in an economy.  
 But there is a remaining question about agriculture and light manufacturing as 
well as organized labor. Why are they not so consistent predictors of cross-national CBI? 
The question can be answered if one considers those sectors’ different levels of 
preference intensity with regard to CBI. As Figure 1-1 illustrates, the financial sector is a 
robust and consistent pro-CBI group whereas capital-intensive industry is a strong and 
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consistent anti-CBI group. But those sectors in the middle of the spectrum have weak and 
fuzzy preferences, which results in their inconsistent and/or insignificant regression 
coefficients despite the coefficient signs that I expected.  
 
Social Preferences and Central Bankers’ Independent Supervisory Power 
 Considering that central bankers in Thailand and Malaysia were effective in 
maintaining price stability but not in keeping prudential banking sector, I examined 
correlations that central bankers’ supervisory independence have with the power of 
various social groups. I found that the economic weight of capital-intensive industry is 
negatively correlated with central bankers’ supervision, and positively correlated to 
financial fragility. In contrast, the weight of the agricultural sector is positively correlated 
with financial supervision, but negatively correlated with financial weakness. The weight 
of SMEs, often found in the light manufacturing sector, is weakly correlated with 
financial supervision. The financial sector does not have any significant correlation 
coefficient with the supervision or financial fragility. The financial sectors’ inconsistent 
preferences toward price stability and supervision might explain why central bankers at 
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur showed the different performances in two areas, although 
further research on this is needed. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Politics of Coalition and Central Bankers 
I. Introduction  
Interested in why the Asian financial crisis of 1997 impacted Taiwan and Korea 
differently, I researched the uneven development of central banks’ independent authority. 
My dissertation asks, why do some central bankers have autonomous power that 
contributes to their monetary and financial stability, while others do not? The question 
addresses the political context under which a government chooses coalition partners 
among various social groups for its political survival, and how the choice affects central 
bankers’ authority and the financial-monetary regimes they are in charge of. 
I explored two main cases (Korea and Taiwan) as well as three additional cases 
(Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand). I also employed a large-N cross-sectional data 
analysis to test my arguments in a broader context. In the next section, I summarize what 
I have discussed throughout this dissertation. The last section discusses some theoretical 
contributions, implications, and limitations of my study. 
 
II. Summary 
My arguments are as follows: 1) if a government makes a coalition with capital-
intensive industry and/or organized labor, politicians are less likely to delegate 
independent authority to central bankers; and 2) if a government forms a coalition with 
the financial sector, agriculture, and/or small and medium-sized enterprises, politicians 
are more likely to delegate independent authority to central bankers.  
 Chapter 2 compared Korea and Taiwan as the main cases, since the two nations 
share many similarities in comparative perspective: Confucianism, experience of 
Japanese colonialism, strong bureaucracies, strong states, their existence as divided 
nation-states, export-oriented open economies, democratic transitions, successful land 
reforms, and their subordinate relationships with the U.S. since World War II.  
 The KMT government in Taiwan learned the political importance of 
macroeconomic stability from its historical trauma (i.e., defeat on the mainland China). 
As the “balanced-growth-with-stability” strategy proved successful in the 1950s, the 
KMT leadership established the Central Bank of China, which has overseen industrial 
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development up to the present day. The KMT’s anti-private capitalist ideology and 
Minsheng principle also contributed to including various sectors like farmers, SMEs, 
SOE employers, and workers into a loose yet broad developmental coalition. Taiwan is a 
case of a broad developmental coalition between a pseudo-mass party, the KMT, and 
social sectors, which I expect to contribute to a strong and independent central banking 
system. 
 In contrast, Park’s authoritarian regime suffered from a lack of democratic 
legitimacy. The government thus pushed economic development as its legitimatization 
vehicle. Furthermore, the government was subject to a short time horizon: it had to prove 
its economic capacity to the public before the next election. Thus the government 
employed the “economy of scale” strategy. It chose a few big businessmen as its 
industrializing agents, and funneled to the manufacturing sector tremendous financial 
resources in the form of policy loans. Those conditions contributed to the growth-first 
drive at the costs of macroeconomic and financial instability, which led to dependent 
central bankers subject to political pressure. 
 Chapter 3 compared various social groups in the two countries. The Korean 
industrialization heavily depended on chaebols, while discriminating against SMEs and 
subordinating them to the big firms. In contrast, the Nationalist government supported 
SMEs that were actually the economic engine of the Taiwanese economy. The 
government discouraged the development of a big bourgeoisie and, instead, fostered 
SOEs under its jurisdiction in order to politically survive on the island. 
 The banking sector, the most effective pro-CBI group, was repressed by the state 
in Korea to mobilize cheap industrial funds to chaebols that were participating in the HCI 
project. The inflation-averse financial sector was actually transformed into a risk-taker 
that was ready to tolerate macroeconomic instability and financial debts, since the 
developmental government usually intervened in banking crises to guarantee bailouts to 
commercial banks, turn bad loans into equity, and reschedule repayment terms for debt-
ridden big firms. In contrast, the banking sector in Taiwan was controlled by a 
government that was characterized by fiscal, financial, and monetary conservatism, 
which contributed to private bankers staying clear of massive industrial financing. Savers 
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and financiers in Taiwan gained more benefits compared to those in Korea, where several 
bailout episodes occurred in 1969-70, 1972, 1979-80, 1986-88, and 1997-8. 
Farmers in Korea were almost discriminated against due to a city-first economic 
growth strategy. In contrast, the Taiwanese farmers had a better chance to run their 
businesses thanks to the rural-to-urban economic transition and dispersion of SMEs in 
rural communities. 
 Both countries politically demobilized and disorganized industrial workers during 
their economic miracles, although levels of material compensation for their political 
losses were totally different. Taiwanese workers were given relatively more material 
benefits in exchange for the political quietism compared to their Korean counterparts in 
terms of working hours, unemployment rates, wage differentials, and compensation for 
occupational injuries. 
 Chapter 4 argued that the KMT government’s broad and balanced social bases 
resulted in an independent central banking system, while Korea’s narrow and chaebol-
based political economy led to a dependent central bank vis-à-vis the financial arms of 
the government. The Park government held the central bankers on a tight leash in order to 
squeeze industrial financing out of their safes. So the Bank of Korea relegated to the 
MOF’s a “rubber stamp” for their expansionist developmental scheme. Central bankers 
were incapable of managing inflation within low limits, while extending lavish industrial 
credits to chaebols. Furthermore, the “outside branch” of the MOF could not regulate and 
supervise the non-bank financial community, which led Korea into the Asian crisis in late 
1997. 
 The KMT government put top priority on monetary stability. The KMT 
government fully supported the central bankers’ autonomy from spending and planning 
agencies, and their power to oversee the macroeconomic policy. They were successful in 
maintaining low inflation and supervising their financial community, which contributed 
to the Taiwanese economy’s survival of the Asian financial crisis. 
 Chapter 5 addressed the generalizeability of my arguments by exploring 
additional cases in Southeast Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Singaporean 
case approaches the Taiwan model in terms of the political coalition partners. Facing 
ostracism by Malaysia, the PAP leadership chose an economic development strategy by 
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which the tiny entrepôt-state could survive national and economic insecurity. They made 
serious efforts to keep monetary and financial stability to attract foreign financiers and 
investors to the entrepôt. The PAP government incorporated various groups such as 
workers, bankers, and industrialists into a balanced coalition, which contributed to the 
autonomous and effective MAS with institutional support from the MOF. 
 The UMNO government approaches the Korean model in terms of the industrial 
financing that was critical for its political survival in an ethnically diverse society. By 
funneling massive financial resources to the indigenous industrialists, the Malay 
government fostered the development of the Bumiputera class to offset the economic 
power of ethnic Chinese. In contrast to my expectations, this ethnically motivated 
industrial financing did not lead to a high turnover rate of governorship, mainly due to the 
BNM’s foreign devolution of its own sovereign monetary authority to Singapore. Malay 
central bankers’ monetary performance has been good, although they lacked the political 
will to regulate and supervise special and development banks which were financial pillars 
of the UMNO government’s developmental scheme. In sum, the Malay central bank 
registers a partial central banking regime, in the sense that it exercised independent 
authority in the monetary area but not in the financial regulation and supervision areas. 
 Commercial bankers in Bangkok were the major sources of the national wealth in 
Thailand. Since inflation is a bête noire of commercial banks, the central bankers in 
Bangkok were good at maintaining low and stable price levels. But, as capital accounts 
were liberalized after the 1980s, the “finance capital” was active in attracting short-term 
foreign loans through the channel of the BIBF. Furthermore, bankers were so powerful in 
lobbying the government, the Thai central bankers could not intervene to regulate and 
supervise their financial businesses. 
 In chapter 6, by using statistical analyses of developing countries, I found that the 
financial sector is a robust and consistent pro-CBI group, whereas capital-intensive 
industry is a strong and consistent anti-CBI group. But those sectors in the middle of the 
preference spectrum (i.e., small and medium-sized industry, labor, and farmers) have 
weak and fuzzy preferences toward the CBI, which results in inconsistent and/or 
insignificant regression coefficients in my equations.  
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What are their preferences for central bankers’ financial supervision? I tested the 
correlation coefficients between the central bank’s supervisory power and the strength of 
various social groups. I found that the social groups have the same preferences as they 
have toward central bank independence. The strength of capital-intensive industry is 
negatively correlated with central bank’s supervision, leading to financial fragility. The 
agricultural sector has a positive correlation coefficient. Light industry has a positive 
correlation, but weak correlation with central bank supervision. A caveat is that the 
financial sector shows an insignificant correlation coefficient with central bank 
supervision. This suggests that the sector might be reluctant to be supervised by the 
central bank. 
 
III. Contributions, Implications, and Limitations. 
 My study emphasizes the importance of central banks especially in a globalization 
era. The literature of the Asian crisis tends to pay too much attention to mobile capital’s 
speculative attacks on the region, management of foreign exchanges, government – 
business relations, and impacts of short-term loans, highly leveraged big firms, financial 
panic and contagion, and overdeveloped NBFIs, etc. It is, however, rare for scholars to 
focus on the “control tower,” central banks in the region.  
 On the other hand, my study takes on a “fundamentalist” approach to the CBI. I 
emphasize politicians’ choice of coalition partners and its impact on the central banker’s 
independence. The literature of the central banking system tends to posit voluntaristic 
arguments, but I argue that a central bank’s authority is more deep-rooted in and 
dependent on the domestic coalition-making among capital-intensive industries, the 
financial sector, agriculture and farmers, workers, and SMEs/light industry. My study 
implies that if there are no serious efforts to realign the coalitional arrangement, the mere 
change of a central banking charter and relevant financial laws does not guarantee an 
autonomous central bank and prudential financial regime.  
 The literature on CBI tends to focus on stereotyped variables like the legal 
stipulations of a central bank charter and turnover of governors. My study goes beyond 
that. By comparing different levels of CBI in Asian countries, I explore 1) how political 
elites see central bankers when they start an economic growth plan; 2) the power 
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relationships between central bankers and the MOF officials; 3) and how the central 
bankers’ varying levels of independence translates to different qualities of performance 
such as inflation management and prudential financial regimes.  
 My research especially brings up the issue of central bankers’ financial 
supervisory authority in determining the CBI of the five countries that my study covers. 
Throughout the chapters, I examine how much power central bankers actually command 
in terms of financial supervisory functions as well as macroeconomic management.  
Although monetary and financial policies are different from each other, I consider 
both aspects at the same time, because these two policy areas are critical to central bank 
independence. This is clear in the “consistent cases” of Korea (i.e., poor monetary and 
financial management) and Taiwan (good monetary and financial management). 
Furthermore, by observing both areas at the same time, I find that there are two ways for 
governmental elites to control central bankers. One is to repress both functions of a 
central bank as seen in Korea; the other is to support central bankers’ monetary authority 
but to repress their financial supervisory autonomy as seen in Malaysia and Thailand. 
Malay and Thai governments left monetary initiatives to their central bankers, but 
prevented central bankers from regulating and supervising the financial realm.  
In chapter 6, I test the correlations between the economic strength of various 
social groups and central bankers’ supervision. The analysis suggests that social groups’ 
preferences for the CBI were roughly the same as their preferences for central bank 
supervisory authority, although the financial sector’s preference is somewhat fuzzy and 
weak toward supervision. 
What are the implications of my study in a globalizing era that faces frequent 
worldwide financial problems? It suggests two conclusions. First, an effective economic 
system under an independent central bank will be facilitated by the “political integration” 
of subordinate groups that receive little attention in conservative economic ideology. My 
study suggests that the “inclusion of diverse groups whose interests partially conflict with 
those of businesses in the institutionalized network that bind state and society” (Evans 
1997: 83) creates strong pressures for economic transparency as well as prudential 
financial/monetary regimes. 
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The traditional objection to incorporating subordinate groups such as labor, 
farmers, and SMEs into socio-economic coalitions is that they will become a dreaded 
“distributional coalition.” Neoliberals argue that if a government is trapped in the 
distributional ideology, it will exhaust sources of national wealth in the near future. My 
study suggests that this is not necessarily the case.  
The second implication is that the state matters. The neoliberal idea of financial 
liberalization in developing countries often connotes that the state needs to withdraw 
from the market and let it function by itself. My study suggests that emerging capital 
markets in developing countries can stave off the malfunctions of financial liberalization 
by setting up prudential regulatory regimes controlled by central bankers.35 In this sense, 
the “central bank can be seen as the repository of reason against the short-term claims of 
passion” (Elster 1979: 89). State responsibility for financial transactions within and 
across borders is still important for economic performance, as opposed to the free-
wheeling globalization drive encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s. 
And the disciplinary capacity of the state matters. Financial liberalization and 
globalization need to be sought through re-regulation rather than de-regulation. The 
central bank can make the process more effective and prudential. 
 Although my study may contribute to the literature by inserting information about 
the supervisory function into the traditional definition of the CBI, I did not examine 
whether the central bank should be a bank supervisor. Instead, an independent 
supervision agency other than monetary authorities might provide effective supervision. 
There are intense debates about this very issue (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2002). 
 Basically, my study divides the social groups/interests along sectoral cleavages, 
following a “specific-factors approach.” There are, however, other possible dividing lines 
along which various socio-economic groups can coalesce to get the most from lobbying 
the government. For example, economic changes in trade, prices in general, and foreign 
exchanges may cause social actors to line up along the lines of tradables / nontradables, 
import substitution / exports, and factor endowments (i.e., labor, land, and capital). In 
 
35 As some countries recently set up financial supervisory agencies independent from both central bankers 
and the finance ministries, there are still debates about whether or not central bankers have to control the 
financial supervisory function in their jurisdiction.  
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other words, sectoral groups not the only grouping principle that explains socio-economic 
interest organization.  
 Other limitations of my study include that 1) I did not develop a hypothesis about 
the effects of a coalition between industrialists and commercial bankers; 2) I did not 




Tables and Figures 
Table 3-1: Chaebols’ Share (%) of GDP in the Manufacturing Sector in Korea  
Chaebols 1973 1975 1978 1984-5 
Top 5 8.8 12.6 18.4 45.0* 
Top 10 13.9 18.9 23.4 - 
Top 20 21.8 28.9 33.2 - 
Top 50 - - - 80.0 
Source: Koo (1984: 1032) 
* Figure for top 4 chaebols 
 
Table 3-2: 100 Largest Firms’ Share of GNP in Taiwan (in percentage) 
Year 1973 1974 1977 1979 1981 1983 
% of GNP 34.0 29.5 29.1 32.8 30.0 31.7 
% of employees 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.7 
Source: Chunghua Weihsinso (1992 and 1993) 
 
Table 3-3: Ten Largest Companies in Korea and Taiwan, 1987 
country Rank/company main industry Sales* employees Ownership 
1) Samsung Electronics 21,053.5 160,596 Local private 
2) LG Electronics 14,422.3 88,403 Local private 
3) Daewoo Electronics 13,437.9 94,888 Local private 
4) SK Petroleum 6,781.6 17,985 Local private 
5) Ssangyong Petroleum 4,582.7 16,870 Local private 
6) Korea Explosives Chemicals 3,563.8 18,291 Local private 
7) Pohang Iron & Steel Iron and steel 3,533.2 19,329 State 
8) Hyundai Motor Motor vehicles 3,437.4 29,000 Local private 
9) Hyosung Textile 3,257.8 24,000 Local private 
Korea 




2,964.5 48,200 Local private 
1) Chinese Petroleum Petrochemicals 5,491.0 20,700 State 
2) Taiwan Tobacco &  
 Wine 
Food & beverage 2,277.1 13,495 State 
3) Nan Ya Plastics Petrochemicals 1,423.7 11,883 Local private 
4) China Steel Steel 1,287.8 9,476 State 
5) Formosa Plastics Petrochemicals 946.8 5,352 Local private 
6) Ret-Ser Engineering Construction 852.0 13,358 State 
7) Tatung Electronics 836.2 14,139 Local private 




702.9 8,377 Local private 
9) Yue Loong Motor Motor vehicles 687.4 3,782 Local private 
Taiwan 
10) San Yang Industry Motor vehicles 600.9 3,637 Local private 
Source: Fortune (August 1988); Common Wealth (July 1988) 
* U.S.$ millions 
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Table 3-4: Cross-National Share* of SOEs in Nonagricultural GDP 
Country/region 1968-1971 
18 Latin American & Caribbean economies 11.6 
14 African economies 17.1 
8 Asian economies 10.9 




Taiwan (1950s-60s) 21 
Taiwan (1980s-90s) 14-17 
Source: Hsueh, Li-min, Chen-Kuo Hsu, and Dwight H. Perkins (2001: 106) 
* figures are unweighted averages in percent 
 
Table 3-5: Cross-National GDP shares of the Ten Largest Firms, 1987 (US$ millions) 
country Sales of top ten firms (A) GDP (B) Ratio (A/B) 
Mexico 20,917.8 141,940 14.7 
Brazil 31,312.5 299,230 10.5 
Korea 77,034.7 121,310 63.5 
Taiwan 15,105.8 105,750 14.3 
Source: Gereffi (1990: 96) 
 
Table 3-6: World’s Biggest 500 Industrial Corporations, 1988 (sales in US$ million). 
country 1-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 Total 
Argentina 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Brazil 1 1 0 2 1 5 
Chile 0 0 1 0 0 1 
India 1 0 3 2 1 7 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Malaysia 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Mexico 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Korea 3 3 3 1 1 11 
Spain 2 0 3 1 2 8 
Taiwan 0 1 0 0 3 4 
Turkey 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Venezuela 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Source: Fortune (July 31, 1989: 290-299) 
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Table 3-7: Profitability of Manufacturing firms in Korea and Taiwan, 1987-1997 
year  1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 avrg* 
A 10.71 6.42 5.62 4.22 11.03 -4.21 7.22Korea 
B 3.58 2.50 1.78 1.70 3.60 -0.34 2.64
A 23.65 17.89 11.92 8.67 10.17 n.a. 13.76Taiwan 
B 5.8 5.00 4.0 2.9 5.1 n.a. 4.38
Source: The Bank of Korea (1987-97) 
A: profit / asset; B: profit / sales 
* average between 1987 and 1995  
 
Table 3-8: SMEs’ Share of Export in Korea and Taiwan, 1981-1988 (US$ hundred 
millions)  
Korea Taiwan Year 








1981 n.a. n.a. n.a. 226.0 153.9 68.1 
1982 218.5 48.2 22.1 222.0 154.7 69.7 
1983 244.5 48.9 20.0 251.2 159.3 63.4 
1984 292.4 74.4 25.4 304.6 180.5 59.2 
1985 302.3 84.1 27.8 307.2 188.0 61.2 
1986 347.1 122.3 35.2 390.9 264.1 67.6 
1987 472.3 178.1 37.7 535.3 359.0 67.1 
1988 606.9 231.5 38.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Abe and Kawakami (1996: 164) 
 
Table 3-9: Country Breakdown of Banks in Top 200 Asian Survey. 








Australia 15 324,928 18.96 0.99 3.0
China 5 418,807 21.00 1.19 8.0
Hong Kong 19 193,899 na na 6.5
India 22 137,611 9.77 0.29 na
Indonesia 18 70,458 21.10 1.11 na
Korea 29 310,152 7.84 0.52 5.0
Malaysia 16 39,929 17,47 1.01 6.0
New Zealand 3 16,897 3.04 0.13 4.0
Philippines 16 15,351 27.14 3.14 na
Singapore 6 55,665 4.57 0.43 3.5
Taiwan 18 222,736 29.52 1.09 3.0
Thailand 16 75,146 19.90 1.21 5.7
Source: The Banker (October 1991) 
* the highest score is 1, the lowest 10. The lower, the better. 
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Table 3-10: Allocation of U.S. Aid to Taiwan and Korea, 1950s-60s (percentage of total). 
 Taiwan  Korea  
Infrastructure 37.3 50 
Agriculture 21.5 4 
Human resources 25.9 10 
Industry 15.3 29 
other 0 7 
Source: Jacoby (1966: tables IV-3 and IV-4, and appendix B); Mason et al. (1980: 191) 
 
Table 3-11) Breakdown of Manufacturing Firms in Korea and Taiwan (in percentage) 
Korea (1988) Taiwan (1991) no. of 
employees A B C D A B C D
1~ 9 77 11.6 5.3 3.5 65.7 14.8 11.4 8.1 
10~49 17.3 20.8 16.5 13.2 28.1 31.5 26.1 22.6 
50~99 3 11.5 10.5 9 3.7 13.9 13.1 12.9 
100~499 2.3 24.1 25.2 25 2.3 24.3 27.7 29.5 
500~ 0.4 32.1 42.5 48 0.3 15.6 21.8 26.8 
Source: Abe and Kawakami (1996: 150-151)
A: number of firms (in percentage of total firms) 




Table 3-12: Industrial Disputes in Korea and Taiwan, 1961-2000 
Korea Taiwan years 
A B C A B C
1961-65 53 10313 195 27 1107 41 
1966-70 12 16591 1383 12.6 1689 134 
1971-75 24 6739 281 318 13200 42 
1976-80 104 17674 170 492 7600 15 
1981-85 150 19951 133 1212 10600 9 
1986-87 2013 490900 244 1523 19427 13 
1988-90 1271 278878 220 1880 48240 26 
1991-95 164 108531 660 1929 24053 12 
1995-2000 148 107792 728 4308 57651 14 
Source: National Statistical Office (1995: 399); Ministry of Labor (1961-2000) 
A: average number of industrial disputes; 
B: average number of workers involved; 
C: average number of workers involved per dispute 
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Table 4-1: Change of Government, Regime Type, and BOK Governors in Korea 
President Regime BOK Governor Terms of office 
Rhee, Syngman semi-democratic Ku, Yong-So Jun.1950~Dec. 1951 
Kim, Yu-Taek  Dec. 1951~Dec. 1956 
Kim, Chin-Hyong Dec. 1956~May 1960 
Chang, Myon Democratic Bae, Ui-Hwan Jun.1960~Sep.1960 
Chun, Ye-Yong Sep.1960~May 1961 
Park, Chung Hee military Yu, Chang-Sun  May 1961~May 1962 
Min, Byung-Do  May 1962~Jun. 1963 
Lee, Chung-Hwan Jun. 1963~Dec. 1963 
Kim, Se-Ryon Dec.1963~Dec. 1967 
Seo, Chin-Su Dec.1967~May 1970 
Kim, Sung-Hwan May 1970~May 1978 
Chun, Doo Hwan military Shin, Byung-Hyon May 1978~Jul.1980 
Kim, Chun-Sung Jul.1980~Jan. 1982 
Ha, Young-Ki Jan. 1982~Oct. 1983 
Choi, Chang-Rak Oct.1983~Jan. 1986 
Park, Sung-Sang Jan. 1986~Mar. 1988 
Roh, Tae Woo semi-democratic Kim, Kun Mar. 1988~Mar. 1992 
Cho, Sun Mar. 1992~Mar. 1993 
Kim, Young Sam democratic Kim, Myong-Ho Mar. 1993~Aug. 1995 
Lee, Kyung-Sik Aug. 1995~Mar. 1998 
Kim, Dae Jung democratic Chun, Chul-Hwan Mar.1998~Mar. 2002 
Roh, Mu Hyun democratic Park, Sung Mar. 2002~ 
Source: The Bank of Korea (2000) 
 
Table 4-2: Loans and Investments of Financial Institutions (% of total credit) in Korea 
year Comm a special b develop c invest d savings e insurance securities
1970s 42.80 32.57 16.70 0.00 6.54 1.39 0.00 
1980s 37.75 23.23 15.34 7.42 9.00 3.85 3.41 
1990s 20.55 10.33 7.13 13.17 26.49 7.98 14.36 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years 
a commercial banks 
b specialized banks 
c development funds 
d investment companies 
e trust accounts at banks amounts to 6.54, 7.25, and 16.4 percent in each period. 
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Table 4-3: Chairmanship at the Financial Supervisory Service in Korea, 1998-2005. 
No. Name Terms of office Career & Background 
1 Lee, Hyun-Jae Mar.1998~Jan.2000 MOFE minister 
2 Lee, Yong-Keun Jan.2000~Aug.2001 Chairman of FSC and FSS 
3 Lee, Keun-Young Aug.2001~Mar.2003 MOFE official, private banks 
4 Lee, Jung-Jae Mar.2003~Aug.2004 Vice-minister of MOFE 
5 Yoon, Jeung-Hyun Aug.2004~ Director of MOFE 
Source: FSS websites, accessed July 15, 2005. 
http://www.fss.or.kr/kor/abu/ceo/wewonjang.jsp?menu=abu010200
http://www.fss.or.kr/kor/abu/ceo/ceohistory01.jsp?menu=abu010800
Table 4-4: Price Indexes During Wartime Period in Mainland China, 1938-1945 
Year Free China Chungking Chengtu Kangting 
1937 100 100 100 100
1938 131 126 128 137
1939 220 220 225 225
1940 513 569 665 587
1941 1,296 1,576 1,769 1,352
1942 3,900 4,408 4,559 4,388
1943 12,541 13,298 14,720 12,982
1944 43,197 43,050 56,965 49,229
1945 163,160 156,195 170,379 171,053
Source: Chang (1958: 371) 
 
Table 4-5: Government Finance in Mainland China, 1937-48 (in CNC $ millions) 
Year Expenditure Revenue Deficit 
1937 1,992 1,393 560
1938 2,215 723 1,492
1939 2,797 740 2,057
1940 5,288 1,325 3,963
1941 10,003 1,310 8,693
1942 24,511 5,630 18,881
1943 58,816 20,403 38,413
1944 171,689 38,503 133,186
1945 2,348,085 1,241,389 1,106,698
1946 7,574,790 2,876,988 4,697,802
1947 43,393,895 14,064,383 29,329,512
1948 655,471,087 220,905,475 434,565,612
Source: Chang (1958: 374). 
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Table 4-6: The CBC Governors on the Mainland 
CBC governors Terms of Offfice 
Tse-wen Sung Oct. 1928 ~ Apr. 1933 
Hsiang-hsi Kung Apr. 1933 ~ Jul. 1945 
Hung-Chun Yu Jul. 1945 ~ Feb. 1946 
Tsu-yi Pei Feb. 1946 ~ Mar. 1947 
Chia-ao Chang Mar. 1947 ~ May 1948 
Hung-chun Yu May 1948 ~ Jan. 1949 
Kung-yun Liu Jan. 1949 ~ Jun. 1949 
Kan Hsu  Jun. 1949 ~ Oct. 1949 
Source: CBC (1996: 195) 
 
Table 4-7: The CBC Governors in Taiwan Prior to the Resumption of Operations  
CBC governors Terms of office 
Chi-yu Kuan Oct. 1949 ~ Feb. 1950 
Hung-Chun Yu Feb. 1950 ~ Jun. 1960 
Fei-perng Yu* Jun. 1960 ~ Jul. 1960 
Source: CBC (1996: 195) 
* deputy governor acted on behalf of the governor. 
 
Table 4-8: The CBC Governors in Taiwan After the Resumption of Operations 
CBC governors Terms of office 
Po-yuan Hsu Jul. 1960 ~ May 1969 
Kuo-hwa Yu May 1969 ~ May 1984 
Chi-cheng Chang  Jun. 1984 ~ May 1989 
Samuel C. Shieh Jun. 1989 ~ May 1994 
Kuo-shu Liang* June 1994 ~ Mar. 1995 
Yuan-dong Sheu** Mar. 1995 ~ Feb. 1998 
Fai-nan Perng Feb. 1998 ~ Present  
Source: CBC (1996: 196-9). 
*) Liang was out of office due to an accident. Interview of a legislator, summer of 2003, 
Taipei, Taiwan. 
**) Sheu was out of office due to his poor performance as a governor, interview of a 
legislator, summer of 2003, Taipei, Taiwan 
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Table 4-9: Loans and Investments of Financial Institutions  in Taiwan, 1961-2001. 
Institutions 1961 1970 1980 1990 2001 
Full-service banks 82.0 76.4 67.5 68.3 84.0* 
Foreign banks 0.4 3.1 7.6 3.7 3.0 
SME banks 3.8 4.9 4.8 10.0 n.a. 
Credit co-ops 7.1 7.1 7.0 9.2 2.5 
Credit department** 4.7 4.4 4.7 6.3 3.9 
Investment & trust 
companies 
1.6 1.9 6.3 6.0 1.0 
Postal savings 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 n.a. 
Insurance companies 0.3 0.7 1.8 5.5 5.5 
Total 100 100 100 100  
Source: MOF (1975, 1990); CBC (2003). 
* Full-service banks’ share includes SME banks’ share in 2001 statistics. 
** Credit departments of farmers’ and fishermen’s associations. 
 
Table 5-1: MAS chairmen and their terms of office in Singapore 
MAS chairmen Terms of office 
Hon Sui Sen Jan. 1971 ~ Jul. 1980  
Goh Keng Swee Aug. 1980 ~ Jan. 1985 
Richard Hu Jan. 1985 ~ Dec. 1997 
Lee Hsien Loong Jan. 1998 ~ Aug. 2004 
Goh Chok Tong Aug. 2004 ~  
Source: MAS (http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Introduction_to_MAS.htm).  
accessed August 29, 2005. 
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Table 5-2: Governors of The Bank of Thailand, 1942 ~ 2005 
 governors regime Period in office 
1 H.H. Prince Vivadhanajaya Military Nov. 1942 ~ Oct. 1946 
2 Serm Vinicchayakul Democratic Oct. 1946 ~ Nov. 1947 
3 Leng Srisomwongse Military Nov. 1947 ~ Sep. 1948 
4 H.H. Prince Vivadhanajaya Military Sep. 1948 ~ Dec. 1948 
5 Leng Srisomwongse Military Dec. 1948 ~ Aug. 1949 
6 Dej Snidvongs Military Aug. 1949 ~ Feb. 1952 
7 Serm Vinicchayakul Military Feb. 1952 ~ Jul. 1955 
8 Kasem Sriphayak Military Jul. 1955 ~ Jul 1958 
9 Jote Guna-Kasem Military Jul 1958 ~ May 1959 
10 Puey Ungphakorn Military Jun. 1959 ~ Aug. 1971 
11 Bisudhi Nimmanhaemin Democratic Aug. 1971 ~ May 1975 
12 Snoh unakul Democratic May 1975 ~ Oct. 1979 
13 Nukul Prachuabmoh Semi-Dem.  Nov. 1979 ~ Sep. 1984 
14 Kamchorn Sathirakul Semi-Dem. Sep. 1984 ~ Mar. 1990 
15 Chavalit Thanachanan Democratic Mar. 1990 ~ Sep. 1990 
16 Vijit Supinit Military Oct. 1990 ~ Jul. 1996 
17 Rerngchai Marakanond Democratic Jul. 1996 ~ Jul. 1997 
18 Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi Democratic Jul. 1997 ~ May 1998 
19 Chatu Mongol Sonakul Democratic May 1998 ~ May 2001 
20 Pridiyathorn Devakula Democratic May 2001 ~ Current 
Source: BOT (http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/BankAtWORK/AboutBOT/Or
ganize/ListOfGovernors_E.htm). accessed on Jun. 28, 2005.  
 
Table 5-3: Average Governor Turnover Per Year, 1961-2001 
periods Singapore Taiwan Thailand Korea 
1961 – 1970 n/a 0.1 0.0 0.6 
1971 – 1980 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1b
1981 – 1990 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
1991 – 2001 0.1 0.27a 0.45 0.5 
Source: the author’s calculation based on four countries’ central bank websites. 
a The slight increase of turnover rate is due to unexpected deaths of Kuo-shu Liang from 
a chronic disease in 1995, and of Yung-dong Sheu from a airplane crash in 1998. 
interview with a legislator of the People First Party, summer 2003, Taipei Taiwan. 
b The low TOR is due to the fact that the 11th governor Kim Sung-Hwan (1970 – 1978) 
has a reputation of obedience to the MOF.  
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Table 5-4: Indices for Quality of Financial Supervision for 5 Asian Countries. 
Index Taiwan Singapore Malaysia Korea Thailand
Sum of indices 7 6 5 3 1 
Disclosure of risk management a 1 1 0 0 0
Supervisors’ action without bank 
approval b
0 1 1 0 0
Requirement for auditor to report 
c
1 1 1 0 0
Supervisors’ legal action against 
auditors’ negligence d
0 1 1 0 0
Supervisors’ power to change a 
bank’s organization e
1 0 1 0 0
Credit ratings of bank f 1 0 0 0 0
Liability of supervisors to their 
action g
1 1 1 1 0
Explicit deposit insurance 
scheme h
1 0 0 1 0
Minimum liquidity requirement i 1 0 0 0 1
# of supervisors per institution j 0 1 0 1 0
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001)  
a “Must banks disclose risk management procedures to public?”: yes=1; no=0 
b “Can supervisors meet external auditors to discuss report without bank approval?”: 
yes=1; no=0. 
c “Are auditors legally required to report misconduct by managers and directors to  
 supervisory agency?”: yes=1; no=0 
d “Can legal action against external auditors be taken by supervisor for negligence?”: 
yes=1; no=0 
e “Can supervisors force banks to change internal organizational structure?”: yes=1; 
no=0 
f “Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks?”: yes=1; no=0. 
g “Are supervisors legally liable for their actions?”: yes=0; no=1. 
h “Is there an explicit deposit insurance scheme?”: yes=1; no=0. 
i “What is the minimum liquidity requirement?”: above avrg=1; below avrg=0. 
j “What is the number of professional bank supervisors per institution?”: above 
avrg=1; below avrg=0. 
 
Table 5-5: Interest Rate Spread, 1977-2001 
Country average 77-80 81-84 84-87 88-91 92-95 96-99 00-01 
Korea 0.54 -1.5 1.95 0.210 0.34 0.04 1.46 1.26 
Singapore 3.06 2.36 2.86 2.954 2.97 2.98 3.16 4.12 
Thailand 3.30 3.68 3.67 2.932 2.18 2.48 3.55 4.62 
Malaysia 2.26 2.15 0.69 3.31 2.17 1.93 2.21 3.35 
Source: World Bank (2003) 
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Table 5-6: The BNM governors and their terms of office, 1959-2005 
governor Terms of office 
Tan Sri W.H.Wilcock Jan.1959 ~ Jul. 1962 
Tun Ismail bin Mohamed Ali Jul. 1962 ~ Jul. 1980 
Tan Sri Abdul Aziz bin Taha Jul. 1980 ~ Jun. 1985 
Tan Sri Dato’ Jaffar bin Hussein Jun. 1985 ~ May 1994 
Tan Sri Dato’ Ahmad Bin Mohd Don May 1994 ~ Sep. 1998  
Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Ali Abul Hassan bin Sulaiman Sep. 1998 ~ Apr. 2000 
Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz May 2000 ~  
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=7&pg=2&ac=5). 
accessed on June 4, 2005. 
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Table 6-1: Determinants of Behavioral CBI in Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = behavioral CBI 
























COUNTER     0.0051*** 
(.0014) 
 













































































R2 0.7415 0.5863 0.5219 0.5887 0.5093 0.6139 
N 26 30 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6-2: Determinants of Overall CBI in Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = overall CBI 
























COUNTER     0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
 













































































R2 0.6054 0.4753 0.4530 0.4703 0.3835 0.4810 
N 26 30 30 30 30 30 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Star (*) were added for correlation coefficients significant at the 0.1 level or better. 
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Table 6-4: Principal Components Analysis of Capital-Intensive Industry and Behavioral 
CBI in Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = behavioral CBI 







































































R2 0.6255 0.4766 0.6170 0.7001 
N 25 30 24 24 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6-5: Principal Components Analysis: Capital-Intensive Industry and Overall CBI in 
Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = overall CBI 







































































R2 0.4501 0.4377 0.5539 0.6049 
N 25 30 24 24 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6-6: Principal Components Analysis of Non-HEAVY Industry and Behavioral CBI 
in Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = behavioral CBI 



































INFLA  -0.0301** 
(0.0133) 
R2 0.4784 0.5937 
N 31 30 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6-7: Principal Components Analysis: Non-HEAVY Industry and Overall CBI in 
Developing Countries during the 1980s 
Dependent variable = overall CBI 



































INFLA  -0.0088** 
(0.0033) 
R2 0.2566 0.4452 
N 31 30 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 6-8: Measurement of Variables 
variables Measurement 
CBSUPWR a Stands for central bankers’ independent power to supervise.  
= FINSUP+FINACC 
FINSUP a = 2, if a central bank is single supervisor. 
=1, if a central bank shares supervision with other agencies. 
= 0, if a finance ministry is the supervisor. 
FINACC a = 1, if a central bank is accountable to no agency or its own governor. 
=0, if a central bank is accountable to a government agency. 
PRINFINFRAG 
a b
Stand for financial fragility and vulnerability. 
Value gained by principal component method using logged NPL, level 
of non-liquidity, and M2fx.  
NPL a Ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 
NONLIQUID a non-liquidity (=100-liquidity) 
M2FX b Ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to gross international reserves 
AGRI b Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
FINPWR a b (universal-fractionalization+concentration)*m2/GDPc
CIIFIXED b Stands for capital-intensive sector. 
Credits to private sector x fixed capital formation as % of GDP. 
LIGHT b Stands for SME sector. 
5 sectors (food, beverage, tobacco, textile, clothing) as % of value 
added in manufacturing 
GOVOWN a Stands for a government’s control of banking sector. 
% of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more 
government owned.  
SHTRMDET b Short-term debt (% of total external debt) 
INFLA b Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
INSUREa =1, if a country has a deposit insurance scheme, 
=0, if a country does not have a deposit insurance scheme. 
Source: a James Barth et al. Database, 2001 
 b World Bank, WDI CD-ROM, 2003 
 c available from the text of the current chapter. 
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Table 6-9: Correlation of Social Interests with Supervisory Power and Financial Fragility  
variable CBSUPWR PRINFRAG 
CBSUPWR 1.0000 -0.2815** 
PRINFRAG -0.2815** 1.000 
AGRI 0.2859** -0.4207*** 
FINPWR 0.0207 0.2257 
CIIFIXED -0.2374* 0.3964*** 
LIGHT 0.2293 -0.2194 
GOVTOWN 0.0452 -0.2026 
SHTRMDET 0.0370 0.3961*** 
INFLA -0.2220* -0.1134 
INSURE -0.2532** 0.0660 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Figure 1-1: The Spectrum of Groups’ Preferences for Macroeconomic Instability 
Capital-intensive 
industry 
Organized labor SMEs and farmers finance 
← pro-growth; less stability-oriented            pro-stability; less growth-oriented →























Source: World Bank (2003); National Statistical Office (1995); Republic of China (1984,  
1990, 1997a); Republic of China (1990, 1997b) 
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Source: World Bank (2003); National Statistical Office (1995); Republic of China (1984,  
1990, 1997a); Republic of China (1990, 1997b) 
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Source: World Bank (2003); National Statistical Office (1995); Republic of China (1984,  
1990, 1997a); Republic of China (1990, 1997b) 
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Source: World Bank (2003); National Statistical Office (1995); Republic of China (1984,  
1990, 1997a); Republic of China (1990, 1997b) 
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Source: Anderson and Hayami (1986: 130-4) 
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Source: ILO (1980, 1990, 2000); National Statistical Office (1995); Executive Yuan  
(1980, 1987, 1997) 
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Source: National Statistical Office (1995: 399); Ministry of Labor (1970, 1980, 1993,  
2000); Republic of China (1984, 1990, 1997a) 
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Source: National Statistical Office (1995: 383-4); Republic of China (1980, 1991) 
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Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html),  
accessed May 16, 2005. 
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Source: National Statistical Office, Statistics Korea (1995: 373); World Bank (2003);  
Republic of China (1970, 1980, 1990, 2003). 
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Source: ILO (1980. 1990. 2000. 2003); National Statistical Office (1995; 393);  
Occupational Safety & Health Agency (http://www.kosha.net/kosha/index.jsp), 
accessed June 15, 2005. 
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Source: World Bank (1993); Republic of China (1969, 1984, 1990, 1997a) 
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Source: email interview with CBC and FSS, July 2005. 
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Source: World Bank (2003); Republic of China (1969, 1984, 1990, 1997a) 
* GSUS is taken from average of inflation rates in Germany, Switzerland, and the 
U.S. 
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Source: World Bank (2003) 
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Source: World Bank (2003). 
GSUS stands for Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S. 
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Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine database (2001) 
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Source: Phongpaichit and Baker (1995: 338) 
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Source: Phongpaichit and Baker (1995: 339) 
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Source: World Bank (2003) 
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Source: World Bank (2003). 
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Source: Gomez and Jomo (1997: 31) 
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Source: World Bank (2003) 
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